


THE PARCHMENT OF KASHMIR

History, Society, and Polity



Edited by
NYLA ALI KHAN



THE PARCHMENT OF KASHMIR

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Islam, Women, and the Violence in Kashmir: Between India and Pakistan
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
The Fiction of Nationality in an Era of Transnationalism (2005)

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HISTORY, SOCIETY, AND POLITY

Edited by
Nyla Ali Khan

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PREFACE

Parchment of Kashmir: History, Society, and Polity is a work conceived while I was putting the finishing touches on my second book, *Islam, Women, and Violence in Kashmir: Between India and Pakistan*. Working on a monograph on Kashmir while teaching literature at the University of Nebraska-Kearney and the University of Oklahoma, Norman, was stimulating, challenging, and very demanding. It was a long-awaited chance for me to reconnect with my native land; to reestablish emotional, intellectual, and spiritual ties with the land that is an integral part of my being, despite the physical and geographical severance. Writing about Kashmir while being in the diaspora gave me the resplendent chance to revisit the historical events, cultural and literary traditions, political awakenings, religious discourses, and identity politics of the past, some of which have spilled into the present in distorted, revisionist, reinterpreted, or statist forms. Working on the monograph made me realize that in order for my writings to disavow insulated elitist discourses, it was important to connect with indigenous scholars and intellectuals, based in the state of Jammu and Kashmir. It is they who had witnessed, suffered, grown, and been immersed in political, historical, religious, cultural, and social discourses and events that I could theorize, debate, and intellectually engage with, but lacked the visceral connections that their work could legitimately claim. And that was when I conceived the project of an interdisciplinary work in which I would ask scholars established in Jammu and Kashmir to contribute to a reader on Kashmir.

Given my professional and personal responsibilities, it has taken me several years to complete the manuscript of *Parchment* and to give it the shape I had envisioned a few years ago. I have the deepest admiration for my contributors for being forthcoming, intellectually astute, politically savvy, amenable to suggestions, responsive to my demands, and nurturing a visceral conviction about the resilience of Kashmir. *Parchment of Kashmir: History, Society, and Polity* is an attempt to shape a much needed discourse on Kashmir that might dismantle the status quo while underscoring the need to create democratic

spaces and revivify the much neglected role of civil society in the state.

I am grateful for the generosity of Mohammad Ishaq Khan, Rattan Lal Hangloo, M. H. Zaffar, Neerja Mattoo, Noor Ahmad Baba, Gull Mohammad Wani, Rekha Chowdhary, Bashir Ahmed Dabla, and Hameeda Naeem for sharing their rich and layered insights with me. The University of Oklahoma, Norman, has always provided me with a congenial and energizing atmosphere without which my work would have been more difficult. My mentors and colleagues at the University of Oklahoma have treated my work with an intellectual seriousness and given it recognition, which has encouraged me to work diligently. The finer details of this project would have been askew had it not been for the commendable work of the Computer Lab Manager in the Department of English, University of Oklahoma, Jack Day. My parents, Suraiya and Mohammad Ali Matto, with their reserved dignity, integrity, unassuming pride, and unabated love for Kashmir, have been role models for me. My daughter, Iman, tolerates her mother's idiosyncrasies with the patience of an angel and enlivens my days with her beatific smile. I thank my husband, Mohammad Faisal Khan, for appreciating the work that went into this project and for being by my side even when I was completely immersed in the completion of this book. The call of the mountains of Kashmir is never far from my mind. No tribute that I pay to Kashmir will do it justice. The land of my being and my dreams, *Kashir*, remains ever ungraspable, irrepressible, and unconquerable.

Nyla Ali Khan

INTRODUCTION

Nyla Ali Khan

There is a plethora of opinions on the political future of the conglomerate of Jammu and Kashmir. Is Jammu and Kashmir a principality? An autonomous unit within the Indian Union? An integral part of India? A subversive unit with the Indian Union? A bilateral issue between the nation-states of India and Pakistan? Is the mainstream Indian understanding and interpretation of the Kashmir conflict the only credible one? Is the mainstream Pakistani understanding and interpretation of the Kashmir issue the only credible one? Do the people of Kashmir have a voice in the matter? Is there a space within Kashmiri society in which the democratic aspirations of the populace of Kashmir could be nurtured? Is there a critical discourse on Kashmir that foregrounds the views of scholars and lay people from the state, even if that discourse is in opposition to the mainstream one?

These questions have been causing irrepressible angst in me for a while now. Can we break the silence? Can we bring the instability to an end, for our generation and the generations yet to be born? A large majority of the populace Jammu and Kashmir is troubled, dispossessed and mocked by the processes of democracy, by United Nations resolutions, by armed insurgency, by counter-insurgency, by militarization, and by revisionist histories. The people of the state are yearning for the right to dignity; the right to live decent existences devoid of bestial militarism; the right to work and enable their families to enjoy the basic necessities of life; the right to hold opinions of which others take cognizance; and the right to an existence in which brutalization, demoralization, trauma, and rage are a thing of the past. In addition to the denizens of Jammu and Kashmir, diasporic

Kashmiris also suffer from the indelible scars of having lost their homeland, and mourn a lost innocence.

In this Introduction, I am repeating several points made in my earlier book, *Islam, Women, and Violence in Kashmir: Between India and Pakistan*.¹ After reviewing the first edition of my book *Islam, Women, and Violence in Kashmir: Between India and Pakistan*, published in June 2009, several Kashmiri academics pointed out to me that autonomy was an inadequate solution to the Kashmir conflict. The intractability of the Kashmir conflict has made advocates of conflict resolution rather wary of applying a seemingly workable but facile solution to the complex political conflict. Mainstream media, intellectuals housed in academic institutions, formulators of public policy, and think-tanks are quick to point out that regardless of the bloody and seemingly infinite nature of a political, ethnic, or racial conflict, a viable solution can always be found to dilute the fierceness of a conflictual situation. But one is cautioned against glibly advocating a kitsch solution to the Kashmir conundrum by the complexity of the Kashmir conflict, which embodies the brutalities of nation building devoid of myth or self-infatuation.

Although the idea of self-determination collides with military oppression on the contentious site of nationalism, political accommodation can lead a war-weary people out of the prison of duplicitous rhetoric, political domination, and forceful imposition. The debate among political thinkers, scholars, and policy makers about finding viable ways to do justice to marginalized ethnic minorities in Jammu and Kashmir has seemed infinite. Which is the most viable solution to the Kashmir conflict?

Several questions were asked by the students in my Senior Seminar on World Literature at the University of Oklahoma in spring 2010 during the class discussion on Neerja Mattoo's translations of Kashmiri short stories *Stranger Beside Me*,² and at the Senior Seminar on Muslim Women's Memoirs, in fall 2011, while discussing women in conflict zones. "What is the political status of Kashmir?" "Can Kashmir exist as an autonomous enclave, the security of which is guaranteed by India and Pakistan?" "This might be a dumb question, but does Kashmir have credible politicians?" "If Kashmir is a nuclear flashpoint, why are most Americans unaware of the complexity of the Kashmir issue?" "Does Kashmir have fields of gold and mountains of silver?" "Are you familiar with the Led Zeppelin song, 'Kashmir'?" "Are any women in positions of decision making in that part of the world?" "Is the exotic description of Kashmir in novels, poems, and travelogues an attempt to dehistoricize and decontextualize the region and its people?" "How is the reductive portrayal of

Kashmir as a romantic and exotic locale going to make the primarily Western readership of, for example, some short stories on Kashmir and Salman Rushdie's *Haroun and the Sea of Stories*³ aware of the political upheaval in the region?" "Why are we talking about political allegory?" "Is there an inextricable link between pedagogy and politics?" "Why can't the intelligentsia in Kashmir and diasporic Kashmiri intellectuals forge a coalition to come up with feasible solutions to the conundrum?"

I have always enjoyed teaching the short stories in *Stranger Beside Me* because some of the stories represent the mythical beauty of Kashmir, on the one hand, and the stultifying atmosphere created by murky politics, on the other. Before getting my students to do a close reading of the stories, I explained the historical backdrop of the Kashmir conflict; the political situations and maneuvers orchestrated by the two nation-states of India and Pakistan; the onset of the armed insurgency in Jammu and Kashmir in 1989; the simmering resentment, rage, and alienation of the people of Kashmir that added fuel to the insurgency; the unpopularity of formerly populist leaders whom the masses no longer deemed genuine representatives; the nostalgia of expatriate Kashmiris who had been uprooted, dislocated, and dispossessed; the trauma generated by the loss of innocence in a militarized culture; the exclusionary discourse of Indian nationalism, which over the years has subsumed the discourse of *Kashmiriyat* or a unitary Kashmiri nationalist identity within it; and the erosion of cultural myths, legends, and folklore upon which the edifice of Kashmiri society is built. My students had been unaware of the political swamp in Kashmir prior to our discussion; therefore, it was encouraging to hear them make intelligent comments about world views other than Western-centric ones: about issues of sovereignty, legitimacy of statehood, representative nature of democracy or lack thereof, discourse of human rights and the bounden duty of international powers to protect fundamental rights in politically conflictual environments, pluralism as an antidote to the orthodoxy of ethnocentric politics, the construction of identity politics, and the implosion of the boundary between state and religion.

The issues that my students came up with can be summarized in the following way: the intricate relationship between the political and cultural power that emanates from metropolitan centers and the peripheral territories in which it manifests itself requires the formation of cultural practices that sustain the persistent disparity in power between the center and the "peripheral world." This observation helps answer persistent questions. Is the effective political sovereignty of India over Kashmir achieved by force, by political collaboration,

or by economic, social, or cultural dependence? Does the political sovereignty of India over Kashmir exist in its most potent manifestation in ideological and cultural practices? After delving into the role of discourse in constructions of identities and subjectivities for a long time, I have found that dominant political powers use “discourse”—political, militaristic, gender, religious, and cultural—to disseminate the values that mold the ethnic and cultural identities of the dominated as well as the dominator. The strategy of fortifying domination with structures of knowledge creates an unbridgeable gulf between the “center” and the “margin.”

Let me generalize using the language of postcolonial theory. The totalizing form of the discourse of the center, and its overpowering impulse to exclude, repress, and incorporate threatening forces, generate a dichotomy between the center and its peripheries. The legacy of this polarization is a strongly bounded area of social and cultural knowledge that produces veneration for the monolithic center and obedience of the “margins” to it. The practice of political domination is ratified by the authority of academics, institutions, and governments that formulate a methodology, “surrounding it with greater prestige than its practical successes warrant.”⁴ The ideology propounded by the dominant order reflects and produces its interests. The representatives of the privileged center of the discourse of power (political, academic, cultural, religious, and institutional) silence the voices that are on the fringes of society. In order to achieve this outcome, the hegemonic order creates structures that cater to its unquestioned authority.

The rhetoric employed by mainstream Indian and Pakistani rhetoricians, politicians, academics, and policy makers has become the authoritative discourse of officialdom that separates itself from the realm of the Kashmiri people. It is a dogmatic discourse that has been used to assert its ascendancy among other verbal and ideological points of view. Meanwhile, the cultural identity of the Kashmiri people is damaged by the erosion of their autonomous institutions, by traumas and terrors generated by insurgency and counter insurgency. Still, the cruel politics of these neighboring nation-states has not obliterated the legacy of a rich heritage.

Frantz Fanon, in particular, espoused the attempt to refurbish social and political consciousness in order to undermine racist, ethnic stereotypes.⁵ Although Fanon’s theories were specifically geared to the Algerian national struggle, his characterization of culture as the contentious site where psychological and spiritual emancipation might be achieved is relevant to the Kashmiri context as well.⁶ In the

case of Kashmir, the pervasiveness of prejudicial notions, particularly after 1989, undermined the self-representation and self-construction of the Kashmiri people. The struggle for autonomy and, some would argue, the legitimate right of self-determination in Kashmir quickly forged discourses in order to oppose the discourse of discrimination that had created a sense of marginalization in the populace. Kashmiri scholars, like the contributors to *Parchment of Kashmir: History, Society, and Polity*, have sought to critique the inheritance of Indian and Pakistani hegemonies and to reconstruct their histories, which includes elements of cultural memory.

Fanon famously propounds an anticolonial nationalism as a therapeutic device to cure the psychological and historical torture inflicted by the dichotomies of the culture of dominance. According to Fanon, the fallacy of the racial and culture privileging of the dominant power is confounded when the natives refuse to follow the trajectory charted out for them by the discursive practices of colonialism.⁷ Cultural nationalism challenges and overthrows the hierarchy of ruling ideologies by enhancing a unity among all socioeconomic classes of an occupied area, which it has failed to do in the Kashmir context. This revolutionary stance can eliminate the petty feuds that exist in an area and can replace them with a sanctified notion of nation. History is no longer imposed on them; now they are able to wield memory as a powerful tool. In this process of nationalist self-imagining, the deployment of allegory, as some Kashmiri short story writers have done in their works, can be used to re-create and preserve a jeopardized way of life. Such narratives rewrite history and create symbols of nationhood. They impart resolvability to a disharmonious history, as I discovered while reading *Stranger Beside Me*, Neerja Mattoo's translations of several Kashmiri short story writers into English. Moreover, through a magic realist novel like *Haroun and the Sea of Stories*, my students were able to theorize the prerogative of a people to "redream their own land." Instead of a contemptuous dismissal of the power of myth and fetishes, writers explore these as repositories of culture. This process of recuperation makes the hitherto lost voices of the margin audible.

A multiplicity of voices and perspectives, as in *Parchment of Kashmir: History, Society, and Polity*, shuns simple decoding. Yet as the foregoing discussion suggests, the major topics in the contributors' understanding of the political and administrative structures of Kashmir include the mainstream ideologies and discourses, plus the counter-discourses that either already exist in an indigenous form or are generated as a strategy to reinscribe the normative forms created by hegemonic ideology. We encourage a revisioning of culture and

society, which recognizes the rich syncretism and plurality of Kashmiri society, culture, and politics, in order to empower marginalized people.

Parchment of Kashmir: History, Society, and Polity is an edited volume of interdisciplinary chapters that address various aspects of political, cultural, and socioeconomic life in Kashmir. What sets this work apart from other works on Kashmir is that the authors of the chapters are all themselves academics based in the state of Jammu and Kashmir and are well known, well established, and well respected within Kashmiri society, but they haven't had much opportunity to reach an audience outside of Kashmir and outside of South Asia. In this way, the project does the highly significant work of creating a space for subaltern scholars to project their voices, understandings, and interpretations to a larger audience. This is an especially critical project in the context of Kashmir.

This book provides a forum for scholars from Jammu and Kashmir to voice their opinions and articulate their arguments vis-à-vis the labyrinthine Kashmir issue. Voices from Srinagar, Kashmir, and Jammu articulate opinions that deconstruct the dominant perspective. The chapters in this book, in questioning the status quo, enrich and make more nuanced our understanding of the political, cultural, and socioeconomic complexities of Kashmir. Readers might find some of the arguments voiced in these pages perfectly legitimate and opening up a much needed space for analyzing the intricacies of the Kashmir issue; they might disagree with others or find them particularly opprobrious. We certainly don't intend to force any opinions down the throats of the readers. Speaking for myself, I aim to make more layered the understanding of the readers vis-à-vis the once paradisiacal, now dismal land of my childhood, my dreams, my political and spiritual awakening, and my hopes.

When I asked the contributors of *Parchment of Kashmir* to highlight their perceptions of the Kashmir conundrum and the notion of *Kashmiriyat*, I wanted them to foreground their subjectivities, underscore their particular locations in the culture, and explain what was at stake for them in the arguments they were making. I wanted them to highlight the indigenous Kashmiri point of view. I wasn't looking for "dispassionate" or "objective" analyses, but the analyses of subjectivity, which is what the writers have done. In this cross-disciplinary work, some perceptions present the reality of empirical situations, which can be restricting; in some, the theoretical construct of *Kashmiriyat* is romanticized, but that is the revival of strategic essentialism in these fractured times.

The concept of *Kashmiriyat* is not only cultural but political as well, which can be revitalized by the resuscitation of cultural institutions and the redressal of political grievances. Those contributors who have focused on the pluralistic identity of Kashmir are of the firm opinion that although caste and socioeconomic divides exist in Kashmiri society, they are not institutionalized or religiously sanctioned. Although the authors of this collection have chosen not to focus on caste/class hierarchies, with which some readers might take issue, I emphasize that there is no monolithic “Kashmiri.” Kashmiri society, like other South Asian societies, is by no means egalitarian or unpatriarchal. A rigidly entrenched gender hierarchy also exists in Kashmir; some substantive attempts have been made to deconstruct such a hierarchy. The role of women in a conflict zone; the reconceptualization of a woman’s identity in a politically militarized zone; intersectionalities of class, education, ethnicity, and religious identity in theorizing a woman’s identity; and women’s agential roles or lack thereof are issues that can no longer be relegated to the background. Any attempt to homogenize Kashmiri society or the politico-cultural discourse on Kashmir would be a dangerously flawed exercise.

People on the margins of society lack the same access to political, religious, cultural, and economic discourses and institutions as those in positions of privilege and power. It is important for readers to keep in mind that the contributors to this work are not making any attempt to homogenize the political, cultural, or social discourse on Kashmir, but are writing from certain positionalities. A couple of the arguments in this collection might seem old hat to the “initiated” but are not known to the younger generation, which is not as familiar with the multiple discourses on the palimpsest of Kashmir. The authors of the essays in this collection do not share consensual opinions of every aspect of the Kashmir imbroglio, which adds to the richness of this work. Narrative structures in this work are constituted by the variables of race, gender, education, marital status, social class, and nationality, which generate complex conventions and relations of power. Some chapters might be romanticizing *Kashmiriyat*, but there is no strategic endeavor to gloss over class differences. I shall assume my editorial authority to observe that one of the limitations of some of the essays in this collection is the lack of a nuanced and piercing critique of the violence perpetrated by armed insurgents, militants, and mercenaries against Kashmiri civilians. The venality and dissipation of mercenaries and some armed insurgents, who later donned the cloak of political legitimacy, should not be overlooked by Kashmir analysts. Also, the remorseless militarization of the region, ecological and economic

plunder, negation of legal procedures, lack of infrastructure, and virtual erasure have fueled the hitherto restrained anger and resentment in the Northern Areas of Pakistan. It is ironic that pro-Pakistan separatist groups in the Kashmir Valley gloss over the arbitrary exercise of authority in the Northern Areas, and glibly declare that these areas chose their geographical and political affiliation, legitimizing the lack of fundamental rights in that region.

Because of the calls for *azadi* (independence; a fluid concept with more than one interpretation) raised in the Kashmir Valley, and the brunt of militancy and brutalization of the sociocultural ethos of Kashmir borne by the Valley, the contributors have focused on the situation in this specific province of Jammu and Kashmir. I would like to emphasize that the contributors to this work have interpreted the indigenous philosophical foundations of *Kashmiriyat* and the dynamism within it. A nostalgic interpretation of the notion of *Kashmiriyat* that was deployed successfully in the Kashmir Valley in the 1940s in order to create an alternative epistemology to the discourses of Indian nationalism and Pakistani nationalism is not totally out of place in this work. The readers might find that some of the chapters on Kashmiri identity overlap at certain points. But the overlap underscores the salient point that despite the radicalization of the youth in Kashmir, the pluralism and dynamism of Kashmiri society haven't been depleted. The tradition of *Rishiism* is not dead and buried in the Valley: it continues to bolster a cultural and religious identity that the militarization of Kashmir has not been able to do away with. To that end, the *vaakhs* of Lal-Ded and the *shrukhs* of Nur-ud-din Wali form a very important part of the vernacular of semi-literate and illiterate people in Kashmir. At the risk of sounding repetitive, I emphasize that any unitary discourse that claims to encompass the reality of Kashmir would be lop-sided and suspect.

My attempt is not to propound a particularistic political and cultural ideology, but to highlight the nuanced opinions of indigenous scholars. It is my sincere hope that readers of the book will take this opportunity to engage with the subjectivities, historical understandings, political opinions, and traditions of scholars from the "fringe."

NOTES

1. Nyla Ali Khan, *Islam, Women, and Violence in Kashmir: Between India and Pakistan*, 1st ed. (New Delhi: Tulika Books, 2009; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010; Srinagar: Gulshan Books, 2011).

2. Neerja Mattoo, ed. and trans., *Stranger Beside Me: Short Stories from Kashmir* (Delhi: UBS Publishers, 1994).
3. Salman Rushdie, *Haroun and the Sea of Stories* (New York: Granta, 1991).
4. Edward Said, *Orientalism* (New York: Vintage Books, 1979), 16.
5. Frantz Fanon, *Wretched of the Earth*, trans. Constance Farrington (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1986).
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P A R T I



CONSTRUCTIONS OF KASHMIRI
IDENTITY WITHIN THE
OVERLAPPING DISCOURSES OF
KASHMIRIYAT, ISLAM, SAIVISM,
AND SUFISM

CHAPTER 1

EVOLUTION OF MY IDENTITY VIS-À-VIS ISLAM AND KASHMIR

Mohammad Ishaq Khan

My earliest experiences of Islam were as a Muslim child waiting for months for the two most important Muslim festivals, *Eidu'l-Fitr* and *Eidu'l-Azha*. The former is celebrated joyously after observing fast for the entire month of Ramadan, in remembrance of a devotee's successful struggle against the desires of the self, while on *Eidu'l-Azha*, Muslims perform the ritual of slaughtering an animal in memory of the devotion of Prophet Abraham to his Lord. *Eidu'l-Azha* follows approximately 69 days after the first *Eid* of the year. I waited eagerly for the two *Eids*. For Muslim children like me, these two festivals were great times to rejoice, and continue to be so for Muslim children today. We joined the elders in congregational prayers at *Eidgahs* or mosques and prostrated before Allah. We, the children, weren't solemn believers. We often giggled and laughed during acts of prostration, and I remember disturbing the adults while they were deeply involved in prayer on several occasions. I also noticed some of our elders burst into tears while praying. As childhood faded into adolescence and youth, I tried to comprehend that seemingly strange behavior of the elders on happy occasions like *Eid*. Slowly, I realized that they did not invoke Allah merely for help in states of distress and helplessness, but more importantly, for spiritual union with Him. They understood Allah as the *Nourisher of the Worlds, the Compassionate and the Merciful*. Some examples from my mother's life reinforced this image of Allah in my mind. She had received no formal education

except that she had attended, for some time, a *maktab* attached to the mosque in her locality. She felt sorry about being illiterate. “The beauty marks on my face made my father cancel my admission in the *maktab*. He feared someone would cast an evil eye on his beautiful daughter,” she laughingly told me. The marks that she referred to were dents on her skin caused by smallpox.

Like most traditional Kashmiri women, she had learnt the rudiments of *namaz*, which she performed as the nights in Srinagar melted into dawn. Her most passionate and loud prayer, recited in our native Kashmiri language, as she prepared for *namaz* was *kul jahanas yaeri* (May the whole world be blessed!). She invoked the various titles of Prophet Muhammad (Peace of Allah be upon him) as *Hayatun-Nabi* and those of the great Sufi of Baghdad, Sheikh Abdu'l-Qadir Jilani, highly venerated in Kashmir as *Dastgir* (the helper). After her *namaz*, she implored Allah in the most humble manner. The tears flowing from her eyes made me think about my relationship with Allah, Islam, and my society. But that relationship did not evolve in a certain imaginative direction until the political upheaval of August 9, 1953, following the dismissal of Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah as the prime minister of Jammu and Kashmir.

I was around eight years old when my father swore to take revenge against his Kashmiri Hindu neighbors, the Thusoos, following their bizarre expression of glee by clapping and embracing one another at the news of Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah's arrest. The news was announced on Radio Kashmir, Srinagar, while we were having breakfast in a room on the first floor of our house next to that of the Thusoos. I never forgot the words of my father uttered in deep anguish and anger: “See these ungrateful Pandits. They are celebrating the dismissal of their saviour. Didn't *Sher-e-Kashmir* protect them during the tribal invasion of 1947?” But Baba's tantrums did not last long. We continued to enjoy cordial relations with our Hindu neighbors. Our earnest participation in each other's festivals and marriage ceremonies was proverbial until the mass exodus of the Pandits from their homeland, following the onset of militancy in the Kashmir Valley in 1989.

In my experiences with Islam in Kashmir, the years 1953 and 1989 are strongly linked. The year 1953 was a turning point in Kashmir's modern history from both political and religious viewpoints. Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah, the towering leader of Kashmiri Muslims, was put behind bars for championing the cause of Kashmir and Kashmiris rather than Islam by India's champions of democracy, socialism, secularism, and nationalism. His long imprisonment gave birth not only

to never-ending periods of political instability in Jammu and Kashmir but also to the formation of different attitudes to Islam and identity politics among Kashmiris. In the aftermath of his arrest, Kashmiri society was mainly divided between his followers and those of the Delhi government. An overwhelming majority of Kashmiri Muslims and a considerable number of Muslims belonging to the regions of Jammu and Ladakh adored the Sheikh; a minuscule minority of Muslims of all regions of Jammu and Kashmir and most of the non-Muslims in the state followed the government in Delhi. The differing viewpoints politically divided the Hindus and the Muslims of the state and led to the birth of a very strong anti-India sentiment among the Muslims.

Sheikh was in prison, and his deputy, Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad, who shook hands with Delhi, was appointed the prime minister of Jammu and Kashmir. Bakshi ruled Kashmir for 11 years—the long period during which he made a sustained but abortive attempt at bringing about the integration of Kashmir with India at political, economic, cultural, and emotional levels. Delhi backed him for realizing such a cherished goal, but only insolently. Freedom of the press was curbed; only public meetings supporting the views and policies of the ruling gang could be held; and thousands of supporters of Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah were arrested. My father, Ghulam Ahmad Khan, then owner of the Kashmir Guest House in Lal Chowk, Srinagar, the most popular rendezvous of the state politicians until the late 1970s, had to suffer three months' imprisonment in 1955 for having given refuge to Sofi Mohammad Akbar, the only close companion of Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah who later vehemently opposed the Indira-Sheikh Accord of 1975.

My father's arrest made my mother invoke Allah's help more and more loudly in the early hours of morning. But this was not enough. At such a time of personal crisis, someone advised her to seek the help of a *pir* who lived and still lives in Batmaloo. I remember accompanying my mother to the house of the *pir*, popularly known as Nab Jinn. The *pir*'s prediction that my father would be released after three months turned out to be true. The release of my father was great news and, indeed, a huge event for us, the always cheerful children of the Khans of Magarmal Bagh. Our immediate neighbors were Pandit families and *Gurkhas*. The latter held high ranks of colonels, majors, and captains in the Indian Army. For several weeks, the visits of relatives, neighbors, friends, and supporters of Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah to our house did not abate. There was a *jashan* in our family. But this *jashan* was different from the one that Bakshi used to arrange so lavishly in the Mughal gardens to hoodwink the world into believing

that Kashmiris were with him and with India. The *jashan* of small children in the Khan family was one of celebrating the freedom of the soul from chains of oppression and slavery. A small team of six children (Ashraf, Bashir, Ishaq, Rashid, Mushtaq, and Iqbal) could always be seen playing cricket in the big lawns of their house, but during those days of celebrations, they were up in arms against India. They looked at poor Kumar, Vijay, and Vinod (Our Kashmiri Pandit counterparts) with disdain and vengeance for no fault of theirs. I can never forget the extreme warmth and nobility of culture of such neighbors and playmates. But then so tremendous was the impact of the family *jashan* on our embryonic political consciousness or psyche that we could not suppress our anger against the oppressor. And the moment our *Gurkha* friends peeped through their windows out of curiosity to look at the rush of visitors to our house, we would force them to retreat to their barracks by booing.

There was yet another source of enjoyment for us in the aftermath of our father's release from the Central Jail: a feast served to *Pir* Ghulam Nabi and his entourage of 12 disciples every fortnight. One positive dimension of the spiritual assemblages (*khatam-i-sharif*) preceding sumptuous meals was certainly devotional love inculcated in our young minds for Islam and its holy personages. But I also remember one such occasion when a meeting was arranged between Begum Abdullah, spouse of Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah and a political and social activist in her own right, and the *pir* at our house. The extent of terror struck by Bakshi through his network of spies can be gauged from the fact that Begum Abdullah was forced to wear a *burqa* that evening to enter our house not through the main gate but via the premises of Dr. Ali Mohammad Jan, the most celebrated physician of the Kashmir Valley. Begum Abdullah was so distressed that she earnestly appealed to the *pir* several times for the release of her illustrious husband. What the *pir* said is not difficult to recollect, considering that whenever *Pir* Ghulam Nabi happened to meet me by chance, he would recount the exact words uttered by him in 1955: "Don't worry. Your husband will be released. Bakshi will go one day. And Sheikh Sahib and you will rule Kashmir again."

Paradoxically, *Pir* Ghulam Nabi enjoyed spiritual ascendancy for a brief period only. He later chose to join the state Congress party rather than cultivate inner piety. I have often wondered why the *pir* gave up his noble profession of cheering human souls. But then what has given me inner solace is that my father did not live long to see the unimaginable metamorphosis of his great political and spiritual heroes into degraded versions of their former selves in a brief period. He died

quite early at the age of 47 in 1956, when Bakshi was at the acme of his power.

Given a free hand to rule Kashmir at his will, Bakshi's regime became the symbol of repression, nepotism, and corruption. The two elections that took place during his reign in 1957 and 1962 were rigged. Millions of rupees flowed into Kashmir from Delhi. Out of this, some amount was spent on developmental projects. True, some progress was registered in the educational and economic spheres, but it was counterbalanced by the reign of terror. Any citizen could be kept behind bars for a period of five years. He could be rearrested for another such long term after having been released from a five-year incarceration.

Despite his tyranny, Bakshi appeared as a benevolent ruler, thanks to the propagandist strategies of the sizeable number of *goondas* (goons) in his pay. He founded a "peace brigade," apparently with the noble aim of helping the poor, but with the main object of terrorizing and silencing the supporters of Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah. I still remember how much hatred the youth in all schools and colleges nursed in their hearts and minds against Bakshi, his *goondas*, and the "peace brigade," deridingly called *khoftan faqir* (beggars at night) in local parlance.

But all liberal grants from Delhi were not invested in developmental and peace projects. Enough evidence exists to show that most of the money filled the coffers of the Bakshis, who purchased estates in Srinagar and the rest of India through dubious means. The assets of the Bakshi family, according to the enquiry commission report of a former Supreme Court judge, Rajagopala Ayyangar, had risen from Rs. 10,000 in 1947 to Rs. 1.25 crores in 1964, when Bakshi was made to resign under the ingenious Kamaraj Plan.

Beneath the razzmatazz of Bakshi's rule brewed the incipient and sullen resentment of Kashmiris against the Indian occupation of Kashmir. The imprisoned Sheikh was the "Lion of Kashmir," who symbolized faith in the Islamic principles of struggle and sacrifice. "Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah would not have met such a fate at the hands of his trusted lieutenant," argued the adherents of pro-Pakistan ideology, "had he not thrown his lot with an infidel (*kafir*) like Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru. Had he accepted the counsel of *Qaid-i-Azam* Mohammad Ali Jinnah for the integration of the Muslim majority princely state of Jammu and Kashmir with Pakistan, Kashmir would not have come under the rule of the Hindu communalists." In the popular estimation, Nehru, the cunning Brahmin who subjugated Kashmiri Muslims, was the person who betrayed his friend, Abdullah. Kashmiri Pandits' support for Nehru and his henchman, Bakshi, made

their loyalty to the Kashmir cause questionable. Kashmiri Muslims saw Nehru and his community of Kashmiri Brahmins as communalists masquerading as secularists and liberals. Although such images of Brahmanism versus Islam molded my socio-religious consciousness quite early, they did not turn into preconceived notions in my mind as a result of a pleasant daily social intercourse with my Pandit compatriots.

Kashmiri Muslims and Pandits differed politically and maintained conflicting attitudes to the history of Kashmir, with some honorable exceptions, but showed a remarkable degree of tolerance, respect, and concern for each other in their daily lives. Until 1989, nobody could have imagined the exodus of the Pandit community from Kashmir. I cherish the memory of my life during the mid-1960s and 1970s at my ancestral house in Magarmal Bagh, Srinagar. Beside our kitchen was the beautiful garden of Pandit Arjun Nath Thusoo. The huge, but now abandoned, house of the deceased *tehsildar* of the Dogra regime (1846–1947) caught fire in mysterious circumstances in November 1992. Its ruins often rekindle memories of its grandeur and the absentee landlordism that once characterized the social order in Kashmir, and also of my days spent in its proximity. Every morning, the grand old lady of the Thusoo family plucked flowers in her garden for *puja*. The moment my mother felt the presence of the beloved “queen” (*raza bae*), as an average Pandit woman was respectfully addressed by a Muslim, near the window of our kitchen, she would leave the steaming samovar to exchange greetings with her. The women greeted each other with the same phrase in Kashmiri: *Salam Haebi* (May peace be upon you!). A friendly chat continued often until the children of our joint family cried for a cup of tea, as traditionally it was the mistress of the house who controlled the samovar, and no child or adult could enter her territory.

In spite of periodic political upheavals, Kashmiris were at peace with themselves, with their neighbors, and with Kashmir. Muslims and Hindus greeted the spring with the *Badamwari* festival, as flowers blossomed in almond gardens. They relished tea and water nuts, and never forgot to pay a visit to the shrines situated on the Hariparbat Hill: the shrine of *Sufi* saint Makhdum Sahib and the temple of Hindu goddess Parvati, Sharika. On the Sikh festival of Baisakhi, the citizens of Srinagar filled the Mughal gardens. Kashmiris loved to celebrate the festivals of the four communities, Muslim, Hindu, Sikh, and Christian, and they always found reasons for family picnics in the enchanting meadows and mountainous resorts of the valley they loved so much. Pilgrimages to holy sites dominated the

social and religious life. In certain areas, Muslim shrines (*asthans*) and Hindu shrines (*asthapans*) stood facing each other in the same spaces. Pandits made pilgrimages to Muslim shrines and visited the living *Sufis*. Kashmiri *Sufi* poetry largely takes its themes from the esoteric message of the Koran and *tasawwuf*. But certain themes taken from the Hindu *shastras* are also occasionally used, in the true manner of Sheikh Nuruddin Rishi, for the wider dissemination of the spiritual and social ethics of the Koran. Kashmiri *Sufi* poetry was and continues to be sung at the abodes of the living *fagirs*. Hindus and Muslims sat together in such gatherings and listened to *Sufi* music in rapture.

Of the several migrant Pandits who visit the shrine of Khirbhawani at Tullmula in Kashmir, a considerable number are also disciples of the living *Sufi* Rahman Sahib. One can see them, even today, at the latter's residence during the annual celebrations at the temple of Khirbhawani. I am always amazed to find migrant Pandits from different parts of India in conversation with him, over the phone, throughout the year. The *Sufi* was not born blind; he lost his vision as a result of penance long ago. But he has a heart that can see both spiritual and social reality better than one who refuses to see contrarily. He recently renovated the mosque founded by his grandfather and *murshid*, the revered Asad. His *Sharia* consciousness notwithstanding, Rahman Sahib listens to music devotedly. Interestingly, some of his Pandit devotees still arrange *Sufi* musical evenings for him when they invite him to Delhi.

About six years ago, the ecstatic *Sufi* revered by Hindus and Muslims alike was Sultan Sahib of Butasgam. Such was the devotion of Professor Rattan Lal Hangloo to the *Sufi* that he would always talk about his exalted spiritual status in glowing terms. Often finding me distressed after my mother's death on September 24, 1980, Hangloo arranged a pleasure trip for me to his home in Hangalgund. I stayed at his residence, which is in picturesque surroundings, for a night. He showed me an old manuscript of his ancestor, the famous Pandit saint Mirza Kak of Hangalgund. It was a rewarding experience for me to discover Mirza Kak singing in praise of one God. I often hear in my mind the echo of the word *Tawhid*, used by the Mirza in his mystical poetry. The tragic thing is that I have not been able to get at such a rare manuscript in spite of my close and intimate relationship with Hangloo (Professor of History at Central University, Hyderabad). I visited the *samadhi* of Mirza Kak that evening. But I hurriedly left that serene site without praying for the peace of the deceased noble soul. Indeed, I was struggling with my reason anchored in a superficial understanding of the *Shariah* about the permissibility of praying for

the peace of the departed soul of a Hindu saint. The point will recur later in this account of experiencing Islam in the Valley of saints.

Next morning, the meeting with Sultan Sahib turned out to be an ethereal and mesmerizing experience. A spiritually intoxicated soul like him would usually abuse and beat his visitors in the true manner of *malamatis*. The latter were *Sufis* living in several regions of the Muslim world who sought to hide their spiritual attainments by behaving in a manner outrageous in terms of religious law. But Sultan Sahib talked to me without sounding paranormal. “What is that in your right hand?” asked the well-built *qalandar*. “Cigarettes for you, Sir,” I quavered. The moment I handed the packet of cigarettes to him, he threw it out of his window and roared, “You must never smoke. Do you get me?” I nodded.

Before my meeting with Sultan Sahib, I used to smoke on rare occasions like wedding ceremonies, picnics, etc. Or, sometimes, I would smoke in the true manner of pseudo-intellectuals who would engage in pointless discussions either at the Srinagar Coffee House or elsewhere. Even then my total consumption of cigarettes annually must not have been more than a packet. Realizing that it was now no use indulging in such frivolities, I there and then resolved not to smoke in future. Also, I came to believe somehow that my meeting with Sultan Sahib would not go up in smoke in spiritual terms. Of course, my first meeting with Sultan Sahib for the fulfilment of a worldly desire had occurred several months earlier, but my last meeting with him was extremely significant for my future spiritual life.

In my youth, in the early 1960s and 1970s, some Pandit *Sufi* saints, like Nand Mout and Lala Sahib, lived in Kashmir and commanded immense respect among the Muslims. Nand Mout would occasionally visit the Thusoos. I saw him on two or three occasions, alighting from our neighbor’s car to listen to the entreaties of the Muslims who would assemble around him. He would issue immediate orders for the redressal of their mundane problems in a manner that suggested he was the real ruler. Once, Professor Ghulam Mohammad Rabbani, my colleague at Kashmir University, told me an amazing story about Nand Mout. Soon after retiring from government service as a college teacher, Mr. Rabbani met Nand Mout by chance. Nand Mout asked him, “What do you want?” Rabbani replied, “Job....” The intoxicated soul (in spiritual terms) there and then verbally issued an order that Mr. Rabbani be appointed a lecturer at Kashmir University. I never had any reason to disbelieve Mr. Rabbani. During my association with him for two or three years at the university, I found him to be a thorough gentleman, knowledgeable, but at the same time, with an inclination toward the *Jamiat-i-Ahl-i-Hadith*, the organization that

has no faith in spirituality of any kind and has always deprecated *Sufism* as antithetical to the omnipotence of Allah.

An intimate spiritual and social bond between Abdul Majid Khan, ex-deputy controller of examinations at Kashmir University, and the Pandit saint Lala Sahib, despite the former's strict adherence to the *Shariah* in daily life, was always a puzzle to me. It was not until my long association with Hazrat Mohammad Ahsan Shah of Pampore (1979–2002) that I began to realize that superficial social and religious barriers of all kinds disappear on a higher spiritual plane. Ahsan Sahib was the standard-bearer of the *Shariah* in all respects. But a few of his contemporaries realized that he was Maulana Jalaluddin Rumi's ideal "Man of God" (*Mard-i-Khuda*):

The man of God is made wise by the Truth.
The man of God is not learned [only] from book.

For several hours, Ahsan Sahib would engage in serious dialogue with me on issues of a spiritual and social nature. On this account, sometimes a solitary visitor had to wait. Once he asked such a wayfarer, "Where do you come from?" No sooner did the visitor utter the words "*Janab, Janab*," that he began to sob. "What is wrong with you?" enquired the guru. "*Janab!* I am Pandit.... You were my Principal at the Higher Secondary School in Tral.... You had appointed me as peon.... You helped me at a time of great distress.... I always remember you with good feelings and today, after a gap of several years, I have come to pay obeisance to you, *Janab*." A cup of *kahwa* with *shirmal* was served to the grateful creature of the Nourisher of the Worlds (*Rabbu'l-'Alamin*).

Having lived in Srinagar and particularly in the then posh locality of Magarmal Bagh in the vicinity of the palatial houses of the Thusoos, Rainas, the Raja of Chinani, Anchal Singh, and so on, I had never thought about the poverty and sufferings of some of my poor Pandit compatriots in rural areas. But more revelatory was Ahsan Sahib's concern for the Pandits during his conversations with me. Whenever he narrated an anecdote concerning a Pandit colleague or a neighbor, he would first pray for them. Initially, I could not reconcile myself to his unusual invocation of Allah's forgiveness (*maghfirat*) for them. How can Allah forgive the Pandits? They are not believers like Muslims. Such questions boggled my mind. I didn't have the courage to seek a clarification from my *mursid* on that issue. But as time rolled on, my research endeavors concerning the social roles of the Muslim *Rishis* not only broadened my spiritual and mental horizons

but also made me feel very small in the company of the troubadours of human love.

An anecdote recorded by a seventeenth-century hagiographer concerning the spiritual experience of his *pir* is worthy of deeper reflection. A distinguishing trait of the seventeenth-century Kashmiri *Sufi* Baba Nasibuddin Ghazi, entombed in Bijbehara, was his regular visit to the crematoria of Hindus with the object of offering prayers for the departed souls. This practice caused serious concern among his contemporaries. Thus, while answering a question about his unique behavior, he addressed his disciples with tearful eyes in words that are worth quoting: "Whatever I see is beyond your vision. The departed souls of many such persons who were outwardly Hindus appear to me as those of believers. And some of these souls even say to (to me): 'Your blessings lessen our tortures'. So, I feel pleasure in doing this beneficence." While recording this anecdote, Baba Dawud Mishkati, the noted disciple of Nasibuddin, himself a leading expert on the Islamic jurisprudence of his time, gives tacit approval to his preceptor's behavior. The emerging point is that Nasibuddin, notwithstanding his *Sharia* consciousness, considered a faithful life of even a non-Muslim to be the best preparation for the next world.

Thus, it is not mere religious tolerance that defines Kashmiri-ness or *Kashmiriyat* for me; it is also the ideals of nationality, intercommunity life, international life, and interreligious life that give meaning to my understanding of *Kashmiriyat*. My experiences and research have taught me that the "diffusion" of Islamic civilization did not necessarily cause total collapse or disintegration of local cultures; rather it created favorable conditions for the convergence, if not the synthesis, of diverse elements. Although Islamic mysticism (*tasawwuf*), with its roots in the Koran, *Sunnah*, and egalitarianism, was opposed to the ethos of Kashmiri Brahmanic culture, efforts were made to arrive at a certain point of understanding. Without such convergence of attitudes, Islamic civilization would not have developed amidst the survival of ancient religions and cultures.

I have never perceived Islam as a romantic ideal like *Nizam-i Mustafa* or *Khilafat* that existed in the strictest sense during the time of the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) and the four caliphs who succeeded him. The tragedy of Islam during the heyday of militancy in Kashmir, understandably under the impact of Afghan *Mujahideens'* *jihad* against the Soviet occupation, the Iranian Revolution, and Zia-ul-Haq's Islamization ideology, was the abysmal ignorance exhibited by the protagonists of the "Islamic Revolution" in Kashmir about the intrinsic spiritual and historical nature of the ideals not only

personified by the Prophet and his illustrious four companions, but also symbolized by their society under their benign influence. A very vast body of writings in the Urdu press of Srinagar on the theme of *jihad*, produced under the spell as well as threat of the gun by both committed adherents of Islamization and upstart *mujahids*, was superficial, distorted, and misleading. For such a band of Islamists, Islam was not a spiritual and social ideal or reality worth striving for in the profoundest recesses of one's mind, heart, and soul at the individual level, but a matter of bringing about an Islamic revolution overnight, under the harsh rattle of the gun.

Central to the call for *jihad* was the strategy to turn every mosque and shrine in the Valley into a site of protest and mass mobilization against what was termed "Brahman imperialism" and "Hindu fascism." This strategy had several implications. Initially the militants, by pandering to the religious sentiments of the people, succeeded in raising the pent-up anger, emotions, and feelings of the Kashmiri Muslim masses against India to a feverish pitch, so much so that the Islamic dimension of an essentially political movement received wide coverage in the national and international press. The electronic media played a huge role in highlighting this phenomenon. Underneath the development lay the danger of a popular movement being dubbed and defamed as "fundamentalist" and "terrorist." Also, infatuation with *jihad*, without understanding its meaning in the contextual depths of the Koran and the *Sunnah*, was nothing short of a misadventure. Muhammad Azam Inqalabi, in one of his writings in the local Urdu press of Srinagar, claimed that his *mujahidin* would be able to wage *jihad* against "Indian imperialism" from Kashmir to Kanyakumari. Ironically, his outfit is said to have never crossed the double figure mark. Not only did the *imams* of mosques deliver fiery speeches against the Indian occupation of Kashmir, but also many knowledgeable persons were persuaded or coerced, in certain cases, to deliver sermons on *jihad*. When in the chilly weather of early 1991 some political activists of my *mohalla* in Magarmal Bagh urged me to speak on *jihad*, I disappointed them by stressing the importance of the greater *jihad*, that is, the struggle against one's own baser self. Some time later my article on *jihad bin nafs* in a local English daily, *Greater Kashmir*, even provoked angry reactions from unintelligent critics in their letters to the editor.

Has my major research work on the Muslim *Rishis* of Kashmir made me somewhat biased against *jihad* involving armed combat? Do I prefer the philosophy of nonviolence as preached by the Muslim *Rishis* to the armed struggle against oppression? In fact, *jihad* against

the pestering self is an essential condition for military warfare in the Meccan context. Moreover, one needs to understand that in the strictest sense of the Koran and the *Sunnah*, the undisputed spiritual leader of the Muslim community (*ummah*) alone can give the call for *jihad* under divine command for fighting the forces arrayed against the primordial, in my understanding, religion of humankind, that is, Islam. Viewed in such a context, the use of *jihad* for political ends is tantamount to its abuse. This explains why a sizeable number of the so-called *mujahids* in Kashmir later turned into either renegades or self-styled ambassadors of elusive peace.

This, however, is not to deny the supreme sense of commitment to the concept of *jihad* as a forceful weapon against the aggressor. I will come to this point later in relation to my experiences with the deceased deputy chief of the pro-Pakistan militant organization *Hizbul-Mujahidin*. Here, it will suffice to say that the *Sufis* and Muslim *Rishis* of Kashmir were engaged in a life-long *jihad* not only against their inner selves but, more importantly, also against caste tyranny in the Brahmanical environment of the Valley. Enough evidence exists in the mystical poetry of Sheikh Nuruddin Rishi to show that he was more of a rebel against the iniquitous social order than a misconstrued pacifist. This is why he earned prestigious titles proclaiming him the standard-bearer of *Kashmiriyat*, namely, *Alamdar-i-Kashmir* and *Shaikhul-Alam* as early as the seventeenth century. While the first title identifies him as the upholder of the banner of Kashmir, the other identifies him as a spiritual leader of the world.

Kashmiriyat, therefore, rests on Koranic egalitarianism and pluralism rather than on a shallow synthesis of Hindu-Buddhist and Islamic mystic ideas. It was this spiritual and social base of Islam in the Valley that stood as a bulwark against the post-partition Hindu communalist frenzy of Jammuites. While the latter phenomenon led to the massacre of thousands of Muslims in Jammu, not a drop of blood was shed in Kashmir, thanks to the real spirit of *Kashmiriyat*. But *Kashmiriyat* was not a highly misunderstood and abused term then, as it is now. Today, however, the deployment of *Kashmiriyat* in Indian print and electronic media rarely conveys its real meaning. Being part of the nationalist project to undermine popular forms of protest against India, official harping on *Kashmiriyat* only blurs its true religious, human, and historically problematic perspective. This is also the reason why the militants, in their ignorance, deride *Kashmiriyat*, while serious misgivings continue to exist about it among various pro-Kashmir and anti-Kashmir lobbies. In such a situation, while Kashmir has become a big casualty ward for its denizens, *Kashmiriyat* has just

turned out to be a chapter of accidents as a result of its vulnerability to alien influences and interpretations.

Over the centuries, Islam had become intelligible to Kashmiris through the indigenous medium of Sheikh Nuruddin's *Sufi* poetry, described as the Koran in Kashmiri (*Koshur Quran*). With the spread and growth of the radical politico-religious ideology of the *Jamati Islami*, however, in the 1960s-1970s, the ethics of nonviolence enshrined in Nuruddin's religious thought began to be questioned. In 1968 I avidly read the *Khutbat* of Moulana Maududi. A colleague of mine at Kashmir University later lent me a copy of the *Tafsīmu'l Koran*. I was awestruck. Like several acquaintances of mine, I began to search for the roots of my Islamic identity. Within no time, I felt a dramatic change in myself. I was now going to embark on a life-long mission to work for the restoration of the lost glory of Islam. My only aim in life was to preach that Islamic revival was not possible in a secular state, that only a government that enforced the *Sharia* could create better conditions for the revival of the pristine spirit of Islam. The pacifism of the *Rishis* and *Sufis* was, therefore, antithetical to the true spirit of Islam. The classroom at Kashmir University was a convenient stage for me to propagate the ideas of radical Islam. But this did not happen to be a reality in days to come.

It didn't take me long to discern that Maududi's interpretation of the Koran was no more than an intellectual and ideological response of a great politico-religious thinker to both Western imperialism and communism. In a quest for understanding the roots of my Islamic identity, I found Maududi's revolutionary ideas in conflict not merely with the historically pluralistic structure of Muslim societies but also with the spiritual and social ethics of the Koran. His interpretation of the Koran was generally understood as a politico-religious struggle that was incumbent on all Muslims against all that was un-Islamic. An incessant struggle against social evils or innovations (*bid'a*) for establishing a welfare society was welcome, but politicking for *khilafat* or the likes of *khilafat* did not appeal to my mind.

I found little difference between the radicalism of the adherents of the *Jamaat* ideology and that of Marxism when such issues came up for lively debate and discussion during my lectures on the philosophy of history to MA students. An articulate student in my class who subscribed to the *Jamati* take on Islam and history was Ali Mohammad Dar, who later, during the heyday of militancy, sacrificed his life for the cherished goal of establishing *Nizam-i Mustafa* in Kashmir as the deputy chief of the *Hizb-ul-Mujahidin*. Dar was one of my favorite and brightest students. After completing his master's in history in

1978, he wished to pursue a doctorate under my supervision. He would have been my first PhD scholar had the university administration not rejected his application on technical grounds. Although I advised him to apply for a fresh registration, he did not pursue his academic interests. I then came to know about his recruitment in the state police department. The news of my student's recruitment in the state police came as a shock to me. I thought his affable manners, piety, honesty, and scholarly disposition were serious disqualifications for the profession he had been compelled to choose by fate. The state police department had earned a bad name not only in view of rampant corruption in its rank and file, but also on account of the vitriolic culture in it.

No sooner had I taken over as Head of the Department of History on September 1, 1988, that Ali Mohammad, sub-inspector of police, visited the campus to congratulate me on my promotion to full professorship. He exchanged ideas on issues ranging from Kashmir politics to *Sufism* over a cup of tea. And when we boarded the bus at Hazratbal for Lal Chowk, the theme of discussion was *Sufism*. Although he had reverence for the great *Sufis*, he was critical of the passivity of the Muslim *Rishis* of Kashmir. While speaking in his mellifluous voice, Ali Mohammad remarked, "Kashmiris' commitment to the non-violent tradition of their *Rishis* and *Sufis* has been responsible for their physical, psychological, economic, and emotional slavery. So long as they do not come out of their ignorance and superstitions, they will continue to be ruled by outsiders." Then he unwittingly said, "The only way to get India out of Kashmir is armed resistance." I retorted to the soft-spoken sub-inspector, "But you know we are peace loving. We will never shed blood, which would be contrary to the peaceful teachings of Islam and its illustrious champion in Kashmir, Hazrat Sheikh Nuruddin Rishi." Ali Mohammad smiled. As the bus was hardly a mile away from the storm-center of the Valley, Maisuma, Ali Mohammad said, "We have always struggled through peaceful means but to no avail. Now the time is ripe for resisting the onslaught of every kind—religious, cultural, political, etc. Shouldn't the valiant sacrifices of the Afghan *mujahidin* against a world power inspire the youth of Kashmir? Shouldn't we learn a lesson from the Iranian Revolution? Didn't Iran defy Western imperialism?" With Ali Mohammad's ardent advocacy of armed struggle in Kashmir ended my last and most memorable classroom discussion with an unforgettable character. What an irony of history! After September 1988, a home bird like me could never catch a glimpse of the man who had not simply flown into a passion but had also flown off at a tangent.

The vital difference between the historian and the man who wanted to make history was that while the former always felt an immense pleasure in being an unnoticed and hidden observer of social reality, the latter, by wielding the gun, hurriedly sought to present a version of history that was repugnant to the spirit of the tradition in which he himself had been born and bred.

The intermingling of politics and religion in Kashmir following the outbreak of militancy posed challenges of an immense magnitude to both Islam and *Kashmiriyat*. Using Islam for political ends in the 1990s, however, was not a new phenomenon in Kashmir. Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah had done it from the 1930s until the sad end of his political career. But his use of Islam to further the Kashmir cause was poles apart from that of the *Jamat-i Islami* and several militant outfits. For Abdullah, shrines, particularly Hazratbal, did not merely provide ready-made platforms for molding the political consciousness of Kashmiri Muslims against the Dogra monarchy, Indian military and political dominance, and ultimately defending *Kashmiriyat*: they also served as bulwarks against New Delhi's insidious designs against his co-religionists. Even after the Indira-Abdullah Accord of 1975, he could feel that Kashmiri Muslims were not secure in the secular India of Gandhi and Nehru. His speech at Hazratbal one Friday following *Miladu'n-Nabi* spoke volumes about his apprehensions for the future, even when he held the position of chief minister. New Delhi had betrayed him in 1953. After the Indira-Abdullah Accord of 1975, he again felt let down on several occasions, particularly with regard to New Delhi's reactions to the Resettlement Bill and the opening of the Mughal Road. The aging "Lion of Kashmir" had actually been caged in the office of the chief minister. Unable to roar or even growl, he only groaned under the weight of the deepening and despairing sense of his ultimate failure as the most towering leader of Kashmiri Muslims, on the one hand, and as an ardent Muslim champion of Indian secularism and nationalism, on the other. His autobiography, *Aatish-i Chinar* (*Flames of the Chinar*), bears elaborate testimony to this monumental tragedy.

After the death of Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah, his oldest son, Farooq Abdullah, began to emerge as the champion of Kashmiri Muslim sentiment. Farooq opened his political innings with confidence by putting an end to the age-old *Sher-Bakra* conflict between the followers of Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah, traditionally known as *shers* (lions), and those of the Mirwaiz, traditionally known as *bakras* (goats).¹ Farooq was not a separatist, but he gave the impression of justifying Muslim separatism of the pre-1947 era against the

background of New Delhi's ill-advised Kashmir policy. More than once he said that even if he mounted the top of the Himalayas to proclaim that he was an Indian, New Delhi would not trust him. Indira Gandhi did not like his plain speaking, so his duly elected government was overthrown. The mantle of chief ministership now fell upon Farooq's rival and older brother-in-law, Ghulam Mohammad Shah. New Delhi's plot was successfully carried out by the new governor, Jagmohan, who was especially sent on a mission of cowing down the assertive spirit of Kashmiri Muslims who were attempting to retrieve their bruised identity.

Farooq's removal, however, proved to be a blessing in disguise for him. I remember that even those Kashmiris who had strong contempt for Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah because of their love for Pakistani nationalist ideology now began to develop a soft corner for his son. He had become very popular among the youth much earlier because of his supposed connections with Kashmiri leaders in Pakistan-administered Kashmir. Even before the Indira-Sheikh Accord of 1975, he had roused the hopes of the youth by leading several demonstrations, raising such revolutionary slogans as *choun desh meun desh, Koshur Desh! Koshur Desh!* (Your country, my country, Kashmir! Our country, Kashmir!). As chief minister he visited the Kashmir University campus several times. I could feel his growing popularity among the students as well as university and college teachers, the class of people whom I have always found very critical of Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah for his purported treachery to the cause of Kashmiris by accepting the office of chief minister in 1975 in contradiction of his valiant struggle, first against the Dogra monarchy and then against India for the right of Kashmiris to determine their own future in accordance with UN resolutions.

I had an opportunity to listen to Farooq closely at an *iftar* arranged for him at the Srinagar club soon after his thumping victory in the Jammu and Kashmir Legislative Assembly elections of 1983. Farooq seemed cool, calm, and pensive in a small get-together of intellectuals. He unburdened himself by talking about the frustrations of his administration generated by Indira Gandhi's attempt to browbeat him and, in turn, Kashmiri Muslims. In a very bitter tone surcharged with emotion, he remarked, "*Qaid-i Azam* Mohammad Ali Jinnah was right and Papa was wrong.... Now that my party has won by the grace of Allah and with the support of my people, I am not unaware of the challenges ahead.... You are intellectuals. You have to play a very important role in highlighting *Kashmiriyat*." A friend told

Farooq about my forthcoming book, *Perspectives on Kashmir*. After it appeared in print, I presented Farooq with a copy, but he never read it. He was concerned not about preserving *Kashmiriyat* but about hanging on to the chief ministership in perpetuity. The “prodigal son” abused *Kashmiriyat* by his thoughtlessness and flamboyance. He equated it with regionalism, chauvinism, and parochialism. He did not feel shy of even considering abrogation of Article 370 in the near future.² Such irresponsible statements, made in a harsh tone at the pulpit of Hazratbal, certainly disturbed me at a time when I was in deep meditation in the solemn environment of the shrine. The sacred space where Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah had often reinforced my religious sentiments was now being used against those very sentiments. Such political frivolity and flippancy not only cost the National Conference, the political organization founded by Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah, the ready-made platform of Hazratbal for good, but more than that, they hurt the religious and historical sensibilities of Kashmiri Muslims.

As Farooq was getting alienated from his people day by day, the forces that had described the Indira-Sheikh Accord as a complete sell-out became more active and assertive. But they could not muster strength at a time when a sizeable majority of Kashmiri Muslims still hoped against hope that the National Conference was capable of striking a better deal with New Delhi for their community as compared to the *Jamat-i Islami* or the state Congress. The Rajiv-Farooq Accord of 1986, however, dashed that forlorn hope to the ground. Under such dismaying political circumstances, the emergence of Muslim United Front (MUF) during the 1987 assembly elections, a conglomerate of several parties, was inevitable. The MUF contested the 1987 assembly elections but could not win more than five seats. According to a popular estimate, the MUF was denied at least another five seats as a result of rigging.

The Kashmiri youth who had supported the MUF were now left with no alternative but to take up the gun. With the first shots fired in my locality, Magarmal Bagh and the neighboring Raj Bagh, were sown the seeds of militancy. The response of over 90 percent Kashmiri Muslims was spontaneous: “Awake, awake, (freedom) has dawned”! The revolutionary song in Urdu, played on audio cassettes in every nook and corner of Srinagar, including the loudspeakers of mosques, created an environment that reminded me of the days of my youth when the civil disobedience movement launched by the Plebiscite Front in the 1950s created a great stir in Kashmir. The open defiance of the police then by the students of two women’s colleges in Srinagar

led to an instant composition of an Urdu song broadcast frequently on “Azad” Kashmir or Pakistan-administered Kashmir Radio:

, The daughters of Srinagar, The daughters of Srinagar
 The daughters of *Mujahids*, The daughters of *Mujahids*,
 Out in Lal Chowk
 To break the shackles of oppression.

(Ed. asst. note: Is this fair use?
 If so, why—the original is in the
 public domain? How do we know this?)

The cry for *azadi*, independence, was heard everywhere under the banner of the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF). The freedom movement seemed to have started on a positive note. The JKLF shot into prominence when it succeeded in negotiating the release of its top militants following the abduction of the then Central Home Minister Mufti Mohammad Sayeed’s daughter, Rubaiya Sayeed. Multitudes of people, especially women, children, and youth, thronged the main roads of Srinagar and some main towns raising slogans of *azadi*. Processions of thousands of freedom-loving people taken out from Srinagar and other parts of the Valley to the shrine of Sheikh Nuruddin Rishi in Chrar-i Sharief in snowy weather were spectacular.

Nothing could daunt pro-freedom and peaceful demonstrators. But the largest democracy of the world sought to muzzle the collective and melodious tones of freedom by exhibiting its brute armed strength. Following the massacres of freedom-loving young and old, including women and small children, at Gaw Kadal, Bijbehara, Sopore, and elsewhere, congregational observances of funeral prayers for the martyrs turned into the order of the day everywhere. It was a heart-rending experience to offer prayers at a place where the mourners assembled in front of biers. But prayers of a similar kind, known as *gaibannana namaz-i-janaaza*, held throughout the Valley for the same martyr or, in certain cases, scores of martyrs, lent an unimaginable and immeasurable degree of sanctity to the physical and social environment. It was not simply a yearning for freedom from the Indian yoke but, more than that, the desire to achieve martyrdom that now began to captivate the youth. It is no wonder then that during the early phase of the movement, the youth took up the gun voluntarily.

But the story of open revolt against oppression that had unfolded so gloriously in 1990 began to drift into a crisis of political foresight, prudence, and authority of the militant leaders. The recruitment of all

sorts of people, including antisocial elements, as militants by various outfits illustrates this. While some received training in camps across the border, others, rather many, were locally trained in handling explosives like grenades or even pistols and rifles. This was viewed as a negative development for the future of Kashmir by some of us. But in a situation in which the gun ruled the roost, there was no scope for a critical discussion on the pros and cons of militancy. Reacting to my repeated concern over such a development in my intellectual and social circles on campus, a colleague addressed me angrily in April 1991, "Khan Saheb! Why are you wasting your intellectual efforts on your research on *Rishis*? We want you to write on *jihad*. This is the need of the hour. This is not my personal feeling alone. I have been commissioned to convey this message to you." Seeing my dimpled smile in response, the dear one in his usual emotional, loud, and angry tone addressed his old teacher in these words: "Sir, You must learn to swim in strong tides rather than watch us from the bay." I answered, "You know that I always go against the tide."

I have often been asked by many freedom-loving Kashmiris why the militant movement did not yield the desired results. Pearl S. Buck said in one of her novels, which I read during my college days, that when peasants and intellectuals unite, a revolution is bound to occur. The mass uprising of 1990 was nothing short of a revolution. But a revolution without intellectual evolution is largely ephemeral. There was no dearth of intellectuals in Kashmir. But when intellect is made subservient to the gun or to opportunistic goals, it loses its eternal strength to radiate souls and guide fertile minds in the right direction. Consequently, the mass movement became rudderless in no time, with many local, not national or truly Islamic revolutionary, leaders in the fray.

While *azadi* seemed to be at the doorstep to many, the striking developments taking place in the Valley afforded me an opportunity for deep reflection on events. Behind the kaleidoscopic nature of events lay the sentimental attachment to *azadi* nurtured by Kashmiris in their hearts since 1931. The longing for freedom was rooted in their consciousness about Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah's historical role as first the redoubtable leader of the Muslim Conference, then the National Conference, and later as a zealous champion of plebiscite. His scathing criticism of the Mughal, Afghan, Sikh, Dogra, and Indian rule in Kashmir was never forgotten by the people, nor did they forget that it was, paradoxically, the Sheikh who instead of ensuring *izzat abru ka maqam* for his nation (*quom*) ultimately chained them to the position of slaves in India.

Azadi, therefore, was not a pipe dream for Kashmiri Muslims in historical terms. Their historians and spiritual mentors had harbored the idea of freedom as early as 1586, when the independent Muslim kingdom of Kashmir was lost to the Mughals. Similar to the redolence of patriotism in historian Haidar Malik Chadura's *Tarikh-i-Kashmir*, manifested clearly in his account of the relations of the independent rulers of Kashmir, the Chaks, with Emperor Akbar, the author of *Baharistan-i-Shahi* does not fail in glorifying the dogged resistance of the Chaks to the Mughals. Not surprisingly, Abul Fazl, the official Mughal historian, who was employed by Akbar to lend ideological support to imperialism versus local patriotism, called Yaqub Shah Chak and Shams Chak "two scoundrels." Since the Mughal army could not subjugate the dauntless spirit of the Chaks for long, derogatory epithets like "animal-like Kashmiris," "irreligious" (*be pir*), and "evil-natured" (*bad zat*) were used to denigrate Kashmiris. How far such vilification of Kashmiris was a catalyst for their gradual and inner transformation is reflected in their attitude toward *Sufis* and Muslim *Rishis*. A spiritual guide was sought not merely for the fulfilment of mundane wishes, but more importantly also with cultural and personal consciousness to elevate oneself in both social and celestial estimation. It is this same sense of being *koshur* against the hubristic attitudes of other races and ethnicities that animated the souls undergoing the long process of Islamic acculturation in both the spiritual and social senses for centuries of misrule and oppression. Even Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah, with an innate but mutilated and muted sense of Kashmiri nationalism as the chief minister of Kashmir, paid a special visit to Patna after the Accord of 1975 in order to pay homage to the "great sons of Kashmir," Yusuf Shah Chak and his son Yaqub Shah Chak.

During the Kashmiris' struggle against the Dogra ascendancy, Kashmiri poetry was superbly replete with themes of freedom from slavery and oppression. Abdul Ahad Azad wrote:

The law has sanctioned human slaughter;
Rend the veil; uncover the seething, bubbling heart;
Change: change: Bring new change.

Again,

To become free, to end tyranny, and to abolish superstition
This is my cherished dream, my desire, and my slogan.

Ghulam Ahmad Mahjoor, whose revolutionary songs were sung by Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah at mammoth public gatherings that I attended in Srinagar after his release in 1964, would create a strange kind of fervor among his compatriots. I still remember that the young and the old joined their then beloved leader in a chorus with a great deal of emotion and tearful eyes. Before 1947, Mahjoor had versified his sentiment of independent Kashmir in these words:

Hindus will keep the helm and Muslims ply the oars;
Let us together row ashore the boat of this country.

Considering that the roots of independent Kashmir are embedded in the past, it was no marvel, therefore, that the militants had the unstinted support of the people in the early phase of the armed insurgency. But soon turns and twists on the road to *azadi* began to appear. The movement was hijacked with the radical Islamization of the ebullient sentiment for *azadi*. Forced to move in the direction of a romantic or uncultivated goal in a rising tide of sullen and popular anger against India, *azadi* began to lose its original meaning. The militant outfits were now engaged in fighting not only against the Indian forces, but more against their own people in the name of differing ideologies or on the basis of mere suspicion or vengeance. At the outset of armed insurgency in Kashmir, some Kashmiri Pandits were killed by a notorious militant of JKLF. The slogan mongering of the militants in favor of *Islami Inqalab*, *Nizam-i Mustafa*, *Kashmir banay ga Pakistan*, and so on prepared the ground for the migration of Kashmiri Pandits. The new governor, Jagmohan, made the best of the genuine fears nursed by the Pandit community. The Indian media, splashing atrocities supposedly committed by Muslims against Pandits, men and women, added fuel to the fire. This gave an opportunity to Jagmohan to engineer and sponsor the mass exodus of the Pandits quite cleverly in order to tarnish the essentially secular character of the movement.

Underlying the outcries from the pulpits of the mosques was, in fact, a deep-rooted anger against Delhi. But such collective frenzy, instead of being channelized into a certain creative direction in historical and political terms, was used against everyone ranging from real enemies to even those whose sufferings at the hands of New Delhi or the security forces were devastating. With the mushrooming of militant outfits, thanks to Pakistan, not only did life in the Valley become a burden, but the concept of *azadi* itself began to appear as a bugbear. A militant group could enter any house at its will and

resort to extortion of various kinds in the name of *azadi* or *jihad*. The most contradictory strand that now began to appear in the movement for *azadi* was the feeling of insecurity and fear generated not only by the Indian security forces, but, more than that, by gun-wielding extortionists masquerading as *mujahids*.

Undoubtedly, Indian troops have an ugly record of human right violations, including gruesome custodial deaths. Their high-handedness and over-reaction during periods of grenade attacks, crackdowns, and search operations defy description and definition. I wrote this in a local paper, *Greater Kashmir*, after a crackdown on my locality:

Whatever the significance of the crackdowns, I see ugliness about the manner in which we are forced to sit on the road-side on “auspicious” occasions (26 January and 15 August). In fact, when I contemplate such ugliness, I shudder to put my painful experiences in black and white. Is it that we, Kashmiris as a whole, have collapsed into worse than pariahs in the caste-ridden Indian society? The question of human rights is not merely an affair of random brutality. What is more appalling is our experience in terms of continued psychological genocide of unimaginable proportions.

Notwithstanding the claims of the state power in restoring a certain kind of “normalcy”—stranger than fiction—in Kashmir, it is not an unusual sight to see innocent people being paraded in the markets and on the roadside every day. Often, we are pushed from side to side with sneering remarks. True, in moments of introspection I had always been secure enough to think of my Kashmiri identity as something unique yet dynamic, something that although exposed to grave dangers and bruised, had yet not cut me off from my sense of a glorious past and a rich cultural heritage. But alas! Today, the past that I had always felt strongly about seems to be lost. Contemporary Kashmir, to say the least, knows only the gun-wielding masters all around. Doesn’t the Valley of *Sufis* and *Rishis* today look anarchic, shallow, and frightfully vulnerable?

But then the story of thousands of innocent Kashmiri Muslims also killed or maimed as a result of senseless grenade attacks by militants in busy markets raises a big question vis-à-vis the debate about human rights violations in Kashmir. True, on the political front, militancy has certainly forced New Delhi to talk about peace. But the Indian concept of peace, Kashmiris feel, is somewhat tinged with the *Chanakyan* way of duping rather than befriending with empathy. Certain questions, therefore, lurk in their consciousness. Did the Indian forces

land in Kashmir as guarantors of peace or as an army of occupation and repression? What has been the role of UN observers in Kashmir since the misapplied and misconceived term, the ceasefire of 1948? Considering the sensitive nature of such questions in a specific historical context, is not the demilitarization of Jammu and Kashmir a proposition in consonance with the true spirit of the philosophy of nonviolence preached by our masters of spiritual wisdom, the *Rishis* and *Sufis*?

Notwithstanding banal attempts at distorting Islam and *Kashmiriyat* for sustaining the battered mainstream ideologies of India and Pakistan, still a vast potential underlies my experiences with Islam and history for the development of a realistic and practical approach to the crisis of identity politics in Jammu and Kashmir. Perhaps Sheikh Nuruddin Rishi's mystical verses are addressed to our rulers in New Delhi and Islamabad:

Among the children of the same parents
Why did you create a barrier?
Hindus and Muslims are one.

NOTES

1. Editor's Note: Ahmad Ullah Shah, the senior, had been unequivocally accepted by the Srinagar Muslims as their religious leader, and his authority had been ratified by the Dogra regime. When his son Muhammad Yusuf Shah assumed the leadership of the Jama Masjid in 1931, he had expected to don his father's mantle and exercise the same unquestioned authority. But, to his surprise, his stature was undermined by a young politician of obscure origins and revolutionary political opinions, Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah. Abdullah, a political greenhorn at that point, challenged the hegemony of the *mirwaiz*. As a strategy to eliminate the threat posed to his hegemonic position by Abdullah's rising popularity and clout, Yusuf Shah contemptuously labeled him a heretic. Abdullah vociferously retaliated by aligning himself with Mirwaiz Hamadani. That political move widened the gap between the two religious leaders. A couple of months after Abdullah and Hamadani formed the Muslim Conference (MC), Yusuf Shah founded the Azad Conference, and in April 1933, Abdullah's *Sher* (lion) followers and Yusuf Shah's goat-wearing *Bakra* (goat) followers fought a violent battle during the *Id-uz-Zuha* festival prayers. But Shah's servile attitude toward the Dogra monarchy and his inclination to toe the official line made him an unappealing figure to the repressed Muslim masses. He sank further into the morass of servility and unpopularity by accepting a fiefdom worth Rs. 600 from the Dogra regime.

2. Editor's Note: In October 1949, the Constituent Assembly of India reinforced the stipulation that New Delhi's jurisdiction in the state would remain limited to the categories of defence, foreign affairs, and communications, as underlined in the Instrument of Accession. This stipulation was provisional and its final status would be decided upon the resolution of the Kashmir issue. Subsequent to India acquiring the status of a republic in 1950, this constitutional provision enabled the incorporation of Article 370 into the Indian Constitution, which ratified the autonomous status of Jammu and Kashmir in the Indian Union. Article 370 stipulates that New Delhi can legislate on the subjects of defence, foreign affairs, and communications only in just and equitable consultation with the government of Jammu and Kashmir, and can intervene on other subjects only with the consent of the Jammu and Kashmir State Assembly.

CHAPTER 2

KASHMIRIYAT: THE VOICE OF THE PAST MISCONSTRUED

Rattan Lal Hangloo

INTRODUCTION

The concept of *Kashmiriyat* has been much in vogue in recent years. After Kashmir was taken over by armed insurgency in the late 1980s till date, the term *Kashmiriyat* has been used so often and in such diverse contexts that one begins to doubt whether it means the same thing at all times or refers to different things at different times. One may approach the problem from several directions, but let me examine this concept from a regional (Kashmiri) historian's perspective. But before I do so, I am confronted with some pertinent questions: Why has the concept of *Kashmiriyat* gained currency in recent times, particularly during the armed insurgency that has pervaded Kashmir for nearly the past two and half decades? Is this concept rooted in the empirical reality of the region, and if so, why has it surfaced so suddenly? Do all those who use this concept have conceptual clarity about the phenomenon of *Kashmiriyat* and the linguistic skills or empirical knowledge required to delve into the phenomenon?

But before we take up these questions, let me state at the outset that when we look at different definitions of *Kashmiriyat*, it appears that this concept has been largely used to denote communal harmony, multiculturalism, and the tolerance that the majority community displays toward the minority community. Some define it as an ideological foundation of ethnic nationalism, and in most recent times, it has also been

defined as a marker of Kashmiri identity that cuts across the religious divide.

T. N. Madan, who has dealt with this concept elaborately, says that *Kashmiriyat* constitutes the key elements of the love of the homeland (*kashir*) and common speech (*koshur*), besides similar customs and practices such as distribution of cooked and uncooked food as a token of good will, visits to shrines and reverence for relics, similar culinary and sartorial styles, shared folklore and folk music, etc. To him, all these aspects of Kashmir's culture are said to have contributed to an ineffable sense of mutual recognition and togetherness that was both physical and cultural.¹ Madan accepts the secular character of *Kashmiriyat* but feels that it has been rendered vague in contemporary times, and therefore, he is uncertain about the future of *Kashmiriyat*. He attributes this to the events of the last quarter century that have sharpened communal identities in all regions of the state, that is, Jammu, Kashmir, and Ladakh.² Madan is at his best on this question, leading the reader skillfully through the complex processes of the debate. His practical reasons arguably lie in areas like the uncertainty that confronts *Kashmiriyat*.

The other perspective is offered by M. I. Khan, who believes that *Kashmiriyat* was the gradual outcome of the mutual adaptation of the various pre-Islamic religious traditions and the great tradition of Islam. To him, the most profound exemplars of this dialect were the *Rishis*.³ The spirit of the dialectic was mystical religious experience and universal love. The maturation of *Kashmiriyat* was, however, impeded and even distorted, it is argued, by the fabrication in the mid-nineteenth century of the state of Jammu and Kashmir, a Hindu polity, and its intrusion into the cultural life of the people of the Valley. Their identities were redefined in exclusive instead of inclusive terms. The heightened communal consciousness came to a head in the 1930s. The alienation created then provided the basis for the events of the past two decades. So understood, *Kashmiriyat* refers to "a historical promise which was not fully realized."⁴ Khan has examined a huge body of evidence and the related historical literature and has a good grasp of Kashmir's popular culture (an essential ingredient for understanding *Kashmiriyat*). Aditya Sinha claims that *Kashmiriyat* was shaped in as early as the fourteenth century, thus partly lending credence to the argument of Khan.⁵

Another view is that *Kashmiriyat* is not an ideology but, on the contrary, a behavior pattern dear to Pandits and Muslims of Kashmir alike.⁶ *Kashmiriyat* is also identified with the sense of the existence of general amity or, more perceptively, of a subtle sense

of “mutual support that was not wholly free of tension.” It also refers to the pluralistic culture of tolerance that does not represent syncretism.⁷

Working within the contemporary crisis-ridden scenario of Kashmir, Suhail Showkeen says that when the crisis in Kashmir vitiated the intellectual atmosphere, the concept of *Kashmiriyat* was derisively characterized by some as a hoax and a curse for Pandits. To him, this means that Pandits were living at the mercy of the majority community as second-class citizens—as Hindus and Christians do today in Islamic states like Pakistan and Bangladesh. If that was so, then *Kashmiriyat* would be taken to mean “convert, die, or flee” for 5 percent minority Hindus in the Valley, and that reduced the once majority community of the Valley into a nonexistent minority—“refugees in their own country.”⁸ But looking at the history of conversions that took place in medieval Kashmir, one seriously feels that irrespective of a few isolated examples of coercion under Suha Bhatta (the prime minister of Sultan Sikander), the majority of people at the popular level converted voluntarily.⁹ This clearly establishes the fact that the conditions of early Kashmir differed drastically from conditions in contemporary Pakistan and Bangladesh. Interestingly, Suhail’s argument leans toward communal characterization of the concept of *Kashmiriyat*, particularly when he states that *Kashmiriyat* consists of the constituent elements of secularism and nationalism without which *Kashmiriyat* cannot be conceived.

In other words *Kashmiriyat* is nothing but a hotchpotch of these two ideologies and is being foisted upon the minds of Kashmiri Muslims through electronic and print media. As Muslims it is obligatory on us to judge both of these ideologies with true Islamic perspective so that we may be in a position to accept or reject the same. It is proved beyond any doubt that this is a concept that undoubtedly undermines the basic concepts of Islam, on the one hand; and on the other hand, it is this tool of *Kashmiriyat* which has been used to sabotage the concept of unity among Muslims of the subcontinent. As *Kashmiriyat* is undoubtedly an un-Islamic rather anti-Islamic ideology, so it is very strange on the part of those Muslims who have devoted and are utilizing their capabilities in promotion and dissemination of this alien secular and nationalistic idea.¹⁰

Suhail’s argument presents a view that detracts from the historical narrative of *Kashmiriyat*. His attempt to highlight *Kashmiriyat* as “undoubtedly an un-Islamic rather anti-Islamic ideology” is not only a loosely formulated generalization but also unsubstantiated and is, therefore, disappointing. His analysis is imprecise because

he has ignored the quality of evidence and the historical context indispensable for understanding *Kashmiriyat*.

The Indian mainstream nationalist interpretation holds the *Rishi* movement of Kashmir as the bedrock of *Kashmiriyat*.

Even as the alien *Sufis* and the alien *sultans*, then ruling Kashmir, worked so terribly to bring about a uni-cultural society in Kashmir, it is amazing and appears as divinely ordained that during this very period of about two centuries and more the Valley was blessed with great spiritual saints like *Shavite* mystic poetess Lalleshwari, the enlightened and tolerant *Rishi* Nurudin – Noorani (Rishi Nand) and secular and noble ruler Zain-ul-Abidin (Bud Shah). We had great Aesthetic and mystic poet Shitikant who preceded them a century earlier and Sheikh Hamza Makhdoom, who followed them and is known to have walked barefoot from his *Khanqah* at Hari Parbat to Nund Rishi's *Ziyarat* at Char to pay his obeisance. Between them, these great souls through their sayings and doings formed the warp and woof of the glorious mosaic called *Kashmiriyat* which today is the pride of every well-meaning Kashmiri.¹¹

True that the rapprochement between the *Bhakti* saints and *Sufis* has contributed to *Kashmiriyat*, but that alone does not constitute the bedrock of this phenomenon. This kind of characterization of *Kashmiriyat* reflects the persuasiveness rooted in the Indian mainstream nationalist narrative rather than the ground reality.

The difference between the principles of *Sufism* and the local *Rishi* movement and its attitude toward the people in Kashmir has to be understood. All *Sufis* and *Sultans* of Kashmir were not alien, so employing such generalizations about the constructed unicultural society of Kashmir amounts to brushing aside all complexities of the issue. Besides, there is nothing new in such arguments except the attempt to place medieval Kashmir at par with the various regions of medieval India where *Sufism* and the *Bhakti* movement defined and redefined cultural harmony cutting across religio-cultural diversities. There is no harm in putting the concept in the context of time, but then, the fabrication of homogeneity between mainstream Indian culture and Kashmiri culture proves to be ephemeral in light of the historical roots of the crisis that the Kashmir region and Indian state have shared.

The separatist perspective is that *Kashmiriyat* as an “eternal” concept denotes only Kashmiri identity, thus raising issues about the settlement of the political future of Kashmir and Kashmiris. The main flaw in this argument is that the identity that the separatists are articulating cannot enable the pursuance of substantive political

goals. If Kashmiri identity has to be the bedrock of separationism, it needs a more skillful historical treatment, first in the vein of understanding the uniqueness that embraces all Kashmiris irrespective of their religio-cultural and sociopolitical shades. Otherwise, ill-defined Kashmiri identity and blind adherence to it is a rare disadvantage in articulating Kashmir's future whether at political or any other plane, and, that can only mar future generations in a variety of ways.

Hindu rightists define *Kashmiriyat* simply as a concept “... developed in time by pseudo intellectuals of Srinagar—who enjoyed the patronage of the elite of the Valley.” According to them,

after the accession of J&K to the Indian union in 1947, the Indian State began projecting Kashmir as a symbol of its so called secular philosophy. Hindu rightists further argue that the National Conference regime in the state made the Indian nation believe that while Punjab and Bengal were faced with barbaric communal clashes in the aftermath of the partition of India, the Muslim majority state of J&K maintained communal harmony and protected the minuscule Hindu minority. This is a fallacy that must be rejected and repudiated. Thus *Kashmiriyat* in the lexicon of the fanatical Muslims means recognition of Islamic identity of Kashmir with or without Hindu religious minority.¹²

This argument has no strength; rather on a more cynical note, one cannot help wonder who would buy into such hypotheses apart from perpetrators of Hindu communalist historiography. Their culpable attempt to sweep breathlessly through a framework disregarding even the minimum methodological norms and endeavors to challenge well-worn themes raises a whole host of questions. The whole argument reflects their frustration for not having comprehended the basic tenet of *Kashmiriyat*. Even ordinary readers of Kashmir's history will never excuse these communal authors for not illuminating the hitherto shadowy area of Kashmir's social history. It is a pity that these authors have been either deliberately neglectful or purposely ignorant of the contributions of the National Conference, particularly of its founding father Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah's contribution.

There are enormous problems with accepting the argument that the National Conference regime was even remotely concerned about impressing the Indian nation-state about its secular credentials because it represented a Muslim majority state.¹³ We need some kind of general sensitivity with which to judge the social and political strains within which the National Conference struggled for the structural alteration of Kashmir's polity at a time when colonialism was collapsing and new nation-states were emerging. The hypotheses of Hindu rightist

authors vividly illustrate how these authors have succumbed to the pitfalls of hiding their inability to comprehend the basic tenets of the phenomenon of *Kashmiriyat*. We should always remember that it is the validity of facts, the effectiveness of generalization, and integrity of argument that lend credence to the reconstruction of history, and not loyalty to prejudice.

Sten Widmalm feels that in Jammu and Kashmir, the necessary cultural condition is represented by *Kashmiriyat*, in Tamil Nadu by the demand for separate Dravid Nadu, and in Bengal by the strong Bengali spirit.¹⁴ His study reveals that he is cautiously convinced while outlining his views, but appears reluctant to definitively formulate his opinion, because he has made no attempt to find any comprehensive explanation for the trend he observed but has made broad conclusions with no specific clarity given the amount of knowledge available on the subject. Nasreen Ali has also examined the concept of *Kashmiriyat*, and she states that the term *Kashmiriyat* refers to the political project of Kashmiris constituting a national community. She restricts *Kashmiriyat* simply to Kashmiri-ness, which she says is the general quality of being Kashmiri.¹⁵ Nasreen provides some interesting insights, but she seems to have relied on limited sources for the major portion of her argument. Yet her study undoubtedly performs a valuable service in drawing together the Kashmiri diaspora, whether they come from Jammu and Kashmir or from “Azad” Kashmir. She has succeeded in bringing what she calls “Kashmiri-ness” into the center of the diasporic political arena, even though very little of “Kashmiriness” has survived within the contemporary diaspora. Some other scholars define *Kashmiriyat* as “an abstract noun that signifies origin or affiliation to Kashmir, literally referring to the ethos of being Kashmiri.”¹⁶ However, little agreement exists over the term though many have striven to define it. For many in India, *Kashmiriyat* is the symbol of a common culture devoid of religious connotations.¹⁷

For example, M. J. Akbar says that *Kashmiriyat* is close to a highly significant iconicized concept.¹⁸ He feels that lately it has become important for separatist organizations in Jammu and Kashmir to claim that they are its true custodians. Organizations arguing that Jammu and Kashmir should either become independent or accede to Pakistan refer to *Kashmiriyat* to lend force to their ideologies. These definitions are, however, just as elusive as the formulation that *Kashmiriyat* is the true way of the Kashmiri. This formulation is, of course, nothing new in nationalistic vocabularies and appears more frequently as the struggle for further discussion of *Kashmiriyat* gets more intense and a wide variety of definitions of the term emerge.¹⁹

All these generalizations are meant to define the elements of Kashmir's regional culture, some of which are present in other regional cultures as well, but then what is so specific and special about *Kashmiriyat*? While the literature on *Kashmiriyat* has provided strong, if not unequivocal, support for the existence of the concept of *Kashmiriyat*, the notion, except for Madan's and Khan's arguments, seems to have been used without making much of a connection between the people and their land. Most scholars seem to make little attempt to relate the circumstances that brought this phenomenon into existence. Some scholars seem to have been completely neglectful in examining the varied relationships of Kashmir with the outside world. And these hierarchical relationships evolved over centuries in and outside the region.

Kashmiriyat does not only mean simply a harmonious relationship cutting across religious and sectarian divisions or pluralistic tradition, but it is a far wider concept that has grown over centuries of historical processes that the region of Kashmir has embraced, both in peace and in turmoil. *Kashmiriyat* is not a mere concept but an institution with societal, political, economic, and cultural currents and undercurrents. *Kashmiriyat* is only unique to Kashmir, and this specificity of Kashmir has evolved as a result of special circumstances rooted in the centrality of Kashmir's topography/geography, ecology, religious ethos, and cultural moorings. The immensity of distances has never restricted Kashmiris from traveling to distant lands. This region has always been surrounded by the world's greatest civilizations such as China, Persia/Iran, Central Asia, and India. These civilizations always interacted with the region's population and culture but did not and could not overwhelm the region's character in any manner, irrespective of the small size of Kashmir and the number of people who migrated into Kashmir and inhabited it from time to time. All these forces facilitated the growth of an integral personality of Kashmir that imbibed varied socio-religious, politico-regional, and cultural trends that were assimilated and reworked by Kashmiris in evolving an indigenous model.

The radiance of *Kashmiriyat* has been very wide in terms of assimilating and imbibing varied influences of Greeks, Europeans, Persians, Central Asians, Chinese, and a variety of Indian cultures. The large number of migrants who entered Kashmir from time to time did not preserve their identity, be it Greek, Persian, Arab, Afghan, Tajik, Mongol, Tibetan, Kazakh, Turk, or any other racial/ethnic identity, but after entering Kashmir they all embraced Kashmiri identity and became part and parcel of it. This clearly shows the constant strength

and resilience that Kashmiri culture and local traditions have had to assimilate, accommodate, and then reproduce other racial, ethnic, and cultural identities as part of Kashmir's indigenous culture. While examining Kashmiri popular local traditions and comparing them with those of the neighboring regions, M. A. Stein is very right in saying,

It cannot be doubted that this tenacity of local tradition in Kashmir is due largely to the isolation secured for the country by its alpine position. Nothing is more instructive in this respect than a comparison with territories of Ancient Gandhara and Udyana or with Punjab plains. These regions, so rich in ancient Hindu sites (in Gandhara and Udyana or with Punjab plains), are particularly devoid of local traditions connected with them. This fact is easily understood if we think of the many and great ethnic changes which have passed over the land of Kashmir fortunately for antiquarians research, throughout its known history has escaped such great convulsions and the breaks of tradition usually connected with them. This influence of the geographical position of Kashmir can be traced here also in another direction. Mountains surrounding and consequent isolation tend every where in alpine countries to develop and foster conservative habits of life and thought. We find these habits most strongly marked in the population of the Valley, and may safely ascribe to them a great share in preservation of local traditions.²⁰

Kashmiris of all religious and political shades always strengthened these local traditions by constructing temples, *mathas*, shrines, or *zijarats* devoted to their respective deities, saints, or heretics. They always expressed their pleasure and shared their pain by almost regularly acknowledging the presence of these spiritual mentors in their daily lives. Every Kashmiri village has its own set of heretics. This practice continues down to the present day when, due to the armed insurgency in Kashmir, Kashmiri Pandits migrated to Jammu in large numbers. Instead of getting influenced by mainstream Hindu religious influences and institutions in Jammu, Kashmiri Pandits preserved their pattern by entrenching this heretic culture in Jammu as well. For example, the shrine of Mirzakak of Hangalgund, Kashmir, now raised in Nagrota, Jammu; or the Kralabab in Udhampur, Jammu; Khir Bawani of Tulmula, now raised in Janipur, Jammu; Gupa Bab's Ashram, Srinagar, Kashmir, now moved to Bhori, Jammu; Lakshman ji of Ishber Nishat, Kashmir, now moved to Bhagvatinagar, Jammu; Nandkisher of Sopore, Kashmir, now moved to Akal Pora road in Jammu; Bab Gokul Nath Ashram, Golgujral; and many other shrines and *tirthas* devoted to their local saints and gods/goddesses were erected by migrant Pandits in the Jammu province of the state, enabling the Kashmiri Pandit community to preserve its rituals and

traditions, which do not conform to the conventional and ritualistic practices of the Hindus of Jammu. Simultaneously, such shrines or *tirthas* came up in Delhi, Pune, and Bangalore, or wherever Kashmiri migrants went in sizable numbers. In Jammu, rarely do they associate with places like Rama Krishna mission, *Pir* Baba, Ragunath Mandir, or other religious institutions with equal reverence and regularity.

Kashmiriyat is that self-proclaimed and externally endowed superiority of socio-religious, spatial, and cultural institutions of a small community of Kashmiris of all religious shades that originally inhabited Kashmir. It is this superiority that has overwhelmed and assimilated the social, religious-cultural traditions and traits of greater cultures surrounding Kashmir. This sense of superior self-identity has grown over centuries as a strong trait of confidence among Kashmiris both within and outside Kashmir. We may say that just as we cannot explain society by numbers, we cannot write wholly about *Kashmiriyat* as there are elements at play that cannot be visualized or articulated.

Although the climatology and geography handicapped the region's material culture, those factors enabled the growth of the mutual dependency between groups and communities where craft production and agriculture began to supplement each other. A Kashmiri peasant was as much an artisan as a peasant. Whether it was artisan or peasant, the fineness of art has always been more predominant than material temptations in their respective professions, a rare phenomenon specific to Kashmir. Be it *Buddhism*, *Saivism*, *Shakta*, *Tantra*, or mother goddess cults, local shrines devoted to heretics or their rejection by turning toward Islam en masse, the key concept considered by Kashmiris, which I expound on later in this chapter, at the popular level was all-encompassing whether they approached religion philosophically, symbolically, or ritually. The key concept involved in their approach to religion has always been the "archetype." Historically, religion in Kashmir has always been approached in terms of archetypes that influenced human minds. Interestingly, it has not been Siva's *Trika* Philosophy that has been archetypal with local tradition, but the person who propounded it. This pattern recurs throughout the religious experience of Kashmiris consistently enough to be considered universal conceptually or situationally from Abinavgupta to Ahad Sahab in present-day Sopore. Kashmiris have not questioned, articulated, defined, redefined, or philosophized the spiritual or religious philosophies of *Rishis*, saints, or other dervishes at either the elite or the popular level in the light of organized religious ethics, but they have consistently acknowledged the presence of their heretical

traditions associated with shrines/*Astans* in their lives, both individually and collectively. This perspective has equipped people to see through the conceptions and misconceptions of the past and has made widespread the influence of strong local heretical tradition that has always enabled new ideas to seep into the popular consciousness. Despite the evolution of varied religious and other ideologies in various neighboring and distant regions, Kashmiris have not been permanently influenced by any of them to the extent of eliminating the presence of local tradition in their lives. While doing so, they believed in super-awakening of the self in which the scriptural part of religion was generally ignored. Absolutist and theistic views were also reinforced by Kashmiri *Sufi* poets from time to time. One such example is presented by Mahmud Gami when he said:²¹

Suratas Mane Tabir Khabas
Mushuk zan Milith Gulabas seeth
Vasilas nish jaai schai chai ne kenh nakabas
 (The form and the reality are like the dream and its interpretation
 The two are the rose and its perfume
 Really all the veils are removed from him)

It is in this way that heretical tradition was used to mediate between absolute and finite intelligence. The different forms that were disseminated in Kashmir or evolved locally were incorporated into the supreme, and the acceptance of one form did not reject the other. But it meant the unending process of incorporation that culminated into the syncretic ethos of *Kashmiriyat*. As a result, the heretical tradition has always remained more powerful and widely spread than any other religious formulation. But all these processes were not without stresses and strains.

These new ideologies whether religious or otherwise, which entered Kashmir from early times down to the present day, however, have had disastrous consequences at times, be it the establishment of *Buddhism*, or *Saivism*, or the dissemination of Islam in the fourteenth century, or Kashmir's incorporation into the Mughal state, or the post-partition phase of Kashmir's history when Pakistanization and Indianization confronted each other on Kashmir's soil. The political turmoil and sociocultural upheaval generated in the 1990s were the consequences of the incorporation of new ideologies into the sociocultural fabric of Kashmir.²²

Irrespective of the predominant mainstream religious tradition in Kashmir, the Valley has had its own indigenized religious philosophy

and institution. For example, when *Buddhism* was a very widespread religion, Hieun Tsang said,

How *Arhat* Madhyatika had first spread the law of Buddha in the land; how in the time of Ashoka the five hundred *Arhats* had taken up their abode there; and how finally under the great Kanishka King of Gandhra, Kashmir had been the scene of the universal council which fixed and expounded the sacred canon. Yet he observes that in his time the kingdom as a whole was not much given to faith, and that the temples of the heretics were their sole thought.²³

It is this core culture of heretics that allowed Kashmiris to acknowledge religious sects like *Saivism*, *Vaishnavism*, and *Shaktism*, and yet maintain its distinct philosophy of remaining attached to mother goddesses' cults. And when any of these institutionalized religions tried to overwhelm the people's faith in totality, there were crises that took a different shape and wiped out the influence of that religion as a major player. The founding of the *Sarvastivada* school of *Buddhism* indigenized that religion. But it was wiped out when it tried to spread its tentacles intrusively. Similarly, *Saivism* was indigenized by evolving *Trika* philosophy, but when it tried to impose its dominance by becoming radicalized, the majority of people abandoned it by accepting Islam. But the heretic tradition continued to remain intact. Abul Fazal acknowledges it earnestly while dealing with the *Subha* of Kashmir in the sixteenth century. He says, "the whole country is regarded as holy ground by Hindu sages."²⁴ He also refers, in general, to the numerous shrines dedicated to virtuous deities and to the popular worship of Nagas.²⁵

Despite its various pulls and pressures, when Islam entered the Valley, it did not overwhelm the various local influences, rituals, and practices. The heretic tradition continued to be very strong at the popular level. Irrespective of the fact that the Koran only recognized the presence of God and his *Rasool*, the Prophet Mohammad (PBUH), Kashmiri Muslims did not find any contradiction in recognizing or acknowledging the power of their local saints, *Rishis*, and *Darwishes* as supreme. That is why and how the institution of heretics exercised a strong influence. I have personally seen thousands of Kashmiri Muslims and Pandits visiting *Darwishes* such as Sultan Saheb of Breng Badasgam, Sonabab of Vessu, Saja Ded of Qazigund, Ahad Saheb of Sopore, and many others. Kashmiris of all shades and hues also visit in procession (*naful*) the shrines of dead heretics such as Kama Saheb, Jala Saheb Reshi pir, Resmol Saheb, Batmaloo Saheb, Mansha Saheb,

and a host of others spread all across the Valley to invoke blessings on various occasions, for instance, when the maturing of crops is threatened by excessive rains or otherwise.

Be it the *Yog* of Patanjali, the preaching of *Buddhism* to the Chinese, the enriching of *Saivite* philosophy that reached its pinnacle in Kashmir, or the first *Karya* (poetry) based on Kshemendra's works, these significant traditions form important landmarks in various areas of Indian literature. The presence of Kalhana's historical sense reflected in *Rajatarangini*, continued by various *Tawarikh* writers down to Pir Hassan Shah's *Tarikh-i-Hassan*; Lalleshwari's critique of the ritual-dominated socio-religious apparatus; her struggle for harmony and monotheism, which became the bedrock for *Bhakti* saints of India later; Sheikh Noor-ud-Din's vision of *Marfat* (*Sufi* philosophy), which far excelled the *Sufi* philosophy that had evolved in the world until then, all of these have always kept the local tradition very strong, around which Kashmir's religio-cultural institutions have revolved. Until today the lives of all shades of Kashmiris have implacably been governed by the presences of heretics dead or alive. The sharing of this religious space has laid the foundation for a harmonious culture in Kashmir. The harmonious culture nurtured by such traditions traveled into regions and political culture as well. Kashmiri *Sultan Zain-ul-Abidin's* (AD 1420–1470) secular tradition was replicated by *Mughal* emperor Akbar in the sixteenth-century India.

The missionary zeal of *Sufi* saints facilitated mass conversion to Islam without tampering with indigenous cultural tradition or political philosophy, the literary tradition of *Ksemendra*, and unorthodox ideas that were embraced by even the migrant families of Bilhana, Gani Kashmiri, Brij Narayan Chakbast, Iqbal, Nehru, Mohammad-ud-din Fauq, Mahjur, and a political personality such as Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah, founder of the first secular regional political party that spearheaded the emancipation of millions of oppressed people in Jammu and Kashmir.

The Islamic view of Kashmir's past is contested, but the answer lies in the question itself as there is no definitive limit of the Islamic past. This is because the pre-Islamic past as *Jahiliya* cannot be applied to the history of Kashmir prior to the thirteenth century. One reason is that the residual elements of Kashmir's pre-Islamic era are still active in Kashmiri thought, which Islamic radicals cannot blot out or erase. Old kings, such as Laltaditya and Zain-ul Abidin, patronized *jonaraja* and continued the Kashmiri narrative of history, that is, the first in Indian historical tradition. Similarly, the *Rishi* tradition cannot be erased. Finally, if Islamic radicals look at the past as *jahiliya* and

their anticipated unified brotherhood as *Dar-ul-Uloom*, then there is no space for Kashmiri identity as membership of the *ummah* is the only identity. This point is not only appreciated but also practiced by the common person in Kashmir. One of the main ideologies that lends a sense of identity to the average Kashmiri during his/her socialization is the emphasis on cultural heroes who are a significant part of his/her upbringing. Therefore, as travelers such as Fredric Drew and others point out, an ignorant human in the view of an average peasant is the one who is ignorant of the great cultural heroes. The embittered peasant may not know about the intricacies of religion and politics but can seamlessly talk about Lalleshwari, Nund Reshi, Haba Khatun, Arieni Mal, Gani Kashmiri, Mahmood Gami, Shams Faqir, Mahjoor, Makhen Lal Hangloo, and *Sher-e-Kashmir* Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah.

Kashmiriyat has undergone various trials and tribulations, but each time has reemerged forcefully. But unfortunately in the post-partition phase, *Kashmiriyat* has increasingly come under attack at the hands of both India and Pakistan. The two nation-states, instead of using it as a bridge have disfigured it, and hence, this situation has arisen where one finds that for the first time in the history of Kashmir, *Kashmiriyat* is threatened. In the post-partition phase, the Indian polity has tried to incorporate Kashmir into mainstream Indian culture, which has proved incompatible with this region's polity and culture and has adversely impacted the sociocultural and religious life of Kashmiris, particularly from 1953 when Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah, the main architect of emancipated *Naya Kashmir*, was put behind bars for reasons not explained until now. Kashmir was constantly subjected to the attempted imposition of varied nationalist and communalist models as a part of the process of incorporation at the hands of both mainstream Kashmiri politicians and mainstream Indian politicians. The Government of India applied its agenda and strategies to Kashmir without taking into consideration Kashmir and Kashmiris; it only responded to the varied belligerent approaches that Pakistan adopted toward Kashmir. Pakistan has consistently worked by clothing its political agenda in religious discourse and has succeeded to a great extent in distracting Kashmiris from *Kashmiriyat*, which has had very dangerous consequences for the rest of India on the political plane. To what extent they have succeeded in their larger mission is a matter of debate, but what is certain is that both India and Pakistan have succeeded in defacing Kashmir and *Kashmiriyat* at different levels. Kalhana says, "such is Kashmir the country which may be conquered by force of spiritual merit but not by armed force."²⁶

Yes, *Kashmiriyat* has been eroded by the armed insurgency and also by counter-insurgency measures. Varied factors have caused the distortion of *Kashmiriyat*. On the one hand, Kashmiri Pandits, unfortunately, felt that it was a well-planned move on the part of Kashmiri Muslims to remove them from the Valley and, quickly and sadly enough, every Kashmiri Muslim was painted a hardcore *Jamaat-i-Islami* activist, though most Kashmiri Muslims were taken by surprise when the crisis, armed insurgency, was unleashed. Kashmiri Pandits failed to understand the internal contradictions of the Muslim social order in general and the Kashmiri Muslim Society in particular. They also could not visualize the impact of the Cold War on Pakistan and its impact on Kashmir, and the threat perception that stemmed from armed manifestations of conflict. All these forces undermined the secular mentality of Kashmiri Muslims and kept them under constant duress—a situation in which their own life, liberty, and honor were at stake.

However, after Kashmiri Pandits migrated to Jammu and other parts of India accompanied by all the unfortunate circumstances surrounding dislocation and dispossession, rumors were circulated that Pandits were enrolling in the ultra-right-wing Hindu Rashtriya Swayam Sevak (RSS) *Shakhas*, which was not true. But the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) did initially exploit the Pandit migration to various parts of India for their political ends, and in that process a few opportunistic Kashmiri Pandits with a false political consciousness took some petty advantages from the party leadership without any ideological orientation or commitment. Most Kashmiri Pandits were left to fend for themselves in their unfamiliar shelters in Muthi, Mishriwala, and Talab Tiloo in Jammu, and various other parts of India. Interestingly, when the BJP discovered that migrant Pandits were scattered and did not constitute a large vote bank, they also limited and restructured their response to Kashmiri Pandit problems to mere lip service at various forums. I know for certain that some self-proclaimed Kashmiri Pandit intellectuals and petty bureaucrats, who for some reason or the other had not grown in their careers in Kashmir, immediately jumped on the BJP bandwagon in order to give vent to their feelings by taking an anti-Muslim stance, thus contributing significantly to the communalization of the atmosphere and erosion of *Kashmiriyat*. Such efforts on their part did not mitigate their problems at all but, on the contrary, left a deep scar on the nature of the harmonious relationship that had existed between the two communities from early times.

At the popular level, also, both the communities failed to view the crisis in an appropriate perspective. When the insurgency was at its

apex, a few sections among the Muslim community thought that their lot would perhaps improve if the Hindus left the Valley voluntarily or under threat perception. But they soon realized that no advantages trickled down immediately after the migration of Pandits, and the Muslims soon discovered that the Pandit presence in Kashmir had acted as a dilator in keeping the Kashmiri Muslims cohesive. The contacts between the communities that had been broad based shrank because of the suspicion and mistrust, heightened by the instigation of mainstream communal politics, which was consistently on the ascendance from 1986 up to 2005.

The other reason for the erosion of *Kashmiriyat* is that the generations born in the late 1980s and after, among both Muslims and Hindus, have no idea of Kashmir's harmonious cultural fabric, because these new generations were born and raised in a period of turmoil, and after migration they have not lived *Kashmiriyat*. The Kashmiri Muslim youth born post 1990 in Kashmir are surprised when they are told about Pandits and their present plight, and the Hindu youth born post 1986 and 1990 display no concern for Kashmiri Muslims not only because they were born outside Kashmir, but more so because they have been brought up in an atmosphere charged with communalism and instilled with anti-Muslim sentiment. The spaces of socialization and interaction that were available to both the communities in government offices, educational institutions, commercial establishments, religious places like *Astans* or *asthapans* (shrines), and on social occasions in neighborhoods were all lost. Kashmiri Pandit youth got scattered all over the world with no appreciation for their native society and culture. Despite the best efforts of the older members of the Pandit community, the youth lost the language, which was a strong medium of their linkages with the Muslim community. They could relate to one another through music and other common elements of culture, which have been the worst victims of the Kashmir crisis. To some extent, these developments were fomented by the phenomenon of globalization, which coincided with the period of Kashmir crisis.

The other degenerating factor has been the counter-insurgency program of the Government of India, which has left no stone unturned in undermining *Kashmiriyat*, even though government agencies in Delhi always shouted at the top of their voices that the preservation and revival of *Kashmiriyat* would help restore peace in Kashmir. The government of India paid lip service to the "healing touch" policy by deliberately appointing persons with military and intelligence background and expertise to the position of governors,

such as Girish Saxena (former chief of Research and Analysis Wing), General Krishen Rao (former chief of Indian Army and Governor of Nagaland), General Sinha (former army general), and others. While deploying counter-insurgency strategies, they used every mechanism to turn Kashmiri against Kashmiri and break into the networks of various militant organizations. The employment of these strategies is well illustrated in the case of late Kukka Parrey, a former militant. Parrey managed to graduate to the position of legislator in the Jammu and Kashmir Legislative Assembly as a result of the counter-insurgency strategy of the Government of India, which employed him to help government agencies to eliminate militants and also infiltrate into different militant organizations and, ultimately, gave rise to a dreaded group of counter-insurgents called *Ikhwanis*.²⁷ His case clearly shows to what levels the Indian state degenerates at times because of its custodians.

During the Legislative Assembly elections of 1996, National Conference President and former Chief Minister Farooq Abdullah apprehended the rigging of elections by gun-wielding renegade militants when one of his party workers, Abdul Majid of Sonawari, was attacked and his leg had to be amputated. The then Prime Minister Devi Gowda and Home Minister of India turned a blind eye to the unaccountability and ruthlessness of renegade militants. The then Home Secretary in an exclusive interview to *Zee TV* said that the renegades could not be disarmed as they were fighting the militants. It was during the same election that Pradesh Congress President Ghulam Rasool Kar also demanded immediate disarming of pro-government militants or counter-insurgents. He even accused the Government of India of patronizing this unruly group. He stated, “They have 1500 guns given by the army and the Task forces, and they have let loose a reign of terrorism in the whole Valley.” Mr. Kar termed Kukka Parrey’s party (Jammu and Kashmir Awami League) as “a government outfit.” He even admitted that he was asked by the authorities to accommodate them but he refused because, according to him, government authorities were not aware of the sensitivities of Kashmir.²⁸ A Valley reporter very rightly remarked,

The din about holding elections and the anti-climax of this drama did not surprise the people of Jammu and Kashmir. This theatre of the absurd was irrelevant to Kashmiris, from the day the idea was conceived in the home ministry. The ground realities in Kashmir have never been in favor of any process that negates the sacrifices that Kashmiris have made to hold the popular demand of the right of self-determination. As on previous occasions, the

Indian government had to cut a sorry figure in imposing its wishful thinking on Kashmiris. The election drama was orchestrated by the director as various political actors left one after the other, gauging the mood of the audience. The spontaneous *band* or boycott on the day of the visit of the election commission team to the state was sufficient proof that imposed elections and selections have no takers in Kashmir. In the process, as puppets refused to dance to the tune of master, the puppeteer himself became the puppet.²⁹

State-sponsored agencies created and sponsored *Ikhwan-ul-Muslimeen*, or muslemen to fight other militants, and also created and armed village defense committees (VDCs), thus criminalizing the entire Kashmiri society. Drug addictions were facilitated during interrogations to decapacitate the youth.

In retrospect, *Kashmiriyat*, as I understand it, is not only the mutual understanding between ethnic groups and religions but also the freedom to dissent without fear of being eliminated. Growing up in Kashmir, I had known no fear. Thus, in a sense, it was the true essence of democratic and secular existence for most Kashmiris.³⁰

Hayā (shame) and *ahtiram* (respectability) have been the very cornerstones of Kashmiri culture from antiquity. But the security agencies threw all norms of Kashmiri culture to the winds. One of the greatest attacks on *Kashmiriyat* was the search operations in both rural and urban Kashmir. During these search operations, generally, elders in village and urban *Mohallas* or neighborhoods were shamelessly undressed before their youngsters irrespective of age and gender considerations. This was considered by Kashmiris far more atrocious and painful than physical torture. Such methods were never applied in any region of India because the security agencies discovered that the significance of doing these things in the context of regional cultural specificity far outweighed other forms of humiliation. In Kashmir's popular culture, death is still preferred to dishonor. India always overstepped the limits of her democracy while dealing with the Kashmir question and Kashmiris. India's efforts have fallen short in Kashmir because it allowed corrupt Kashmiri politicians to operate in the state with impunity and demanded no checks and balances that should be required under good governance practices. India also shied away from curbing growing religious extremism in the Valley from the early 1980s and reacted (sometimes too harshly) only after the law and order situation worsened and minorities were driven out of the Valley in 1989–1990.³¹

Kashmiriyat has been ravaged by the emergence of insurgency in a variety of ways. At the grass roots level *Jamaat-i-Islami's Tabligh* or

preaching about the consequences of Cold War, dictated by Pakistan, was on the rise. When radical Hindu ideology was on the rise in the Indian mainland and the *Jamaat* was gaining ascendancy in Kashmir with all assistance from Pakistan, two rumors gained ground in Kashmir at the popular level, more particularly among the communalists in urban areas. The rumors were that if Kashmiris would launch their struggle against the Government of India for independence, Pakistan would support them to the hilt, and if ever a single freedom fighter was killed, all Kashmiri Pandits would be eliminated in no time; similarly the other rumor that ran counter to this was that if a single Kashmiri Pandit was killed, the Indian mainland Hindus would eradicate all Kashmiri Muslims. Both rumors did not graduate to any degree other than that of mediocrity, because neither were all Pandits killed nor did mainland Hindus respond the way the rumor-mongers expected. Pandits moved out of the Valley because of the horrors and fear created by the sudden upsurge of so-called *Jihad*, which took most Kashmiri Muslims unawares.

Here, I need to emphasize that a large number of Kashmiri Muslims who were labeled *mukhbirs* (informers of state-sponsored agencies) or refused to subscribe to the popular notion of *jihad* also migrated. Although this is also part of the story when told in totality, it has gone unnoticed: members of the majority community that have suffered politically, psychologically, economically, and culturally. When Kashmiri Pandits migrated to Jammu, they received a very hostile reception, irrespective of the fact that their presence in Jammu has improved the material culture in that province. Let me point out two examples: in the height of summer, even small school-going children had to be sheltered in canvas tents that were occasionally used for *yatris* or pilgrims during the Amarnath *yatra* or pilgrimage. Needless to say, the region of Jammu was also under the same state government, but the treatment meted out to Pandit migrants was reprehensible. Even to this day, *kashmiri gand padeya idar* (Kashmiri Pandits have made Jammu dirty) is a very popular phrase in Jammu. There are plenty of examples of this nature. This speaks volumes about the extent to which the Jammu region was prepared to be receptive to cultural pluralism or multiculturalism, which as I have endeavored to demonstrate throughout my chapter, has been the bedrock of Kashmir from antiquity because of historical circumstances. If insurgency in Kashmir has disappointed Kashmiri Pandits, then the post-migration period in Jammu has also been very bitter. As a result of this, many Pandits at times felt that migration to Jammu was a Himalayan blunder, but they were left with no choice by fear. But once the

dust settled, their old linkages were revived and reinforced. Pandits were again sought after by their Kashmiri Muslim neighbors and acquaintances.

The Kashmiri diaspora is a very complex human phenomenon. Generally any diasporic group has specific characteristics because of being outside the terrain of the native land and native people. Today the involvement of the Kashmiri diaspora is not as much in economic, charitable, or social work sectors of the region of their origin as in the areas of conflict or political life. For example, a significant number of Pakistanis who settled in Britain came from Mirpur, a district in Pakistani-administered Kashmir, which is known as “Azad” Kashmir. It is believed that two-thirds of British Pakistanis are Kashmiri in origin, with most coming from Mirpur or Kotli. About 250,000 that left these two places consolidated their settlements in inner urban areas where residential proximity with one another reinforces the very close ties of kinship fostered by allegiance to their Kashmiri roots, whether they all are originally Kashmiri or not. Although this diasporic group is from Pakistani-administered Kashmir and lives in urban settings far away from its original homeland, the deep rootedness of this diasporic community in the ethos of *Kashmiriyat* keeps them united.³² It is, therefore, understandable as to why they brought with them their own concerns and those of their wider kin about the Kashmir conflict.³³

As a Kashmiri, one may treat one’s native culture casually, part of the process of daily routine, but when one goes outside the state or country, one starves for the same ordinary things that assume a great significance in one’s day-to-day life as identity markers. It is with these “unique” food habits, music, art, language, religious-cultural traditions that one takes pride in distinguishing oneself from others. Younger generations of Kashmiri Pandits in the United States of America or elsewhere do not attach the same meaning to their festivals and rituals, nor do they view their native culture with the same degree of sacredness as their Kashmiri counterparts in remote villages of Kashmir or even in migrant camps. The new generation celebrates these festivals or rituals because of a nostalgic yearning for the past rather than for their cultural significance and value. There is a tendency on the part of the diaspora to romanticize and glorify their traditions and culture rather than to truly live up to the ideals of those traditions or culture. In general, diasporic communities live in cultural vacuums, and Kashmiris are no exception.

When Kashmir was overwhelmed by the armed insurgency, the role of the Kashmiri diaspora led to the erosion of *Kashmiriyat* because the

diasporic community was divided by sectarian politics.³⁴ It is true that Pandits left the Valley under duress and not by choice and also suffered terribly in Jammu and other places amidst the Hindu majority. But their sufferings cannot be totally and blindly attributed to Kashmiri Muslims who have also suffered and continue to be in limbo, even to this day. In the turmoil that overtook Kashmir because of internal and external problems, how could a Kashmiri Muslim neighbor save a Kashmiri Hindu by risking his life to the ire of militants or security forces? It is also true that many among Kashmiri Muslims were swayed by narrow ideological considerations and, as a result, adopted a hostile posture, but that should not lead to the generalization that all Kashmiri Muslims are communal or militants. There has been misrepresentation of facts on both sides, which has created a wedge between the two communities. Ashok Kumar, who was staying in a migrant camp in Jammu, stated, “One day my Muslim neighbors came to our houses and began screaming ‘Indian Dogs, leave here or die’. A few days later they raped our women. Then they set fire to my house and we ran for our lives. I owned an orchard; now I am a beggar. The Muslims are determined to eradicate the last of this microscopic community. Why is the world deaf?”³⁵ This statement appears slightly tailor-made. It is true that some excesses took place in hostile neighborhoods, but that was not the general trend. I personally know that a number of Muslim risked their lives to protect the interests of their Hindu neighbors. Because it has been a war-like situation, many misunderstandings are bound to occur, but they have not totally shaken the bedrock of the basic bond. There is no single migrant Kashmiri Pandit family that was not enquired about and visited by their former Muslim neighbors or friends in Jammu and many other parts of India.

Now, let us take a quick look at a political organization representing the sensibilities of the Kashmiri diaspora in London called *Tehreeb-i-kashmir* (TEK), founded in 1985 by Kashmiris living in London to highlight the plight of the people of Jammu and Kashmir. TEK conducted an international Kashmir Conference in 1986 that led to the formation of the All Party International Kashmir Coordination Committee (APKCC), a conglomerate of various political and social groups in the UK. It is pro-Pakistan in its leanings as is the majority of constituents of APKCC, but they recently took departure from their traditional stand and openly criticized the Kashmir Center organized Kashmir Peace Conference and denounced the Pakistani government for its current Kashmir policy.³⁶ Well, as far as the role of the Kashmiri diaspora is concerned, I think there have been three

streaks: one is consistently dominated by the radical Hindu ideology both in and outside India, which has left no stone unturned in ravaging *Kashmiriyat*; I have, personally, been the victim of the tirade of a group called Kashmir Overseas Association (KOA). The association's website says that views and opinions expressed herein are solely those of the person posting the mail and not of the KOA or its office bearers. It is clear that the site represents sectarianism and communalism. It enlists contributions of some members of the Kashmiri Pandit community and does not represent all Kashmiris. In 1998, I was asked to deliver a lecture on Kashmir, which I did, and to my dismay discovered the amount of mediocrity and ignorance that many members of the group harbored. My lecture was summarized by one of the members of KOA, Rajinder Razdan, in the following words:

In a nutshell, Mr. Hangloo's lecture could be summarized as follows: The Kashmiri people originally consisted of many tribes; the tribal structure was transformed into caste structure with Brahmanism coming about as a means to subdue the lower caste people. Over time, in order to escape the exploitation of the Brahmanical class, the Kashmiri people started converting to Islam, which promised them equality. The conversion to Islam was essentially a peaceful one, with just a few occasional bad Muslim rulers who continued the Brahmanical method of exploiting the Kashmiri people. The modern history of Kashmir, including both the Dogra rule and then the post independence "rule" by congress has been and continues to be an exploitative one.³⁷

In my presence, nobody had the guts to discuss and debate, but behind my back the group indulged in cheap talk and abuse, which is spread over nearly a hundred pages on the Internet from Sunday July 26, 1998, to Sunday August 2, 1998. Most of those from the Kashmiri Pandit diaspora who participated in this abuse, not debate, on the Internet were not in my audience as admitted by some of them, yet they did not hesitate to offer their confused inferences, whatever it was worth to them and their organization. I quote the most degenerate statement of Mr. Kuldeep Razdan, who brought the debate among his friends to such a cheap level, and after shameless indulgence in abuse, he (Kuldeep Razdan) states,

His (Professor Hangloo's) views on Islam, KPS and India are so totally out of line that I really have to seriously wonder about his sanity. The proof of Islamic destruction of India is all over India; indeed it is all over the Islamic world. Islam ONLY spread by murder, rape, loot, and forcible conversion. That a Kashmiri Pandit will support Islam makes me puke. Compared with the Islamic destruction of Hindu civilization, Hitler's third Reich looks like a

storm in a teapot. This view is reinforced by Will Durant in his book *Story of Civilizations*.³⁸

Another equally mediocre commentator, Vinod Moza, argued, “I have always seen one voice on the net, that Kashmiri Muslims (KM) are our enemies and they should be made to pay for atrocities that they have committed against the peace loving Kashmiri Pandit community.”³⁹ Another fellow, Sunil Kumar Bali, went a step further in making confusion more confounded by associating me with Salman Rushdie, the communist government in Bengal, and Mushirul Hassan of Jamia Millia, without understanding the issues or any commonality therein. He states, “The Islam he (Prof. Hangloo) praises must also make him understand that there is one Salman Rushdie who is hiding his head for [sic] past several years for remotely trying to say something about Islam.”⁴⁰

Recent reports from West Bengal indicate that one third of all Assembly constituencies can be tilted in one way or the other by Muslim infiltrators from Bangladesh. That has been done purposefully by the communist “progressive” government of West Bengal (WB) just to stay in power for as long as possible even though WB and Indian national security may go to the dogs and if Hangloo is so obsessed about being squeezed in the tyrannical Brahmanical order, why does he not leave the order along with some others of his league. At least we know up front that they (Kashmiri Muslims) are our enemies now.... Hangloo, however, knows that once out of fold, he will be another Mushirul Hassan of Jamia Millia who had to go into hiding when he spoke “Progressive.”⁴¹

In these circumstances, not only Hindus but also Muslims and Sikhs suffered. Unfortunately, Kashmiri Pandits such as the ones quoted earlier in the chapter do not seek sequential cause-and-effect relationship between things and events. They suffer from a minority psyche and look at things from a sectarian perspective. At any and every time, they establish a pattern that reflects their narrow understanding of the situation they faced. They have to cultivate a wider and more contemporary vision to realize the relevance of *Kashmiriyat*. The consequence of this is that they try to develop thinking in opposition to developing instinct as it refines itself and becomes emotion, which they should realize blurs the sharp edges of their thought and is so detrimental to Kashmiris in and outside Kashmir. Many Kashmiri Pandits ignored their professional commitments but burdened themselves with the task of reconstructing their history from misinterpreted, rotten colonial and communal historiographical notions. Many of

them revisited the question of conversion that took place in medieval Kashmir to portray Kashmiri Muslims as marauders and anarchists, and in one go washed down the philosophy that rendered life intelligible in Kashmir and demonstrated the justice and love that guided the evolution of *Kashmiriyat*. True that Kashmiris have lived through many days of savage vandalism where life and property of many were destroyed and lost. But then perpetuating communal and sectarian politics does not spread goodness around. And if we claim to be riotous Hindus, then we should subscribe to the edicts of the *Bhagavad Gita*, one of which is (III. 25), “As the ignorant act from attachment to action, so should the wise act without attachment desiring the welfare of the world. There is nothing that justifies suffering except our own ignorance.”⁴² The great verses of Lalleshwari that they repeat with their impious lips do remind us that she was tolerant, aimed high, and demonstrated all this perseveringly.⁴³

*Shiv chui thale thale rozan
Mousan hind ta muslman
Trukh hai chuk ta pan parzanav
Sai chai sabibs seeth zani zan.*
(Siva abides in all that exists anywhere
Don’t discriminate between Hindus and Muslims
Self-realization is true emancipation
Recognize your true self that is true knowledge of God.)

Kashmiriyat has been invoked from both above and below. From below it has evolved as an important characteristic of the Kashmir region from early times when Central Asian religious, cultural, and political traditions entered and merged with the region’s local traditions at the popular level to such an extent that they became one with what is Kashmiri. From above it was invoked by representatives of the Indian polity as and when the secular fabric of the so-called secular tradition was threatened in any part of India. In the recent past when the Kashmir region was immersed in crisis, instead of working out a durable solution to the problem and going to its roots, the Indian state pushed Kashmiris to the wall for no fault of theirs by emphasizing that they should not entertain any communal stance, because the region has the concept of *Kashmiriyat* as the bedrock of tradition. The Indian state repetitively invoked *Kashmiriyat* even though the migration of Hindus had nothing to do with any communalism, because the contemporary crisis in a great measure stemmed from the residue of Cold War politics. There is no doubt about the fact that the Kashmir

problem is seriously intertwined with the process of settlement of the political future of the region in the post-partition phase where India and Pakistan also have stakes, but there is another dimension to this problem and that is the Cold War scenario. Although South Asia experienced a great relief after the two world wars when British colonialism was forced to withdraw from the region, this relief was a temporary phenomenon because the end of World War II divided the entire world into two camps, communist and capitalist. Keeping their interests in view, South Asian countries had no option but to respond to these new forces.⁴⁴ The worst feature that stemmed from these developments was that South Asia continued to maintain its position as a subjugated region. The only difference was that in the pre-World War II era, it was subjected to European colonial interests, and in the post-World War II era, it was subjected to the ideologies of the two new imperial superpowers, the former Soviet Union and the United States.⁴⁵

The deepening of Soviet-American antagonism in Europe, East Asia, and the near East enhanced US interests in South Asia. This raised a host of questions for the United States: would the Soviet influence in South Asia increase as the British influence diminished? How serious a blow would be dealt to American prestige and power if Russians came to dominate the Indian subcontinent? What specific measures could the United States take to ensure the region's loyalty to the West? And how could the Indian and Pakistani administrations contribute in a positive fashion to the achievement of Washington's political, economic, and strategic affairs or objectives. The superpower competition erroneously complicated the task of Americans in South Asia. It was at this point of time that the South Asian importance to the United States was inextricably linked to the Cold War struggle between East and West.⁴⁶

In fact, after the withdrawal of the British from the Indian subcontinent and the Anglo-Russian commercial rivalry that was played out in South and Central Asia, the West got the impression that British withdrawal would work to the advantage of the former Soviet Union. Americans viewed South Asia as susceptible to Soviet penetration and felt strongly that any incursion would affect the security of their country. In close cooperation with the British, the United States began to address the issues of socioeconomic, financial, technological, and other assistance to South Asia again. It was then that the possibility of providing military aid that would engage India and Pakistan was seen as an essential element. Such aid was essential to ensure their loyalties to the United States. From 1960, American assessments in South Asia called for an even-handed regional approach toward South

Asia, and such a political maneuver ruled out leaning toward India or Pakistan.⁴⁷

The United States engaged South Asian countries by disallowing them to be neutral. Open support to one would alienate the other and complicate the prospects of resolution of conflict that had been worsened through the three wars: 1948, 1965, and 1971 (even India-China conflict of 1962, in which there was Pakistani involvement).⁴⁸ On the one hand, the resolution of the Kashmir conflict was seen as necessary for it would lead to regional stability, but with the lurking fear that resolutions of other outstanding issues could be left ineffectual. As a result, an even-handed approach became illusory and the tilt toward one nation, Pakistan, became necessary to facilitate the defeat of the Soviet might. Pakistan also provided a more tempting strategic prize because Americans wanted to use religious conservatism as a bulwark against communism. They facilitated the reinforcement of fundamentalism both at the political and at the popular level to enroll the militant militia against the Soviets and detract from communist ideology in connivance with Americans.⁴⁹ Kashmiris labored under the delusion that after freeing Afghanistan from the Soviets, Kashmir's freedom would follow. After the end of the Cold War, Pakistan and America wanted to get rid of the radical Muslim militia, whom they had created and armed, and they exported them to Kashmir. This strategy of Pakistan was not understood by Kashmiris; they thought that perhaps Pakistan was genuinely behind Kashmir's struggle for freedom.⁵⁰ But Kashmir was subjected to various stresses and strains by the processes involving Cold War diplomacy on South Asian soil. These problems should have been articulated by Kashmiri intellectuals, but unfortunately, perhaps, they were more swayed by the advantages that they expected would stem from the freedom of Kashmir than by the problems that were in store for them. Second, the importation of gun-culture totally disallowed local intellectual efforts to reinforce the values associated with *Kashmiriyat*. Therefore, either intentionally or otherwise, the Kashmiri intelligentsia failed to articulate for the larger Kashmiri public the risks involved in this struggle. The inability of a sizable section of Kashmiris to recognize the murkiness of subcontinental and international politics can be attributed to the serious demotivation induced by the *Jamaat-i-Islami* to uphold *Kashmiriyat*, because the *Jamaat* felt that the undermining of indigenous traditions would strengthen pan-Islamic unity. True that pan-Islamic unity constitutes the base of multiplicity and upholds it, but then *Kashmiriyat* has sufficiently proved its constant strength in dissolving gracefully multiple ethnic, cultural, religious, and regional barriers to construct a unitary Kashmiri identity.

However, amidst the current crises, the traditional elite embedded in Kashmir's popular culture raised their voice through their instructive narration and refreshing insights that are deeply rooted not in any religious dogma but in an indigenous religio-cultural tradition that promises perfect order of heaven out of the current chaos of dark waters. The growing readership of the literary, poetical, and critical works of the Kashmiri intelligentsia is a great proof of their sincerity of purpose, because all glory comes from daring to begin. One such example is the poetical compositions of Sufi Zargar Habib, whose poem reads:⁵¹

*Vuch to pana nis abad khanas
 Ganj Chui manz vairanas ta lo lo
 Pak ais chaline lag napak panas
 Janat manz layen varanas ta lo lo*
 (Look at your own habitat, which has got devastated
 The pure and sacred people are busy washing the unsacred
 Quickly realize the human soul otherwise your habitat is ruined.)

He also says,⁵²

*Gavah ath chui Nabi Nazneen
 Chuma askan kanh mazhab ta Din*
 (God's messenger is witness to the fact that
 our lovers are faithless and irreligious.)

Even though the average Kashmiri feels that the soul of *Kashmiriyat* is afflicted by darkness, but just like the soul, *Kashmiriyat* will never die. Again the paradoxes of *Kashmiriyat* are getting resolved by being appropriated by mystical language and infused into the vital consciousness of Kashmiris, but it may take us longer than expected to understand that. The syncretic ethos of Kashmir is sufficiently being articulated by our present Sufis through their poetical compositions, and Zargar Habib is an interesting case in point, when he says,⁵³

*Aschev manz garas vane dene yaras
 Zalvanis naras karun chu athvas
 Ma Vuch zaharas napayadaras
 Zalvanis naras karun chu athvas*
 (Let us enter the cave to realize ourselves
 Because this amounts to embracing the flames
 Don't think this crisis is enduring
 It is temporary like poison.)

Kashmiris are either unaware or have perhaps forgotten in this turmoil that every human being has extraordinary faculties, not only the faculty of reasoning but others that awaken the sense of beauty, create awareness of peace, and so on. Change has to be accompanied by purity, love, a sense of what is right, and the conviction that truth and unity can exist. This aspect is amply stressed by all religions. The Holy Koran also states clearly, “Everything in creation proclaims the glory of Allah. To man is given Dominion over nature, that man may recognize Allah’s Unity and Allah’s truth. Man should never lose sight of his goal, which is the Good, or dispute with the great Teachers, who are sent to all peoples, to bring about unity; all creatures serve Allah.”⁵⁴

NOTES

1. T. N. Madan, “Kashmir, Kashmiris and Kashmireyat-An Introductory Essay,” in *The Valley of Kashmir: This Making and Unmaking of Composite Culture?*, ed. Aparna Rao (Delhi: Manohar Publishers, 2008), 1–28. See also Chitrlekha Zutshi, “Shrines, Political Authority, and Religious Identities,” in *The Valley of Kashmir: This Making and Unmaking of Composite Culture?*, ed. Aparna Rao (Delhi: Manohar Publishers, 2008), 235–257.
2. Although the concept of *Kashmireyat* is secular for some, in today’s circumstances it is rather vague; it has an uncertain future, particularly because the events of the last quarter century have sharpened communal identities in all regions of the state (Jammu, Kashmir, and Ladakh). T. N. Madan, “Kashmir, Kashmiris and Kashmireyat-An Introductory Essay,” in *The Valley of Kashmir: This Making and Unmaking of Composite Culture?*, ed. Aparna Rao (Delhi: Manohar Publishers, 2008), 28.
3. M. I. Khan, “The *Rishi* Tradition and the Construction of *Kashmireyat*,” in *Lived Islam in South Asia*, ed. Imtiyaz Ahmad and Helmut Reifeld (New Delhi: Social Science Press, 2004), 28–30.
4. *Ibid.*, 28–30.
5. G. C. Thomas Raju, ed. *Perspectives on Kashmir: The Roots of Conflict in South Asia* (Boulder: WestView Press, 1992). See also U. Kaul, “Kashmireyat a Hindu Heritage,” in *Story of Kashmir-Yesterday and Today*, vol. 2, ed. Verinder Grover (New Delhi: Deep and Deep Publications, 1995), 722–726. Ajit Bhattacharjea, *Kashmir: The Wounded Valley* (New Delhi: UBS Publishers, 1994), 14, 70. Rajesh Kadian, *The Kashmir Tangle: Issues and Options* (New Delhi: Vision Books, 1992), 115–116.
6. Sampat Prakash interviewed by Bismillah Geelani, “What is Kashmireyat?,” *The Human Rights Journal of Jammu and Kashmir* (September 2006): 3.

7. T. N. Madan, "Kashmir, Kashmiris and Kashmireyat-An Introductory Essay," in *The Valley of Kashmir: This Making and Unmaking of Composite Culture?*, ed. Aparna Rao (Delhi: Manohar Publishers, 2008), 1–28. See also Chitrakha Zutshi, "Shrines, Political Authority, and Religious Identities," in *The Valley of Kashmir: This Making and Unmaking of Composite Culture?*, ed. Aparna Rao (Delhi: Manohar Publishers, 2008), 235–257.
8. Suhail Showkeen, "A Soul in Exile *Kashmireyat*- the Muslim Definition," accessed February 24, 2007, http://soulinexile.blogspot.com/2007_02_01_archive.html
9. See Rattan Lal Hangloo, "Conversions to Islam and the Consolidation of a Social Base of Power in the Sultanate," in *State in Medieval Kashmir* (Delhi: Manohar publishers, 2000), 48–74. See also Rattan Lal Hangloo, "Mass Conversion in Medieval Kashmir; Academic Perceptions and Peoples Practice," in *The Valley of Kashmir: This Making and Unmaking of Composite Culture?*, ed. Aparna Rao (Delhi: Manohar Publishers, 2008), 98–138.
10. Suhail Showkeen concludes his argument with an excerpt taken from the speech delivered by Maulana Mohammad Ali Jauhar at the Round Table conference in London in 1930. Suhail Showkeen, "A Soul in Exile *Kashmireyat*- the Muslim Definition," accessed February 24, 2007, http://soulinexile.blogspot.com/2007_02_01_archive.html
11. P. L. Jog, "Kubravi Sufis and Hindu Shrines of Kashmir," *Bhavan's Journal*, 55, no. 23 (2009): 72–73.
12. Interestingly, this volume has like minded mediocre self-proclaimed historians /writers who have uncritically subscribed to anti-Muslim ideology so much so that they have completely shut their eyes to the basic facts and methods of history to say the least. K. N. Pandita, "Fallacies of Kashmir's History," in *Kashmir and its People*, ed. M. K. Kaw (New Delhi: S. B. Nangia, 2004), 151–152.
13. Ibid.
14. Sten Widmalm, *Kashmir in Comparative Perspective: Democracy and Violent Separatism in India* (New York: Routledge Curzon, 2002), 36, 111,123,164; H. Blochmann, trans., *The Ain-I Akbari by Abu'l-Fazl Allami*, vol. I (Calcutta: The Asiatic Society, 1927, reprint 1993); H. S. Jarrett, trans., *The Ain-I Akbari by Abu'l-Fazl Allami*, vol. II (Calcutta: The Asiatic Society, 1949, reprint 1993); H. S. Jarrett, trans., *The Ain-I Akbari by Abu'l-Fazl Allami*, Vol. III (Calcutta: The Asiatic Society, 1948, reprint 1993); see vol. II, 354–366. The *Ain-i Akbari* or the "Institutes of Akbar," is a sixteenth century document recording the administration of emperor Akbar's empire, written by his vizier, Abu'l-Fazl ibn Mubarak. It makes the third volume and the final part of the much larger document, the *Akbarnama*, the Book of Akbar, also by Abul Fazl, and is also in three volumes. See also M. A. Stein, *Ancient Geography of Kashmir* (Calcutta: Asiatic Society, 1899), 55.

15. Nasreen Ali, “Kashmiri Nationalism beyond Kashmiri State,” *South Asia Research*, 22, no. 2 (2002): 145–160.
16. A closer inspection of media reports reveals a paradox: frequent usage of the term demonstrates its centrality in conventional notions about Jammu and Kashmir, but the wielders of the term freely adjust its definition for their own purposes. This analysis will be limited to public discourse that has emerged since the start of the most recent migration in the late 1980s and is meant to be representative, not exhaustive.
17. Interestingly during his tenure as Governor of J & K, S. K. Sinha called for a “cultural offensive” to resuscitate *Kashmiriyat*, which he defined as “the binding force between the people of various religions and cultures,” by encouraging Kashmir university to implement the study of historical and religious links between Hindus and Muslims in its curriculum, *Hindustan times* 2005.
18. M. J. Akbar, *Kashmir: Behind the Vale* (New Delhi: Viking Penguin, 1991), 30, 36, 86, 81, 171–2, 192, 21, 220
19. Aditya Sinha, *Farooq Abdullah, Kashmir's Prodigal Son—A Biography* (New Delhi: UBS, 1996), 7.
20. M. A. Stein, *Ancient Geography of Kashmir* (Calcutta: Asiatic Society, 1899), 59–60.
21. G. M. D. Sufi, *Kashir: Being a History of Kashmir from the Earliest Times to Our Own*, 2 vols. (New Delhi: Light and Life Publishers, 1974). See vol. 2 of Sufi's *Kashir*, 434.
22. Because the crisis that emanated in 1990 is also seen as the outcome of acceptance of the religious and political philosophy of *Jamaat-i-Islami* which played havoc with local traditions.
23. M. A. Stein, *Ancient Geography of Kashmir* (Calcutta: Asiatic Society, 1899), 15.
24. H. Blochmann, trans., *The Ain-I Akbari by Abu'l-Fazl Allami*, vol. I (Calcutta: The Asiatic Society, 1927, reprint 1993); H. S. Jarrett, trans., *The Ain-I Akbari by Abu'l-Fazl Allami*, vol. II (Calcutta: The Asiatic Society, 1949, reprint 1993); H. S. Jarrett, trans., *The Ain-I Akbari by Abu'l-Fazl Allami*, vol. III (Calcutta: The Asiatic Society, 1948, reprint 1993); see vol. II, 354–366. The *Ain-i-Akbari* or the “Institutes of Akbar,” is a sixteenth century document recording the administration of Emperor Akbar’s empire, written by his vizier, Abu'l-Fazl ibn Mubarak. It makes the volume III and the final part of the much larger document, the *Akbarnama*, the Book of Akbar, also by Abul Fazl, and is also in three volumes.
25. Ibid. See also M. A. Stein, *Ancient Geography of Kashmir* (Calcutta: Asiatic Society, 1899), 55.
26. M. A. Stein, trans., *Kalhana's Rajatarangini: A Chronicle of the Kings of Kashmir* (London: A. Constable, 1900), 2 vols.
27. Kukka Parrey ultimately paid the price for his behavior and was gunned down.

28. "Informative Missive," 30 (1996), 4.
29. Rasheed Mahmood, editorial in *The Valley Reporter*, 2, no. 13 (December 1995).
30. Ashima Kaul Bhatia, *Transcending Faultiness: The Quest for a Culture of Peace* (New Delhi: WISCOMP, Foundation for Universal Responsibility, 2001), 7.
31. Vijay Sazawul, "Kashmir Resolution; The Role of the International Community," *Journal of Kashmir Affairs*, no. 4 (2007), 59.
32. P. Ellis and Z. Khan, eds., "Political Allegiances and Social Integration: The British Kashmiris in Swiil," in *Roots and Routes. Ethnicity and Migration in Global Perspective* (Jerusalem: Magnes press, 1999), 119–134.
33. Judith M. Brown, *Global South Asians: Introducing the Modern Diaspora* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 160–161
34. Some scholars state that it is because of the Kashmiri Diaspora that Kashmiri nationalism has flourished and expanded, but I do not agree with that hypothesis because *Kashmiriyat* is a civilizational trait that has grown over centuries. The cause of Kashmir has been always known to the world, be it the atrocities of Harsha in the pre-Sultanate period of Kashmir history, or the Mughal Conquest of Kashmir, or Afghan oppression, exploitation under Sikhs, or the Dogra rule, or the political scuffle of India and Pakistan over Kashmir.
35. Lewis M. Simons, "Kashmir Trapped in Conflict," *National Geographic*, September 1999, 23.
36. Murtaza Shibli, "Mohammad Ghalib. President (TEK) *Tehrech-i-Kashmir*," *Journal of Kashmir Affairs*, no. 4 (2007): 83.
37. Rajinder Razdan, July 27, 1998 (1:37 p.m.), "Impressions about Dr. Hangloo's lecture on Kashmir History," *Kashmiri Overseas Association*, accessed July 28, 1998, <http://www.koausa.org/koa/>
38. Kuldeep Razdan, July 30, 1998 (7:49 p.m.), comment on Dr. Hangloo's lecture on Kashmir History, *Kashmiri Overseas Association*, accessed August 1, 1998, <http://www.koausa.org/koa/>
39. Vinod Moza, August 4, 2010 (5:46 p.m.), comment on Dr. Hangloo's lecture on Kashmir History, *Kashmiri Overseas Association*, accessed August 4, 1998, <http://www.koausa.org/koa/>
40. Ibid.
41. Sunil Kumar Bali, August 5, 1998 (12:01 p.m.), comment on Dr. Hangloo's lecture on Kashmir History, *Kashmiri Overseas Association*, accessed August 5, 1998, <http://www.koausa.org/koa/>
42. *Bhagvat Gita* (Gorakhpur: Gita Press, 2002), III, 25.
43. Nil Kanth Kotru, *Lal Ded: Her Life and Sayings* (Srinagar: Utpal Publications, 1989), 29.
44. Humayun Khan, Introduction, in Roedad Khan, comp. and ed., *The British Papers Secret and Confidential India, Pakistan and Bangladesh Documents 1958–1969* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003),

xiv–xv; see also Herbert Feldman, *1967 Revolution in Pakistan: A Study in Martial law Administration* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967), 2–22.

45. R. L. Hangloo, “Pakistan: Why a Nation in Jeopardy Today,” *Journal of Kashmir Affairs* (March 2009): 1–16. In 1947, Harry Truman, the president of USA, adopted two distinct and competing strategies in South Asia. On the one hand, USA sought to establish a constructive, possible bilateral relationship with both India and Pakistan. But Americans were diplomatically ruthless in their attitude towards South Asia even though *positive constructive bilateralism* was laid down as the bedrock of their policy. The American policy was shaped by the basic Cold War calculus in which the American planners or politicians of South Asian policy expected all regions to embrace the broad goals of USA foreign policy, i.e., formally or informally conforming to the West and opposing the Soviet Union and all that this represented. The American administration and South Asian specialists carefully differentiated between the relative importance of the two nations, i.e., India and Pakistan to their interests. This policy conflicted with the kind of bilateralism that they espoused initially. It was emphasized within the power circles in USA that Americans should first identify and classify with precision the major elements of interest for their country in South Asia.

They first felt that India and Pakistan were situated away from Cold War area; they first tried to explore the relative importance of the two nation-states, and realized that Pakistan’s presence was of greater strategic importance; but in establishing this relative importance they had to shape their response to Kashmir which had, in the meantime, brought two comities to war in 1948 and later in 1965. So, USA policy makers sought to promote the indifference between the two deliberately and began to treat Kashmir as the main bone of contention between the two. Despite Pakistan’s strategic potential, many USA planners treated India as a diplomatic prize. As a result, initially, up to the mid-fifties of the last century American policy leaned towards India. But from the late forties and fifties when they began to formulate their policy towards South Asia, they felt that depending on Great Britain for advice in diplomatic matters was necessary. But the British were still nursing their wounded pride for having been extricated from the Indian subcontinent. The British were not going to remain silent on the issue, so the American stressed that for security reasons the collaboration of England and America was a must. As a result Anglo-American interest was an integrated approach of American policy in South Asia. Generally speaking, the geographical position of South Asia is such that if the economic and military potential of the region were more fully developed, it could dominate the region of the Indian Ocean and exert a forceful influence on the

Middle East, Central Asia, and the Far East. For details see S. J. Burke, *Pakistan: A Nation in Making* (London: Oxford University Press, 1986).

46. O. A. Westard, *The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times* (Cambridge: Cambridge university press, 2005), 340–390.
47. Ibid.
48. Mohammad Ayub Khan, “The Pakistan American Alliance: Stresses and Strains,” *Foreign Affairs*, 42, no. 2 (1964): 195–209, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/23567/mohammed-ayub-khan/the-pakistan-american-alliance>. See also Humayun Khan, “Introduction,” in *The British Papers Secret and Confidential India, Pakistan and Bangladesh Documents 1958–1969*, comp. and ed. Roedad Khan (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), xiv–xv.
49. O. A. Westard, *The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 340–390.
50. Ibid.
51. Zargar Habib, *Kashmiri Ghazal* (Srinagar: Haft Kalid Ganj, 2009), 30.
52. Ibid.
53. Ibid.
54. *The Holy Quran*, Introduction to *Surat Al Nahl* 16, xvi: 1–25 and xvi: 26–50.

P A R T II



CULTURAL SYNCRETISM AND
DECONSTRUCTION OF A
MONOLITHIC CULTURE

C H A P T E R 3



MYSTICAL THOUGHT OF KASHMIR

M. H. Zaffar

INTRODUCTION

In this chapter, I try to navigate between the two approaches of a radical, exclusionary Muslim interpretation of Kashmir history and culture and a radical, exclusionary Pandit (Hindu) approach. The objective of this chapter is to identify and underscore the predominant spiritual tradition of Kashmir. My effort has been to be closer to an unindoctrinated folk approach, certain aspects of which remain non-mainstream. To illustrate my point, the famous saint poet of the fourteenth century whom lay Kashmiris call Lal-Ded is referred to as Lala-Arifa by Muslim scholars, while Pandit (Hindu) scholars usually call her Lalashwari. Similarly, her younger contemporary saint poet and the founder of the Kashmiri Muslim *Rishi* order is usually referred to by Muslim scholars as Sheikh Noor-u-din Noorani, Pandit scholars call him Sahzananda, and common Kashmiris call him Nund Rishi. My emphasis is on the tradition that was bequeathed by our ancestors and that was preserved and enriched by Lal-Ded, Nund Rishi, and their followers. I posit that this tradition is still alive in Kashmir. Even today there are people in Kashmir who are Muslim by faith, but don't eat meat or any other nonvegetarian food on certain occasions as a mark of respect to some *Rishi*. Kashmir University might have named the chair established in the name of Nund Rishi as *Markaz-Noor*, and the professors and scholars there may address the saint by various persianized names, but the common Kashmiri who might not be very well educated still calls him Nund Rishi.

Despite being an illiterate Kashmiri, my mother remembered many a *vakhas* of Lal-Ded and many a *shrukh* of Nund Rishi, which she used to recite to me when I was a child. She used to tell me the story of Lal-Ded, and how she suckled the newly born Nund Rishi. This was the kind of education that I got from my illiterate mother and this gave me my identity. I am a Kashmiri Muslim, but also an heir not only to Lal-Ded and Nund Rishi, but also to many other *Rishis* like Abhinava Gupta, Somanand, Vasu Gupta, and Kashup Rishi. The very name Nund Rishi connects me with 5,000 years of my history. The spiritual and aesthetic values that have come down to us from our *Rishis* and *Munis* have been a great source of inspiration for all Kashmiris. The characteristic feature of this tradition has been the spiritual approach to the various problems of life. The concept of religion is more comprehensive than it is made out to be by bigots and fundamentalists. Freedom from prejudice and narrow mindedness are the hallmarks of this culture. The whole corpus of Kashmiri mystic poetry revolves round the experience of self-recognition, *pratyabhijñā* or *Irfan-i- Dhāt*, which is considered the ultimate purpose and function of human existence.

In my opinion, the fundamental principles of all religions are the same; it is the exoteric form, practice, ritual, and expressions that make them look different. Although both Buddhism and *Saivism* advocate the principle of equality among all sorts of beings, historically Kashmiri society, at the advent of Islam, was stratified and the Brahmanical social order of caste and disciplines (*Varnāśramadharmaḥ*) was institutionalized in Kashmir. Both these religions had become immensely ritualistic, perpetuating rituals that were very complex and demanding. The hereditary institution of priesthood had degenerated into an institution of exploitation; socio-political and religious structures put in place by the elite of the society were seen by the masses as corrupt and oppressive. I would like to emphasize that conversion from one religion to another is not always motivated by religious concerns, as was clear in the context of Kashmir.

Since India gained independence in 1947 and was ruthlessly divided into the nation-states of Indian and Pakistan, the fabric of Kashmiri society has been woven by violence. The greatest and the most intense act of violence perpetrated against the society was in 1953, when Kashmiri language was thrown out of schools, where it had got its rightful entry only a couple of years earlier, after centuries of banishment. To deny the language of a people is to deny the power of a people. Thus, the space for violence within Kashmiri language and society was created by a political decision, and all this was done in the

name of the so-called national interest. Our present education system in which there is no place for our native language has changed the situation altogether. The graduates, professional or otherwise, whom we produce year after year are totally rootless and know next to nothing about their linguistic, cultural, and spiritual identity. They are strangers to their own native language. So there is a crisis of identity. As an analyst of politico-cultural events, it is my considered opinion that the ruin of Kashmiri identity began the day Kashmiri language was thrown out of educational institutions in Jammu and Kashmir. The seeds that were sown then are bringing destruction now in the form of bloody events, which we have been witnessing for the past two decades. It is an irony of the times that the people who propounded and evolved the philosophy of recognition (*pratyabhijñā*) have become victims of the politics of recognition.

Kashmir's unique identity and essence can be delineated by identifying and foregrounding its metaphysico-mystical traditions: *rishism*, *saivism*, and *sufism* are ideal frameworks to give it a locally rooted global identity.

To facilitate the project of the resuscitation of Kashmir's distinctive identity, the Institute of Kashmir Studies was established in April 2006 under the nomenclature of Centre for Kashmir Studies, as an autonomous body to study, analyze, debate, and reevaluate various dimensions of Kashmir's rich cultural, spiritual, and intellectual heritage. I have been the director of the institute since its inception. In November 2007, the University of Kashmir signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with the South Asian Foundation. As per the terms and conditions of this MOU, the nomenclature of the institute was changed to Madanjeet Singh Institute of Kashmir Studies; subsequently, the foundation pledged a financial support of 1 million US dollars, to be spread over a period of five years, to the institute.

Although the institute was vociferously condemned by some Kashmiri opinion makers, intellectuals, and journalists as a statist attempt to rewrite a revisionist history of Kashmir, which would undermine the significance of the cause of self-determination and the potency of the mobilization of the masses in 1989 and the early 1990s, I am of the opinion that the inaugural function of the institute created a history in its own way and, according to some very eminent Kashmir experts, changed the course of events in the Valley, leading it out of a mind set, conditioned by misapprehensions and misgivings of various hues. The function, presided over by the President of India, Pratibha Devi Singh Patil, was made more purposeful, meaningful, and colorful by the people's representatives and ambassadors from some

South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) countries. To my dismay, some of my colleagues accused me of being an agent of the state, which was seen as the perpetrator of heinous human rights violations and the suppressor of the resurgence of a Kashmiri nationalist identity. But my work is not designed to erase the foray made by armed insurgency, or the mass mobilization at the inception of this insurgency in Kashmir. Nor is my work designed to construct a monolithic Kashmiri identity. The revival of the ancient history of Kashmir does not depoliticize Kashmiri identity, either before or after the armed insurgency of 1989 and the counter-insurgency of the 1990s. To the chagrin of my detractors, the way the people of Kashmir responded to and participated in the inaugural function speaks volumes about the real aspirations of the people for peace, harmony, and progress in the region.

While deconstructing the Islamist as well as Hindu versions of Kashmir history and culture that are becoming hegemonic in the increasingly polarized Indian subcontinent, I attempt to present the Kashmiri spiritual and cultural tradition from the perspective of a common Kashmiri, without being revisionist.

From AD sixth century to AD twelfth century, Kashmir was considered to be the seat of learning and knowledge, in this part of the world. Throughout the Indian subcontinent it was known as *S'ardapith*, that is, the abode of *Sarasvati*, goddess of knowledge. The fourth Buddhist Council was held here during AD third century. Holding of this council in the Valley is evidence that Kashmir held a position of centrality from the point of view of the development of knowledge and learning, although geographically it happens to be on the margins of the subcontinent. The objective of this council was to reach a consensus regarding the basic tenets of Buddhism. It is said that the famous scholar *Ashvaghosh* played a very significant role in the conduct of this council.

BUDDHISM

One of the most influential philosophers of the twentieth century, Ludwig Wittgenstein, concluded his epoch-making book *Logico philosophicus-Tractatus*, published in the year 1922, with the proposition: "What we cannot speak about, we must pass over in silence."¹

We in India have inherited this knowledge from centuries-old wisdom. About 2,500 years earlier, Buddha taught us the significance and importance of silence. The realms that transcend linguistic categories cannot be articulated in the discourses of language. But to postulate

the possibility of such realms has been the characteristic feature of the human quest for the absolute truth.

The principle of *nirvana* as propounded by Buddhism is an instance of such a realm. *Nirvana* is postulated as a state of being that is possible only by removing wrong knowledge about the self and realizing the principle of non-self or *shunya*. Buddhism highlighted the negative aspect of the divine. To be divine is to realize the state of non-self or *shunya*. The way to the realization of this absolute state is via negation, which implies denial of all specific qualities and attributes in order to reach the ultimate nothingness of the absolute, as Max Muller has rightly pointed out:

Nirvana... Is a name and thought but nothing can be predicated of it. It is what no eye hath seen, and what hath not entered into the mind of man.²

Since nothing can be predicated of it, it is quality-less being, and a quality-less being is non-being. To elucidate the point further, let me quote from A. B. Keith's *Buddhist Philosophy in India and Ceylon*:

It follows from the fact that we are not concerned with relative knowledge that any definition of suchness is utterly impossible; to apply to it empirical determination is wholly misleading; to say that it is void is to ascribe to it the character which belongs to the phenomena of this world; to say that it exists is to suggest something individual like ourselves which, however, leads to an eternal existence. It is necessary, then, to content ourselves with silence or to choose the simple term suchness or suchness of being, an idea which in its simple form is known to the Hinayana. Suchness is above existence or non-existence or both or neither. It can, therefore, be most easily expressed by negations like the "Not so, not so" of the Upanishads, and hence it is natural to treat it as the void. But we must not make the error of thinking this a real definition; the void is as void as anything positive.³

As a matter of fact, this way of approaching and realizing the divine can be discerned even in the modern mystic tradition of Kashmir. An early twentieth century *Sufi* poet of Kashmir sings:

*Chu aura kehnai te yaura kehnai Bau kehnai kas wanai kehnai.*⁴

(On either side there is non-being; nothingness is all pervading. I am mere nothingness. How can nothingness be communicated, and to whom?)

From this, we can validly infer that the Buddhist approach of realizing the divine has significantly informed the spiritual consciousness of Kashmiri people. Buddhism was divided into two sects: *Hinayana* and

Mahayana. *Hinayanees* are of the view that people should concern themselves with their own *nirvana*, and that is possible if they follow the righteous eight-fold path as shown by Buddha. But *Mahayanees* (Kashmiris were *Mahayanees*) are of the view that individual *nirvana* is of little significance unless one aims at and endeavors for the *nirvana* of one's fellow beings. They advocate that although Gautama had attained enlightenment, he came back to his fellow men as Buddha to assist them in attaining enlightenment. The tenth-century Tibetan thinker Jé Gampopa in his book *The Jewel Ornament of Liberation* differentiates the *Hinayana* and *Mahayana* approaches, in the following manner:

Clinging to the well-being of mere peace' signifies the lower capacity [*Hinayana*] attitude wherein the longing to transcend suffering is focused on oneself alone. This precludes the cherishing of others and hence there is little development of altruism. [...] When loving kindness and compassion become part of one, there is so much care for other conscious beings that one could not bear to liberate oneself alone. [...] Master Manjushrikirti has said: "A Mahayana follower should not be without loving kindness and compassion for even a single moment" and "It is not anger and hatred[,] but loving kindness and compassion that vouchsafe the welfare of other."⁵

Ananda Coomaraswamy is of the view that "The most essential part of the Mahayana is its emphasis on the *Bodhisattva* ideal."⁶ Being a *bodhisattva* implies possessing a mind full of compassion conjoined with insight into reality, realizing emptiness (*shunya*), or the essence of all things. The *shaivistic* approach to liberation is informed by the principles of *Mahayana* Buddhism. The enlightened one has to come back to the society for the enlightenment of his/her fellow beings, and this is corroborated by the life and message of all the known saints and saint poets of Kashmir.

Saivism

Kashmiri Buddhist scholars achieved great excellence in logic, which informs almost all the schools of Indian philosophy especially the monistic *saivism* of Kashmir. With the erosion of Buddhism in Kashmir, *saivism* resurfaced in the Valley during the ninth century and gradually became popular among the masses. Prior to Buddhism, *saivism* was prevalent in Kashmir, but it was not a monistic creed. The *saivism* that became popular after the decline of Buddhism, and which is also known as *Trikamat*, is based upon various *Agamic tantras*.

The etymological meaning of the word *Siva* is “good.” According to *saivism*, the ultimate and eternal reality is “Absolute Good.” The universe is the manifestation of the Absolute Good or Siva. This Absolute Good is an infinite, eternal, and conscious light, which is also manifested through space and time and all that is contained within space and time. So the universe is a manifestation of the absolute reality, and this reality is absolute conscious light. Humans are also a ray of the same light. The goal and purpose of human life is to recognize this absolute and eternal reality. One of the basic texts of the school is Vasu Gupta’s *Siva-sutras*, which articulates strictly a monistic doctrine in which there is no scope for any kind of duality.

Siva-sutras comprise 77 sutras. These sutras are more like riddles and coded statements that need interpretation and decodification. The first two sutras are quoted here to illustrate the point. The first sutra reads *Chaitanyamātm*,⁷ which means “consciousness is the nature of reality,” or “consciousness is the self or soul,” or “consciousness is the essence of reality, which is the self or soul.” The second sutra is *Jñānam Bandhah*.⁸ If this sutra is read in conjunction with the earlier one, it becomes *Chaitanyamātmājñānambandhah*. This means “consciousness is the essence of reality, and the ignorance of this truth implies bondage.” If read separately, it means “knowledge is bondage,” or “empirical and discursive knowledge leads to the bondage of the agent.”

Of all the commentaries written on the *Siva-sutras*, Khemaraja’s commentary is considered to be the most authentic. Khemaraja was a disciple of Abhinava Gupta, so the commentary must have been written some time during the eleventh century. The literature of monistic *saivism* consists of three parts: *Agama Shastra*, *Spanda Shastra*, and *Pratyabhijñā Shastra*.

- (1) *Agama Shastra*: It comprises revealed books; these books are not the product of human intelligence or experience; their origin is believed to be spiritual in nature. Among them *Siva-sutra* is considered to be the most significant, and it is also called *Saiva-upanishada*.
- (2) *Spanda Shastra*: These are the treatises wherein the *Agama Shastras* are interpreted and commented upon; the two important books belonging to this segment are *Spanda Karika* and *Spanda Sandoha*.
- (3) *Pratyabhijñā Shastra*: Literally, it means the discipline of self-recognition. This part consists of works wherein *saivism* is

presented as a school of thought as well as a world view. The fundamental principles of the system are analyzed, and an effort is made to prove their validity through rational and logical arguments, and arguments based on the experience of the agent himself. The most significant works belonging to this segment are as follows:

1. <i>Siva Drishti</i>	Somananda
2. <i>Ishwar Pratyabhijñā Kārika</i>	Utpalacharya
3. <i>Ishwar Pratyabhijñā Vimarshini</i>	Abhinava Gupta
4. <i>Ishwar Pratyabhijna Vivarti Vimarshini</i>	Abhinava Gupta.

Even after Abhinava Gupta, right up to the time of Lal-Ded (fourteenth century), the debate regarding the principles of *saivism* continued among scholars, and many works were also produced. On the other hand, those interested in spiritual well-being continued practicing the discipline for their spiritual growth and evolution. But the fact remains that no scholar or practitioner could match the achievements of Abhinava Gupta. And even today, Abhinava Gupta is considered to be the chief exponent of Kashmir *saivism*.

The ultimate reality, according to this system, is nonrelational consciousness. It is the cause of all change but does not itself undergo any change. In it there is no distinction of subject and object. Ultimate reality is not only universal consciousness but also supreme spiritual energy or power, which is called *prakashvimarśamay*. It is both transcendental (*Viśvottīra*) and immanent (*Viśvamaya*). In its transcendental aspect it is called *Anuttara*, and in its immanent creative aspect it is called *Śiva tattva*. It is *Svabhāva* or the nature of ultimate reality to manifest itself. This manifestation takes place through a process of descent. The first five stages of descent are called the perfect or pure order; upto this stage all experience is ideal, and the real nature of the divine is not yet veiled. These stages are as follows: *Śiva*, *Śakti*, *Sadāśiva*, *Īśvar*, *Sadvidyā*, and *Śuddhavidyā*.

The following 31 stages are called imperfect or impure order because the ideal nature of the divine is veiled. This order consists of 31 *tattvas*, which are as follows:

- (1) *Māyā* and its five *Kañcukas*—*Kalā*, *Vidyā*, *Ragā*, *Kāla*, *Niyati*
- (2) *Purusa* and *Prakṛti*
- (3) *Buddhi*, *Ahamkāra*, and *Manas*.
- (4) The *Tattvas* of sensible experience, five *Jñānendriyas*, five *Karmendriyas*, five *Tanamātrās*

(5) The *Tattvas* of materiality: (a) *Ākāśa*, (b) *Vāyu*, (c) *Teja (Agni)*, (d) *Āpas*, and (e) *Pr̥thivī*.

Self-recognition is the ultimate intrinsic value for *saivism*. Since all creation has only one origin and source, there is no question of inequality among humans on the spiritual plane. But to realize this value, humans have to strive very hard. *Saivism* as propounded and propagated during the medieval times in Kashmir is not only an academic and intellectual pursuit, but essentially a spiritual course of action for seekers of truth and self-knowledge. This is amply proved by the very person of the saint poet Lal-Ded, who transformed her earthly existence into heavenly being by treading the path of the spiritual discipline. Her poetry forms the foundation not only of contemporary Kashmiri literature but also of Kashmiri culture as a whole. As stated earlier, Kashmir produced great thinkers and spiritual practitioners from AD sixth century to AD twelfth century, but all their works are in Sanskrit. After the advent of Islam in Kashmir around this time, Kashmiris gradually lost their hold on the language (Sanskrit) due to various political, social, religious, and linguistic reasons, and whatever intellectual heritage their predecessors had bequeathed to them became inaccessible to them. With the passage of time, a gulf emerged between pre-Islamic Kashmir and Islamic Kashmir, but Lal-Ded is the most significant historical bridge that connects the two shores of this gulf very effectively. She was the product of the creed preached by Vasu Gupta in the ninth century and the philosophy propounded by Abhinava Gupta in the tenth and eleventh centuries. Her poetry was not written down during her lifetime. It was because of her power to impact her listeners that people heard her and formed her sayings or *vaakhs* into chants and mantras, which continue to be sung even today. She revolted against all the oppressive structures that stifle and kill the human spirit, and critically interrogated practices of inequality and injustice that were prevalent at the time. Lala's poetry is not only a continuation of the tradition but also simultaneously a break or rebellion against the tradition. Lala rejected wholly the ritualistic aspect of the *shaivitic* spiritual discipline. This rejection is articulated and expressed with great force in her poetry.⁹ On the one hand, Lala gave a new lease of life to Kashmiri *shaivistic* spiritual tradition, but on the other hand, she demystified *saivism* by articulating its tenets in the language of the common people and deconstructed its ideology of being a *rahasya* (secret doctrine) by making all the *upayas* (means of realization) available to all those interested in the realization of their true identity.

O fool! The right action is not observing fast and rituals.
 Right action is not caring for your body.
 It is not to adorn your body.
 Meditation on the self is the appropriate course of action.
 It is not wise to torture,
 One's body with hunger and thirst,
 One should take care of one's body when the care is needed. Fasts and
 religious ceremonies do not add to one's spiritual merit. The real good
 action consists in doing good to others.
 Checking the flow of water, cooling fire,
 Walking in the air, contrary to natural laws,
 Getting milk from a wooden cow,
 All this in final analysis is fraud and deceit.
 Without discernment they read the holy books,
 Just as the parrot repeats "Rama! Rama"! from its cage;
 To them reading of the Gita is just pretence;
 I have read the Gita and I am reading it (every moment of my life).
 A *Sanyasi* (religious mendicant) goes on pilgrimages to all the
 holy places;
 He is in search of his Lord.
 O mind: Lose not the path even after receiving education;
 The grass looks greener from a distance.
 Some renounced their hearth and home; some took to living in the
 forest hermitages. All in vain! So long as the mind is not tethered
 at home;
 Counting your breath day and night, as you are, so shall you be.¹⁰

Abhinava Gupta, in his *Tantaraloka*, admits the possibility of attaining self-realization and self-recognition without following the ritualistic path prescribed by the tradition. But he devotes almost half of the *Tantaraloka* (2,637 *shlokas* out of a total of 5,859) to a minute and detailed description of the various rituals prescribed by the scriptures; this clearly shows that these rituals were considered as basic and significant constituents of the *shaivistic* religious creed. According to major *shaiva* scriptures, there can be no valid *saivism* without ritual. One of the postulates of these scriptures is to the effect that the impurity (*malah*) that prevents the soul's liberation is a substance (*dravyava*), and to remove it, action (*kriya*) is needed, and not *jñānam* (gnosis). This effect can be produced only by the ritual of initiation performed by *shaiva* himself through the person of the officiating guru or teacher. But Abhinava Gupta does not totally agree with this view. For him, *malah* or impurity is the consequence or result of ignorance of one's true nature or identity, and what is required for its removal is knowledge (gnosis), not action. But at many places, Abhinava Gupta is

so thick and convoluted that even his thirteen-century commentator Jayratha seems to have faltered in comprehending his texts properly as has been most ably demonstrated by Prof. Alexi-Sanderson in his article “Swami Lakshman Joo and His Place in the Kashmirian *Śaiva* Tradition.”¹¹ At many places, Abhinava Gupta has not explained things to the satisfaction of his readers because he considers the matter under consideration to be too secretive to be deliberated upon beyond a certain limit. But when we come to Lal-Ded, all this secretiveness and thickness disappears, and there is complete semantic transparency. There are no hidden corners in Lal-Ded. She adopted ritual-free *Trika*, propounded by Abhinava Gupta, as the norm. She liberated the doctrine from any sectarian, local, or regional color, and made it a universal message for humankind in general. Lal-Ded is *saivism* made easy for the layperson, irrespective of his/her caste, creed, color, religion, or sex. This is the reason for the total acceptance of Lal-Ded by almost all Kashmiris. With the passage of time, there was a schism in the *Trikamat* of Kashmir *saivism*. On the one hand, we have the branch that maintains the rituals, although not much of the traditional rituals detailed by Abhinava Gupta have survived the ravages of time, and now these rituals are restricted to *samart* observances only, as the elaborate and complex *trika* rituals died down by the fourteenth century. On the other hand, we have the ritual-free *Trikamat* of Lal-Ded, which merges with the *Sufi* mystic tradition of Islam and becomes a forceful movement in the hands of the *Sufi* poets of Kashmir.

SUFISM

The unitary human mystical experience has been interpreted and articulated by different cultures and religions in their own particular way. But there are striking similarities among these interpretations. Shaykh-ul-Islam Zakariyah Ansari defines *Sufism* in these words:

Sufism teaches how to purify one's self, improve one's morals and build up one's inner and outer life in order to attain perpetual bliss. Its subject matter is the purification of the soul[,] and its end or aim is the attainment of eternal felicity and blessedness.¹²

This doctrine of spiritual evolution, which emanates from the Holy Koran, has informed the spiritual quest of seekers of truth all over the world.

It is a well-known historical fact that Kashmir was converted to Islam not through the brute power of the sword, but through the

word of love; the sages and saints right from the great Bulbul Shah and spiritually evolved *Syeds* to indigenous Kashmiri *Rishis*, all were messengers of peace, love, and harmony. Because Kashmir had strong spiritual and mystic traditions, seekers of truth found the atmosphere quite conducive to their quest. Indigenous mystic traditions were refined and recast in new molds, and a new spiritual lexicon with a mixed terminology was developed. This can be evidenced by the writings of various Kashmiri *Sufi* poets, right from Nund Rishi (fourteenth century) to Ahad Zargar (twentieth century). The point can be illustrated by citing some verses from the two poets. Just consider this *shaluk* (verse) of Nund Rishi:

*Poz yod bozakh panish namurakh
Nata maz namurakh soy chhem nemaz
Shivas ta Shunyahas yod myul karakh
Seduy soy chhay vahantar nemaz.*

(If you listen to truth, curb the five; (five senses)
Otherwise, you bend the body and call it “Nemaz”! (prayer)
If you unite Siva (being) and shunya (non-being),
That is the inner Nemaz, indeed.)¹³

One cannot but appreciate the way Nund Rishi preserves and enriches the mystic and spiritual traditions of Kashmir. He does not reject the *sharia*, which is fundamental to Islamic Sufism, but comes up with a new and creative interpretation of it in the light of his own intense spiritual experience. To unite *Siva* (being) and the *Shunya* (non-being, or void) is the real *nemaz*—with what ease have the concepts belonging to different spiritual traditions been intermingled, and what a fantastic rhythm they create! The spiritual experience of the saint has highly recharged these concepts, and the terms connoting them appear to be dancing. A divine light emanates from this dance, which is so sharp that it pierces not only one’s eyes but also one’s heart. In one of his poems, with the refrain, “*Su ma var dita mou devo*”! (“Oh! God grant me the same bone”), Nund Rishi pays tribute not only to Lord Buddha but also to some other Buddhist and *shaivist* saints. In each of the *shaluks* (verses) the *Rishi* describes the spiritual attainments of the saint concerned, pays his tribute, and makes a fervent prayer to God to bless him (Nund Rishi) the same way. He had blessed the noble soul, and he be granted the same bone as the referred saint. Regarding this poem, one of the contemporary scholars in the field writes:

This didactic poem is read collectively and loudly in particular meditational congregations during the “Night of Power” in Khanqah-i-Moula and

Charar-i-Sharief. I say this with all certainty that Kashmir is the only place in the Muslim world where in the mosques the names of Non-Muslims are recited as syllables of prayer. Such evolved traditions provide basis for gradual evolution of a spiritual culture and emergence of a blended mystic Philosophy.¹⁴

Ahad Zagar is one of the most significant signatures of contemporary Kashmiri *Sufi* poetry. He has great command over the language. Like his other contemporary Samad Mir, he is well versed in the spiritual ethos of Kashmir, and by his contribution has definitely enriched the tradition. Some of his poems have ignited controversies in conservative religious circles of the Valley, and some clerics even issued *fatwas* against him. But threats and *fatwas* notwithstanding, he continued to articulate and express himself in the same controversial but piercing idiom. Here are some extracts:

I am the hidden secret of both the interior as well as the exterior.
 To whom shall I bow, and for whom shall I perform the “Nemaz.”
 I am the ultimate grace of both the mosque and the temple.
 I am the worshiper, but I am the one worshiped.
 I am the chain of birth and death.
 And it is me again who is to play the game of love.
 In the absence of Nothingness, there is no possibility of Being.
 Nothingness is all pervading.
 But if Nothingness is mere Nothingness,
 Who has deluded me?
 Realize Nothingness within yourself,
 Dance round nothingness like a moth.
 Keep your heart awake with Nothingness.¹⁵

By examining this kind of poetry even at the linguistic level, we can probably identify the sources from which the poet draws inspiration. To paraphrase these verses in rational prose would be mere sophistry. The poet has attempted to express an experience that transcends the rational and empirical categories. This kind of experience can be comprehended only at the level of faith and not at the level of reason. Zargar is a genuine and true representative of the mystical ethos of Kashmir.

Going back to the *Sufism* that originated from the Holy Koran, let me quote from the well-known book *The Quranic Sufism* by Dr. Mir Valiuddin, a practicing Sufi and a student and teacher of philosophy. In the chapter entitled “On the Descent of the Absolute,” he writes:

Now, the same Absolute Being that in the stage of transcendence is unknown and unknowable reveals Himself in multiple manifestations and different

forms, or in the terminology of eminent Sufis, descends in these forms, or individualises Himself in different forms. This is of such a nature that in spite of expressing Himself in different manifestations and multiple forms the Absolute Being maintains His immutable state, and no change of any kind does necessarily take place. The stages of descent are innumerable but the most marked of these are but six and these are termed the Six Descents by the Sufis. The first three of them are called *Marātib-i-Illahi* (Divine ranks) which are “*Ahadiyyat*” (Abstract Oneness), i.e., the state of Essence, the Infinite, the Indeterminate. The second is “*Wahdat*” (Unity), and the third “*Wahidiyat*” (Unity in Plurality). The remaining three are called *Marātib-i-Kawni* (worldly ranks,) which are “*Rub*” (Spirit), “*Mithal*” (similitude), and “*Jism*” (body).¹⁶

Without making any comparisons, let us remind ourselves that while discussing the process of manifestation from the perspective of Kashmir *saivism*, we came across some similar formulations, although not identical ones.

Delineating the essential features of *Sufism*, Syed Hossein Nasr in his book *Living Sufism* writes:

The Sufi teaches this simple truth that the basis of all faith or *imān* is unity. For as Shaykh Mahmud Shabistari writes in his *Gulshan-i-Raz*: “*Yakay been, yakay gony, yakay daan Badeen khatam aamad asal wa farah eemaan.*”

(“See but one, say but one, know but one,

In this are summed up the roots and branches of faith.”)

(The integration of humans means the realization of the one and the transmutation of the many in the light of the one.)¹⁷

Right from pre-Buddhist times, Kashmiri spiritual consciousness has been pursuing this goal of realization of the oneness of being, of course with varying degrees of success, and a Kashmir *Sufi* poet sings, “*Akh cha ti bayi bo ganzar maba, Hab ye chuy gumanaai*”¹⁸ (“Any consideration of the you and me is all but delusion.”).

It would be appropriate to conclude this chapter with a quotation from the already mentioned book by Syed Hossein Nasr, *Living Sufism*:

He who has gained a vision of that mountain top that touches the infinite rests assured that the climbers who are following other paths are nevertheless his companions on this journey which is the only meaningful journey of life itself. His certainty comes not only from the Vision of the peak, but also from his knowledge that those paths that have been chosen for man by God Himself do ultimately lead to the top, Whatever turns they may make on the way.¹⁹

NOTES

Where otherwise not indicated, the translations from Kashmiri into English are by the author himself.

1. Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, trans. D. F. Pears and B. F. Mc Guinness (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd, 1961), 151.
2. Walter Terence Stace, *Time and Eternity* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1952), 24.
3. Ibid., 19.
4. Qadir Saib Kehncha, *Kulyata Samad Mir*, ed. Moti Lal Saqi, 2nd ed. (Srinagar: J & K Academy of Art, Culture, and Languages, 1982), 446.
5. <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Buddhism>
6. Ananda Coomaraswamy, *Buddha and the Gospel of Buddhism* (Boston: University Books, 1975), 229.
7. Jaidev Singh, trans., *Siva Sūtras* (New Delhi: Motilal Banarsi das, 1979), 6.
8. Ibid., 16.
9. In this regard, the following verses of Lala should be considered:
 Idol is but stone, so is the temple,
 Above and below it is joined in one mass;
 O ignorant Brahmin! Whom would you offer worship to?
 Bring about the communion of the mind and the vital air (*prana*)
10. B. N. Parimoo, trans., *The Ascent of the Self* (Delhi: Motilal Banarasidas, 1978).
11. Bettina Baumer and Sarla Kurmar, eds., *Samvidullāsah, Manifestation of Divine Consciousness Swami Lakshmanjoo, Saint Scholar of Kashmir Šaivism—A Centenary Tribute* (New Delhi: D.K. Print World (p) LTD., 2009), 93–126.
12. Mir Valiuddin, *The Quranic Sufism*, 2nd ed. (Delhi: Motilal Banarasidas, 1977), 3.
13. B. N. Parimu, ed. and trans., *Nund Rish: Unity in Diversity* (Srinagar: J&K Academy of Art, Culture, and Languages, 1984), 154.
14. Ghulam Nabi Gowhar, “Kashmir Mystic Tradition” (paper presented as an extension lecture at the Institute of Kashmir Studies, University of Kashmir, Srinagar, Kashmir, October 2009).
15. Ahad Zargar, *Kulyat Ahad Zargar* (Srinagar: K.A. Zargar, 2007), 238.
16. Mir Valiuddin, *The Quranic Sufism*, 2nd ed. (Delhi: Motilal Banarasidas, 1977), 88.
17. Syed Hossein Nasr, *Living Sufism* (London: Unwin, 1980), 39.
18. Such Kral, *Sufi Shairi*, ed. Moti Lal Saqi (Srinagar: Academy of Art, Culture, and Languages, 1984), 78.
19. Syed Hossein Nasr, *Living Sufism* (London: Unwin, 1980), 134.

CHAPTER 4



SYNCRETIC TRADITION AND THE CREATIVE LIFE: SOME KASHMIRI MYSTIC POETS

Neerja Mattoo

As a Kashmiri Pandit woman growing up in Kashmir in the 1940s and 1950s, I was never aware of any difference between the Muslim or Sikh girls of the same social class and me, either in the neighborhood or in school and college. The fathers of most of us were Anglophone-educated professionals, not feudal aristocrats, who were keen to be a part of the then “modern world.” They were college teachers, civil servants, doctors, and engineers—not rich or affluent, but proud of their attainments, and what they cherished most was a “respectable” position in society. They had ambitions for their children, and though marriage was the first priority for daughters, they were not averse to their receiving the same education as sons, particularly since a college exclusively for women had been set up in Srinagar, the summer capital of Jammu and Kashmir, only a few meters away from our neighborhood. My girlfriends and I dressed in the same way, following the fashion of the day; spoke the same mix of Kashmiri-Urdu-English; ate and shared one another’s food; enjoyed the same movies and books; and had similar career ambitions. Of course, our mothers adamantly refrained from partaking of cooked food from the other community, which was understood and accepted, and caused no offence. Consumerism had not invaded our lives then. We were unselfconsciously guided by the positive philosophy of our Kashmiri Saint poets like Lal-Ded and

Nund Rishi, who, apart from addressing our spiritual concerns, also preached contentment and cheerful acceptance of what life had to offer. The following verse of Nund Rishi illustrates this point:

*Vethavaavas tan nani su ti doha Nasro,
 Ton vugara ta seni pani, su ti doha Nasro
 Nishi rani tu vuruni khani, su ti doha Nasro,
 Vurabata ta gada gain, su ti doha Nasro.¹*
 [A body bare to the chill winds from the Veth, (the River Jhelum)
 That too was a day, O Nasar!
 A thin gruel and saltless turnip leaves to eat,
 That too was a day O Nasar!
 The wife beside me and a quilt as cover,
 That too was a day O Nasar!
 A feast to relish with chunks of fish,
 That too was a day O Nasar!]

A shared past of togetherness in the midst of various kinds of deprivation and struggles for a better future made our brothers and fathers fight, as one entity, the Pakistani tribal invaders in 1947, who plundered and destroyed as they advanced into the Kashmir Valley. They had hoped to secure it for Pakistan by force when the British left the subcontinent—after dividing it into India and Pakistan—not waiting for the then ruler of the princely state of Jammu and Kashmir, Maharaja Hari Singh, to formally accede to either nation-state. At that time, Kashmiris still breathed an air redolent with the syncretic thought of our poets and seers; we were still in touch with them. Now, when that cohesive social fabric is in tatters, it is time that we reminded ourselves of the syncretic tradition and creative life of our mystic poets, which gave sustenance to that unique identity of Kashmiris, known as *Kashmiriyat*, that is, Kashmiriness, which was visible in a spontaneous acceptance of diversity. There is no doubt that the word *Kashmiriyat* is anathema in the “majoritarian” discourse on Kashmir these days. It may seem ironic that while the major players wish to emphasize a separate Kashmiri identity, they do not want to use the word *Kashmiriyat* to define it. Why has the word become suspect? What did it stand for that is repugnant to them? Has the acceptance of a tolerant, inclusive way of life in which plurality and diversity flourished and were allowed to flourish suddenly become unfashionable? Have religious identities become so dominant that they subsume ethnic, cultural, or linguistic identities? No matter how disappointing to an older generation of Kashmiris it might be, this fact stares us all in the face

today and cannot be denied. The word has become suspect because it is seen as a deliberate design, part of a perceived grand hegemonic Indian project to stress qualities in Kashmiris that they no longer want to be proud of, which they feel were used by the Indian state to trivialize the political aspirations of Kashmiris. Young Kashmiris today have no idea of the inclusive voice our poets used in the past, or even if they do have a vague idea, they are rather embarrassed by it and tend to dismiss it as a rare aberration. It is to them that I address this chapter, so that they see that motifs reinforcing their knowledge of many faiths and mystic practices across cultural and communal divides are constantly present in the literary works of old Kashmiri poets.

Syncretic creativity is the outcome of a reciprocal process of symbiosis where influences from one another are willingly absorbed, because they strike a chord somewhere in minds and hearts and set up resonances with far-reaching consequences. Instead of being hemmed in by one particular religious or cultural parameter, creative people reach out and intermingle, enriching their experiences. The points of reference and allusions, mythological or historical, do not stay exclusive to particular communities, but overarch their creativity, with the assumption that they will be understood by the readers or listeners. Creativity is a celebration of diversity, an inclusiveness that enriches a river with waters from a hundred streams flowing into it. Thus, we hear songs composed by Muslim poets sung at *Sufiana Melhfs* (musical gatherings of a mystical movement within Islam) by Muslim singers, invoking the Hindu deity *Siva* or the *Devri* (goddess). While Baba Allauddin Khan² composes a song of prayer to *Sharada* (another name for Saraswati, the Hindu goddesses of learning and the arts), the Afghan Governor of Kashmir Ali Mardan Khan³ writes a *Siva Stuti* (A Sanskrit devotional hymn recited in worship of the Hindu deity *Siva*), and our Kashmiri mystic poet Ahmad Batwari (1845–1918) refers to Hindu gods and mythology as well as to the *Sufi* Mansur.⁴ Batwari writes:

*Yandrazuni durbar, Naghma karan chhuy Paristano,
Soz-i-Mansur grazaan, kan me ditsov, gos dewaano*⁵
(The fairyland resonates with song and dance in the court of Indra,⁶
The mesmerizing poetry of Mansur resounds all around,
As I listened, entranced, my ecstasy knew no bounds.)

The following quote is a fine example of the inclusive vocabulary and idiom used by a Muslim mystic poet Habibullah Nowshehri

(1555-1617). He happily plunges into Hindu mythology, to create a vivid, graphic picture of *Siva*, complete with all his attributes, familiar to those who worship his icon. Particularly startling is the word *khasi* that he uses for cups. It is a small bowl-like cup with a base, made of a metallic alloy, that was used for drinking only in Kashmiri Pandit houses. The authenticity of touch and the intimate knowledge of the “Other” seem to belong to a “fabled past” in today’s Kashmir!

Amiday Suramati Sanyasi
Tsuri dil ti myon vodasi neuv
Jati Chhas Gang ta buti shahmaro
Deki chhus shubaan tsandramatar
Atbi chhis poshiki ta amret khasi
Tsuri dil ti myon vodasineuv⁷
 [That ash-smeared ascetic, there!
 He stole my despondent heart.
 The Ganga in his locks, a cobra round his neck
 Brow decked with the crescent moon and star,
 In his hands are held bowls of flowers and nectar.]

Kashmiri mystic poetry is replete with such syncretism. How did it happen? To understand this phenomenon and to highlight it for the reader, I have considered one particular period of Kashmiri history.

From the eleventh century onward, with the decline of centuries of Hindu rule, Islam was beginning to make forays into Kashmir in various forms, aggressively as well as unobtrusively. It tried to come as an invading force to Kashmir in 1015, under the command of Mahmud of Ghazni in one of his expeditions to India in AD 1015, but failed to establish itself, because Mahmud faced stiff opposition from the local Hindu king and had to beat a retreat. As for the unobtrusive way, it made a gentler entry as a new philosophy brought in by the *Sufis* and other learned Muslim scholars from Iran and Central Asia, where Islam had swept aside other older religions and become the common faith. With the rise of Turkish militarism and its imperialistic expansion, however, the *Sufi* way of life, with its pacifist message and belief in the brotherhood of all human beings, came into conflict with the powerful establishment that had developed an interest in political, military, and sociocultural hierarchies and exclusivenesses to perpetuate itself. The radical message of *Sufism*, consequently, was under threat. The orthodoxy branded the *Sufis* as heretics, particularly after the renowned *Sufi* Mansur-al-Hallaj had deeply offended the Muslim clergy in Baghdad, Iraq, by pronouncing the words, “*Ana'l-Haqq*”

(I am God). His words had merely expressed the *Sufi* belief in the immanent presence of God in everything, including a human being, but to the uninitiated it was blasphemy, punishable by nothing short of death. Finally, the tyrannical rule of the *Mongols*, who, under the conqueror Timur, had spread their empire to Iran, also drove many *Sufis* away from their original home to the Valley of Kashmir with which there had been earlier contacts, as Kashmir stood at the cross-roads of various cultural and commercial influences. While traveling and interacting with the people of Central Asia, *Sufis* and their Islamic faith had already been influenced by *Mahayana Buddhism* and its austere asceticism and meditative practices. In Kashmir, the people were still Hindu, but theirs was a branch of Hinduism that is now known as *Kashmir Saivism*. In it, too, we find the influence of *Buddhism*, to the degree of its having broken free both from *Brahmanical* strictures and idol worship, and its belief that self-realization was possible for anyone who would wish to find it, no matter what his or her caste or religious fold. To the *Sufis*, therefore, Kashmir would be familiar and welcome territory. But with political instability and resultant decay of the economic, cultural, and social fabric, the religious practices of the populace of Kashmir had also lost their original meaning. The people had forgotten the essence of *Saivism*, and in the absence of worthy commentators or teachers, their religion had degenerated into mere *Tantric* ritual. From the sophistication of real *Saiva Darshan* (worshipping the form of Lord *Siva* that embodies pure consciousness), it had fallen into what is derogatively known as *Vamachar* (secret, occult practices).

A brief note on the essential features of *Kashmir Saivism*, which is a tradition that goes back to ancient times, but is historically documented from AD eighth century onward, is necessary here in order to locate the source of Lal-Ded's mysticism. According to the *Saivites* of Kashmir, it is the sage Durvasa who first revealed the original *mantras* (incantations or prayers) in his *Siva Sutras*, explaining the philosophy and practices of their belief. In a story reminiscent of the revelation of the Ten Commandments to Moses, it is believed that *Siva* himself revealed them to Durvasa by drawing him to a rock at the foot of the Mahadev Range in Srinagar, the summer capital of J&K, on which they were inscribed. These original sources are known among the believers as *Agamas* (something arrived on its own), which suggests their divine origin. The rock known as *Shankar Pal* (the rock of *Shankar*, another name of *Siva*) can still be seen, but there are, alas, no words of wisdom to be seen on it today; it is smooth as a slate wiped clean!

The *Sutras* were, later, further explained and elaborated upon by a succession of scholars known as *Saiva Acharyas* (teachers), prominent among whom were Vasugupta, Bhatta Kallata, Somanand, Utpaldev, and Abhinavagupta. Their commentaries and scholarly exposition of the subtle forms and content of *Saivism*, based on logic as well as intuitive comprehension, from the ninth to the early eleventh century, led to the evolution of a uniquely Kashmiri mystic philosophy, *Trika Sastra*, or what is now known as Kashmir *Saivism*. The world, in its view, is not an illusion, but real, born out of the playfully creative vibrations (*Spanda*) emanating from *Siva*, the supreme being. (The literal meaning of the Sanskrit word *Siva* is “auspicious” or “benevolent”). This divine creation, therefore, has to be appreciated by the senses, comprehended by the faculties, and apprehended intuitively, without becoming too attached to it. *Siva* is in it as well as outside it, and the highest goal of human life is to see itself at once as part of this divine play, as well as outside it. *Trika* is the method by which one can achieve this highest goal of human life, because it is concerned with creating a harmonious relationship among three entities—human, energy, and God—and then suggests three ways to achieve it: *Anavopaya*, *Shaktopaya* and *Shambhovopay*. Roughly translated, *Anavopaya* means using external aids like logic and other kinds of sense perceptions to lift the veil that hides the supreme being, even though He is ensconced within every living thing; *Shaktopaya* means withdrawal within one’s own being, meditating, in order to see Him; *Shambhovopay* means God’s grace, which enables one to see Him without any effort at all, that is, *being*, instead of *becoming*, which happens only rarely.

The chief influence of *Saivism* in daily life for a Kashmiri Pandit like me is in accepting all God’s creatures—animate and inanimate—as not only having sprung from the same source, but as a manifestation of *Siva*’s living presence; hence any distinction of religion, caste, gender, or race, although divisive, is only further proof of His reveling in diversity. Monoculture or homogenizing is, therefore, anathema as it belittles that supreme being’s grand, carefully worked-out, multi-chromatic design. Denying oneself nature’s bounties is also an insult to His generosity. Unlike other Hindus, when we Kashmiri Pandits celebrate the festival of *Siva*’s marriage to *Parvati* or *Shakti* (supreme energy), fish, mutton, and all available vegetables are cooked and offered in worship. The next morning, goodies are shared with friends and neighbors, Hindu and Muslim. The way we grew up was a constant celebration of diversity.

Now I examine *Sufi* philosophy as it manifested in Kashmir and became what is known as *Reshyot* or the *Rishi* Order, which was not a homogenized, rigid creed, but a catholic way of love influenced by indigenous genius, a life lived in close communion with God and all His creation. The *Sufis* liken infinity to an ocean, and the *Sufi*'s vocation is to discipline oneself to plunge into, rather drown in, infinity, so that he is drawn back into the source from which he was born in the beginning. Love for God and for all His creations, including themselves, therefore, is for them the path that leads to the implosion of divinity and self, which is the goal. Their creed implies total dedication. On the one hand, they believe in love, but on the other, there is a constant need to wage war against the soul, which refuses to submit to the intense discipline required to follow the path. This may seem a paradox, but it is not so to the *Sufi*. The way of love presupposes the presence of its opposite and, hence, the constant battle to overcome it. This coexistence, as it were, with and without the world is what brings the *Saiva Yogi* and the *Sufi* closest to each other.

The encounter between *Sufis* and local Kashmiris, used to *yogis*, must, therefore, have been rewarding to both. With their exemplary behavior, sincerity and firmness of faith, believing and practicing a doctrine of equality of all human beings, the message of the new arrivals must have struck a chord with the populace. Kashmiris were now face to face with a new choice of beliefs. There was much that was similar between this and their old faith, though outwardly they seemed to be in conflict, having sprung from soils so removed from one another. A spiritual orientation with an earnest desire to know and become a part of the ultimate reality, and a readiness to undergo penance in this pursuit, were some of the common attributes of *Saivism*, as practiced in Kashmir, and *Sufi* Islam. Thus, a kind of fusion of faiths took place, and it is from this very fusion that the *Rishi* order of Kashmir was born. Sheikh Nuruddin Wali, whom local Kashmiris call Nund Rishi, founded this spiritual brotherhood at the beginning of the fifteenth century. Apart from the spiritual, moral, and ethical influence it had on the people, this peculiarly Kashmiri order of *Rishis* enriched the stream of mystic poetry in Kashmiri, which continues to flow uninterrupted to this day, from Nund Rishi through Shamas Faqir (1843-1901) and others down to Bimla Raina (1947-). Lal-Ded appeared on the scene at a very interesting juncture in the history of ideas in Kashmir, and her life and work had a lot to do with the fusion that has given a distinct identity to Kashmiris' religious practices, whether Hindu or Muslim, hence the desire of both

the communities to claim her as their very own.⁸ To the old faith she is a symbol of resistance to the new, while to the new one, that of conquest of the old.

Now I attempt to demonstrate how syncretism became a way of life for Kashmiri poets right from Lal-Ded in the fourteenth century. Here is a well-known *vaakh* (saying or aphorism) of hers, which is an excellent example of her employment of a syncretic idiom:

*Shiva chhuy thali thali rav zaan
 Mo zaan Heund ta Musalmaan
 Trukay chhuk ta panun paan praznaav
 Soy chhay Sahebas suti zaanizaan⁹
 (Siva is everywhere, know Him as the sun
 Know not the Hindu different to the Muslim
 If truly wise (*Trikait*) know your own self
 That alone is the way to know the Saheb (Ultimate Reality).)*

Apart from the idea of breaking down barriers by invoking the image of the sun shining upon everyone without distinction and going on to emphasize the ideal of re-recognition, notice how seamlessly Lal-Ded hangs the Islamist valance of *Saheb* to the apparent reference to *Siva*. The verse embodies in its own syncretic idiom the religious, mystic, and linguistic synthesis it advocates.

Now I do a quick comparative study of a Nund Rishi *shruk* (verse) with the above *vaakh*:

*Akis maalis maji hundyan
 Timan duy traavith ta kyaye
 Musalmaanan kyaav Hendyan
 Kar bandan tosh Khoday¹⁰
 (Born of the same parents,
 Who can create division between the two?
 Whether Muslim or Hindu,
 Bind the two, and God you will please.)*

Here is another *shruk* of his in which syncretic diction is pervasive and a picture of a society in which reference points and idiom were inclusive:

*Aravalan naagrad rovukh,
 Saada rovukh tsooran manz
 Mudagaran gwor panditha rovukh,
 Raazahaenz rovukh kaavan manz¹¹*

(You were a fountain, but lost in rocks,
 You were a saint, but lost among thieves,
 You were a wise teacher, but lost among the ignorant,
 You were a swan, but lost among crows!)

Mystic Aziz Darvesh (d. 1819) echoes the same sentiments in the nineteenth century:

*Ath kadalas karu zolaano
 Ami apor chbuy “fana filab”
 Na chhu Hyund tay na Musalmano
 Bozu janu suy soz jaan¹²*
 (Tie yourself with chains to this bridge
 Across it you'll find annihilation in the divine
 Where there is neither Hindu nor Muslim
 Listen to that song so sweet, Oh do!)

I quote the Sufi mystic Shah Ghafoor's (d. 1850) verses to show how an inclusive vocabulary transcends compartmentalized religious beliefs:

*Brahma, Veshnu, Maheshwar gaarun
 Shaf chbuy tabunday zuv
 Paan hay khatnay jaan behk marun
 Dharnay dharun sohamsu¹³*
 (Search for Brahma, Vishnu, and Maheshwar,
 The life that flows through you is their boon,
 Should you lose them, it is death indeed,
 Meditate with faith on *Suhamsu*.)

The literal meaning of “Suhamsu” is “I am that,” the ideal state to which all mystic seekers aspire, when the differentiation between the individual and God disappears.

Rupa Bhavani (1625–1721) is another major voice in this tradition, but unfortunately, rather underrated because of the obscurity of her *vaakhs*. During the intervening centuries between Lal-Ded and Rupa Bhavani, Kashmir had witnessed sweeping historical and cultural changes and, consequently, had become a linguistic melting pot, absorbing words from the north, including Iran and Central Asia, as well as from the south. Bhavani's Kashmiri Pandit family left Kashmir and settled down in the Deccan, fearing religious persecution in the late fifteenth century, and returned to Kashmir only a couple of generations before her birth. In her mystic poetry, therefore, the influence

of Sanskrit, the language of religion and intellectual discourse among Brahmins, is much more visible. I observe that she did not share Lal-Ded's mission to make the esoteric accessible to common men and women—she addresses the initiated, to whom her diction and ellipses would have been comprehensible. She, however, establishes a direct link with Lal-Ded in the following verse. She establishes a firm link with Lal-Ded in the syncretic tradition thus:

*Om gwar antar that nirmalam
 Shuddham atyant vidyadharam
 Lal naam Lal Parmam gwaram
 Shiva Madhav naaham param Brahma sohum¹⁴
 (Having established the name of the Guru, flawless,
 Pure, all-knowing, in my inner self,
 Lal is the name, Lal my supreme guru,
 Neither Siva nor Madhav, myself the Supreme Self am I.)*

In spite of her sanskritized vocabulary, the nonduality of human beings is established by her in the following verse:

*Saarith gata travith gwashas tsayas
 Maarith saary yim chani paanths yendri
 Tavay sabazkali yug saadith
 Sarvavadi zaanim gyaan paanas hyuvai¹⁵
 (Feeling my way through darkness, transcending
 The senses five You gave me, I entered the abode of Light,
 Practicing the yoga of Sahajkal, I realized,
 All seekers were like me, on the same path to the same goal.)*

Love for music is evident in Kashmiri mystic poetry, and this too links our poets, irrespective of their faith. Khwaja Habibullah Nowshehri puts it very clearly here:

*Saaz santoor dahraaye
 Dar shariat no chhuyye
 AAshikas tee bas chhuyye
 Yara gathsaro divye¹⁶
 (The instruments saaz, santoor, and dehar,
 Though not part of the Shariat (Islamic Law)
 For the lover they are the only things that matter,
 Friend, let's go where the celebrations are!)*

And Rupa Bhavani too cannot do without music. In fact her choice of instruments is in itself an exercise in syncretism!

*Var diyi ta b u neray vasa
 Bhumi pad game rasa rasa
 Khasaan ta shabd shunum aabang
 Saarang rag veena ta chang¹⁷*
 (If He should grant the boon, I shall go forth
 Step by step, rung by rung I rise,
 The Word I hear, accompanied
 By the music of sarang, veena and chang.)

Finally the diversity of mystic experience itself is fused in these poets—they talk of a similar process.

Here is a *vaakh* from Lal Ded:

*Deev vatta divar vatta
 Petha bon chbuy ikavaath
 Pooz kas karakh hutta Batta
 Kar manas tu pavanas sangaath¹⁸*
 (Your idol is stone, the temple a stone too—
 All a stone bound together from top to toe!
 What is it you worship, you dense Brahmin?
 True worship must bind the vital air of the heart to the mind.)¹⁹

In another *vaakh*, she describes her experience clearly:

*Damadam kormas damanhaale
 Prazalyom deph ta naneyam zaath.
 Andaryum prakash nebar thsotum
 Gati manza rotum ta karmas thaaph.²⁰*
 (The bellows pipe I pressed gently, muffling its breath,
 The lamp lit, in its radiance I stood revealed.
 I let the inner light burst out in the open,
 Through the darkness caught hold of Him and would not let go.)²¹

Lal-Ded's metaphors are not obscure; they come from ordinary life.²² In the above *vaakh* she uses a metaphor from the blacksmith's forge to explain a subtle concept of *Trika Sastra*, that is, the threefold knowledge that is the essence of Kashmir *Saivism* as explained earlier. She is talking about the intensely disciplined practice of breath control as part of *samadhi* (yogic meditation).

Here is a Shams Faqir's (1843–1904) verse, which is uncannily similar in experience:

*Praan Zolnam pavanuki naaran
 Shashkali hund naar me chhuye*

Samah kornam ami omkarān²³
 (My soul set aflame by the fire of vital airs
 The radiance of the mystical moon envelopes me,
 Om has put me in tune, lost me to the world.)

And here is Khwaja Habib in the same frame of mind and spirit:

Arifav ta aashikav rachay van
Mani buz Mansuri naara dazas tan
Analhaq por tani manz marakan²⁴
 (Love's devotees sought refuge in the forests
 The Word revealed to Mansur (reference to *Sufi* Mansur al-Hajjaj), his
 body ablaze
 "I am the Truth" he dared to shout to the populace around.)

Here is a *vaakh* of Rupa Bhavani, which sounds almost totally *Sufi* and uses a mixture of linguistic influences:

Deeb anand nad may
Lutsan pyala mutsar
Saqiya pilao Hu Ha
Bu, Buha ha ha matwala²⁵
 (The body in bliss—a river of wine!
 Lay open the cups of eyes
 Oh Saqi,²⁶ get me drunk on Hu and Ha
 Transported, I laugh in ecstasy!)

I would like to conclude with a juxtaposition of a Lal-Ded *vaakh* with a Swachha Kral (d. 1891) verse:

Gwaras prithsyam saasi latte
Yath na kenh vanaan tas kya naav
Prihsaan prihsaan thuchis ta loosus
Kenh nasa kyathaam draay²⁷
 (A thousand times I asked the Guru,
 Pray how name Him who has no name?
 I asked in vain, exhausted and sunk,
 Till out of nothing something emerged.)

And now Swachha Kral:

Kenh nay os kyathani os
Kenhnas mani chhu kenthsa
Kenhnas mane zaanan gos

*Panay os bu bahanay*²⁸

(When there was nothing, something was,
Some meaning there is in that something,
The meaning dawned on me slowly
He was everything, I a mere excuse.)

These old poets owned everyone, forever widening their points of reference to give comfortable space to every listener. Therefore, delving into our past heritage and celebrating its plurality instead of being embarrassed by it not only can be aesthetically satisfying, but can also enrich us as human beings who must rise above the confines of a particular belief system and be inquisitive about and empathetic to the “Other,” who, we must realize, cannot be wished away.

NOTES

1. Jaya Lal Kaul, trans., and Neerja Mattoo, rev. ed., *Kashmiri Lyrics* (New Delhi: Sahitya Academy, 2008), 8.
2. Celebrated twentieth-century Indian musician, composer, and teacher, the father of the sarod maestro Ali Akbar Khan and guru of the sitar maestro Ravi Shankar.
3. One of the Pathan governors, through whom the Afghans ruled Kashmir from 1752 to 1819.
4. Mansur-al- Hallaj, the Iranian Sufi teacher (858–922), who in a state of mystic ecstasy cried out “Ana al Haq” (I am the Truth), believing that he had become one with God. For this he was charged with heresy, and the Abbasid Caliph Al Muqtadir sentenced him to die in a particularly barbaric manner—his body was cut into pieces and then burnt, the ashes scattered to the winds.
5. This verse is from memory.
6. The ruler of paradise in Hindu mythology, the god of rain.
7. Jaya Lal Kaul, trans., and Neerja Mattoo, rev. ed., *Kashmiri Lyrics* (New Delhi: Sahitya Academy, 2008), 12.
8. Editor’s Note: Through her poetry, Lal-Ded questioned restrictive cultural mores; religious, social, economic, and gender hierarchies; and the relevance of esoteric knowledge. She deconstructed traditional dichotomous categories and anticipated the postmodern notion of the implosion of the Supreme and Nature, the individual Self with the Universal Self.
9. Shiban Kaul Raina, *Lal Ded*, translated into Hindi and comp., Shiban Kaul Raina (Lucknow: Bhuvan Vani Trust, 1977), 99.
10. This verse is from memory.
11. Jaya Lal Kaul, trans., and Neerja Mattoo, rev. ed., *Kashmiri Lyrics* (New Delhi: Sahitya Academy, 2008), 8.

12. Ibid., 18.
13. Amin Kamil, ed. and comp., *Kashir Sufi Shairi*, vol. 2 of 3 vols. (Srinagar: J & K Academy of Art, Culture and Languages, 1965), 95.
14. *Shri Rupa Bhavani Rahasyopadesa: Rupa Bhavani* (Srinagar: Alakh Sahiba Trust, 1977), 71.
15. *Shri Rupa Bhavani Rahasyopadesa: Rupa Bhavani* (Srinagar: Alakh Sahiba Trust, 1977), 99.
16. I have heard this verse sung at *Sufiana Mehfil*s (conclaves).
17. *Shri Rupa Bhavani Rahasyopadesa: Rupa Bhavani* (Srinagar: Alakh Sahiba Trust, 1977), 107.
18. Shiban Kaul Raina, *Lal Ded*, translated into Hindi and comp., Shiban Kaul Raina (Lucknow: Bhuvan Vani Trust, 1977), 37.
19. The Hindu trinity of the creator, preserver, and destroyer.
20. Shiban Kaul Raina, *Lal Ded*, translated into Hindi and comp., Shiban Kaul Raina (Lucknow: Bhuvan Vani Trust, 1977), 66.
21. Sahajkal.
22. Editor's Note: Lal-Ded renders her teachings with sensuous imagery, making her metaphors easier to visualize. The ravages of time and the purported liberation of women in the twenty-first century have not diminished the power of Lal-Ded's radicalism, the tangible beauty of its poetry, and its pertinence in this day and age.
23. This verse is from memory.
24. Ibid.
25. *Shri Rupa Bhavani Rahasyopadesa: Rupa Bhavani* (Srinagar: Alakh Sahiba Trust, 1977), 120.
26. The wine server in a tavern.
27. Shiban Kaul Raina, *Lal Ded*, translated into Hindi and comp., Shiban Kaul Raina (Lucknow: Bhuvan Vani Trust, 1977), 83.
28. Amin Kamil, ed. and comp. *Kashir Sufi Shairi*, vol. 2 of 3 vols. (Srinagar: J & K Academy of Art, Culture and Languages, 1965), 76.

P A R T III



CONCEPTUALIZATION OF
SOVEREIGNTY, DEMOCRATIC
GOVERNANCE, AND REGIONAL
STABILITY

CHAPTER 5



DEMOCRACY AND GOVERNANCE IN KASHMIR

Noor Ahmad Baba

People across the world have known Kashmir as a problem that the Indian subcontinent has been afflicted with for more than 60 years. In this context, Kashmir is being seen as a region with divergent claims from India and Pakistan with a degree of international recognition, reinforced by the two nation-states' actual control of portions of the former princely state of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K). The state has been mostly seen as a sort of territorial dispute between the two contending nuclear powers, which makes it one of the most dangerous places in the world. The international community has occasionally been concerned over the growing tensions between the two parties in dispute. But in this process, the sufferings of the people caught up in the conflict have almost been lost sight of. Let me assert at the outset that more than a bilateral dispute, the Kashmir problem is fundamentally that of its people. We, the people of the state, have lived with this problem and have borne the brunt of its political, social, economic, physical, and psychological consequences. More particularly, it has been the Valley of Kashmir and its immediate surroundings that have remained most vulnerable and suffered the worst in this continuing conflict. From being historically at the cross-roads of the civilizational interface, we, the people of Kashmir, were pushed to a sort of geophysical seclusion, economic disconnect, and sociopsychological insecurity.

In this chapter, I highlight how this community, on account of the continuing conflict, has remained politically dispossessed and bereft of a functional democracy and normal governance. It is my contention that the conflict has not allowed normal politics to function in the state. The underlined argument of my chapter is that the Kashmir problem is grossly distorted in its representation if it is referred to only as a conflict between two nation-states, India and Pakistan. More than that, the dispute involves the people of the place, who have their own history and aspirations.

We, the people here, have suffered disadvantages and insecurities of being victims of this conflict, the division of the land, and erection of arbitrary borders that have restricted our options and pushed us to a sort of periphery, and deprived us of a functioning democracy. We have been rendered politically dispossessed, have been deprived in terms of rule of law and advantage of rights that people across the world enjoy, and have suffered disadvantages of having been under the shadow of abnormally high militarization and repressive laws like the Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA) and Public Safety Act (PSA), which give the Indian military carte blanche in Jammu and Kashmir.¹ The focus of this chapter is on how the people here have remained deprived of normal politics, effective governance, and a functioning democracy.

For the effective functioning of a democracy, and for governance to be more efficient and responsive, a proper political context is needed within which these can operate. Unfortunately, in the context of Kashmir, the requisite atmosphere has remained wanting ever since 1947. Situations and factors that cannot be taken as normal have characterized the political context in Kashmir. It all happened because the legitimacy of the accession process remained undermined because of its contestation, within as well as externally. Maharaja Hari Singh's accession did not substantially contribute to the legitimacy of the Indian Union's hold on Kashmir, as his own legitimacy to rule the state was being questioned by the predominant majority of his subjects. The ruling dynasty, on account of the very nature of its state formation and also because of the character of its politics, was prejudicial and blatantly partisan in favor of a particular community, with which it identified itself in terms of its primordial lineage.² Under this arrangement, Muslims (that constituted 78 percent of the population) in general and Kashmiri Muslims in particular suffered a number of disadvantages resulting in their alienation.³ In political terms, because of the partisan character of the regime, Maharaja Hari Singh's decision had moral validity in the areas of his personal and primordial linkages

and influences, that is, Dogra-dominated areas of Jammu region.⁴ Even externally, Pakistan, which on account of the composition of its population and geoeconomic placement had expected the state to become part of it, has all through contested the validity of the Instrument of Accession as legitimate and final. It even attempted to take over the state forcibly through tribal intervention, soon after independence in October 1947. Even the Indian leadership, in the context of its principled position on principalities like Junagarh, accepted the provisional nature of the Instrument of Accession and need for referring it to the people of the state for their decision in the matter of remaining with either India or joining the state of Pakistan.⁵

Thus, as a result of the conflict and contestations between the two states, even entry of the Indian forces into the state was not able to settle the problem of the state's status for good. It tragically got, and has remained, divided into two parts. Some areas of the state came under the control of Pakistan, while the larger and most important part came under the control of the Indian dominion. With this, Kashmir became an international dispute with endorsement of this character through a number of United Nations (UN) resolutions. It seems that more than the legal niceties of the accession, it was the physical force that became the main deciding factor about the possession of the respective areas.⁶ Thus, the princely state of J&K not only got divided, but also became and has remained a major bone of contention and contestation in the subcontinent, leaving its destiny unresolved, at least in moral and political terms. As the state was effectively divided, its political forces too remained polarized on issues of fundamental political significance. Ethnoregional plurality has added to the political complicacies pervading the state. Thus, the political context in case of J&K has come to be defined by the divided structure of the state, its disputed political dispensation in both its internal and external dimensions, disadvantages of its seclusion from its natural surroundings, and the resultant politico-institutional distortions.⁷ The Kashmir problem as we know it today is, thus, rooted in the multiplicity of objective historical factors, and there are different layers of its manifestations. Kashmir emerged simultaneously as a problem for its people and an international dispute between India and Pakistan with recognition from the international community.⁸ In its internal dimension, the conflict as we know has many tangible political, psychological, economic, and moral bases rooted in history. We must begin with an admission that all major conflicts are generally rooted in certain objective historical situations. If not addressed, the consciousness of such conflicts with the passage of time becomes an integral part of the collective subconscious of the

society in which the conflictual situation emerges. This is true of the Kashmir conflict also. Therefore, in spite of the occasional changing manifestations of the conflict in Kashmir, its underlying cause and the core concerns have, by and large, remained the same.

In this context, politics in Kashmir, from the very beginning of the accession with India, has been a victim of the lack of mutual trust between the people of Kashmir and governments in Delhi and Srinagar. I am analyzing democracy, in the contemporary context, not only as an institutional arrangement but more as the empowerment of people, ensuring rule of law and guaranteeing rights and securities fundamental for living a good life. On most of these counts, democracy and governance in Kashmir continue to be grossly deficient. So the operational context of politics that includes democratic functioning and governance is greatly determined by the problematic nature of Kashmir.⁹ Democracy is generally viewed as an expression of popular sovereignty and a mechanism of empowering the constituents. The main vehicle of this vision of democracy is supposed to be the free exercise of universal adult franchise through fairly conducted periodical elections. But in Kashmir it has rarely been so.¹⁰ Since the lay person's choice rarely mattered, elections in Kashmir were generally manipulated. Thus, the system that evolved lacked in democratic substance.¹¹ Whatever good happened in Kashmir was more because of the benevolent nature of some authoritarian personalities like Sheikh Mohammed Abdullah or Bakhshi Ghulam Mohammed in power. They did not do whatever they did because of democratic compulsion but in spite of the lack of it. Many such regimes that came to power, through not very fairly conducted elections, remained contemptuous to the people on the assumption that they (people) didn't matter for their stay in power. More often these governments remained more sensitive to the central government in New Delhi than to the people in Kashmir. Central governments in New Delhi have almost always taken recourse to the oft-repeated practice of playing safe by allowing a secure passage to the government in power in the state by not addressing some of the basic and legitimate concerns of even mainstream parties and individuals. The relationship of mistrust born out of it has been responsible for the gradual erosion of J&K's autonomous status and subversion of the democracy.¹²

According to the second and more limited view, democracy is seen mainly as a legitimate mechanism of elite circulation in which the electorate exercises some choice. But this choice is limited to favoring one set of elites against the other at a given opportunity. This makes different groups of elites compete with one another for winning over

the electorate, bringing a certain degree of accountability into the system. In the process, some good is done to the masses. That is why the elite in a competitive democracy becomes more responsive to the urges and aspirations of the common person than under nondemocratic and authoritarian regimes. Competitive democracy also gives stability to the system as different groups of elites, who are otherwise influential in the society, develop stakes in the system and in its stability. Even in this limited sense, competitive democracy did not work in Kashmir.¹³ In the history of J&K, as I observed earlier, elections have mostly been used to endorse the regime in power and not to work as a vehicle of elite circulation or regime change. This greatly reduced the co-optational capacity of the system.

Democracy, the way it has been manipulated in Kashmir, pushed the nongoverning elite to greater alienation from the system. It started right from 1951 and climaxed in the 1987 elections.¹⁴ The 1951 election became a trend-setter for future elections that were held in the Valley till 1975. Moreover, in the changed atmosphere after 1953, the situation became somewhat relatively normal in Jammu. For the Valley, the credibility of the elections held in-between these years was further undermined by the fact that after 1953 even the personal legitimizing factor of Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah's charisma was not only absent but also worked as a factor that further diluted the legitimacy of the political process. After 1953, with the exit of Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah, the popular face of the ruling elite became extremely narrow and could hardly afford to endanger its position by going to free and fair elections. Therefore, we find the pattern of uncontested returns of its candidates, particularly from the Valley. Out of 42 constituencies in the Valley in the 1957 elections, there were 32 unopposed returns. In the 1962 elections the number of unopposed returns was 30, and in 1967 it was 22 out of 42. It was more like a one-party state in which, at least in the Valley, no opposition party participated or was allowed to participate in the elections. All this was being done in complicity with the central government in New Delhi and under the Election Commission of India, more as a part of the National Agenda.¹⁵

The political events of 1953 that led to the dismissal of Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah, the most potent advocate of the state's autonomy, started casting their shadow on the state's special position granted under Article 370. This facilitated the process of greater legal merger of the state within the Indian Union, beginning with the presidential order of 1954 and culminating in 1965, bringing the state, in terms of effective powers, almost at par with any other

state of the Indian Union. During 1964–1965, Articles 356 and 357 of the Indian Constitution were made applicable to the state. Under these articles, the central government was empowered to dismiss an elected government and assume all legislative functions of the state. It was the misuse of this provision in 1984 that,¹⁶ in essence, became instrumental in bringing about the collapse of the political machinery in the state in 1989–1990. It happened in spite of the fact that Article 370 in its nominal shape still forms part of the Indian Constitution. “This has left only the provision of State Subject of some worth with the State.”¹⁷ A provision that was there since 1927 could remain even without the ratification of Article 370.¹⁸ However, as discussed earlier in this chapter, forging of greater legal integration did not help the cause of politico-emotional integration of the state. In fact, this process further undermined the legitimacy of the Indian hold vis-à-vis the people of Kashmir. This is the reason that in spite of greater legal integration carried out during 1953–1975, the state’s political future within the Indian Union has remained most fragile and uncertain.

Because of the 1953 development, India lost its most important ally, Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah, in Kashmir. It was he, whose endorsement was seen as vital for Kashmir’s accession to India, who turned to become the greatest delegitimizing factor for the Indian claim in Kashmir. He became instrumental in socializing the post-partition generation in Kashmir in accepting it as an unresolved dispute.¹⁹ Democracy, as I underlined earlier, became its major victim. This façade had to be sustained and supported by elections that were not fair, particularly in the Valley. State authority rested on continuous repression, leaving very little elementary civil and political rights and liberties to its people.²⁰ Corruption and nepotism as dubious mechanisms of rewarding the loyal among the elite were introduced.²¹ The common person was alienated and marginalized with hardly any democratic and political rights, and was forced to live under oppressive order and regimes that represented New Delhi more than their own people.²²

With the removal of Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah in 1953, the Plan for Social Reconstruction envisaged in the 1944 New Kashmir Manifesto also got derailed. The radical land reforms were the only program that the regime was able to carry out successfully in 1950. Abdullah’s exit left the proposed plan for grassroots democracy in the state completely sidelined, and instead created new hurdles for its development. The constitution of the state that was adopted in 1957 reiterated the commitment to the establishment of the *Panchayati*

Raj, which is a South Asian political mechanism of decentralized form of government in which each village elects its representatives, who are responsible for its affairs at the local level. However, nothing significant happened in evolving a viable system. The Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah-led National Conference (NC), which spear-headed the freedom movement in the Valley, had provided for the institutional arrangement for grassroots empowerment in its party program blueprint, the 1944 Manifesto. Kashmir was fortunate to have developed a greater emancipatory vision through this program.²³ It had conceived of a democratic system in the state with the concept of power to the people at the basic level. Among other things, it had provided for the establishment of the peoples' *panchayats* in the districts, *tehsils* or an administrative unit, villages, and cities. The Manifesto stated, "all the regions of the state shall have equal right to participate in the political power [,] and the same will be decentralized up to the district, block [,] and *panchayati* levels. The people will elect appropriate institutions so that they can exercise the powers thus transferred to them."²⁴ However, the dismissal of Sheikh's government in 1953 was a great setback to the whole reform process. Consequently, local self-government could not become functional in the state, in spite of the some half-hearted efforts in this direction.

Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah's assumption of power in 1975 as a result of the Indira-Abdullah accord turned out to be a positive development in the state's politics.²⁵ In this context the state became one of the first few in the country to introduce decentralized planning at the district and block levels.²⁶ However, in spite of this decentralization process, immediately no serious attempt was made to re-activate the *Panchayati Raj* system. Nevertheless, while the *Panchayati Raj* system gained momentum in some Indian states in the 1980s, a new interest toward the process was generated in J&K. So steps were taken to revive *Panchayati Raj* institutions to carry out the ideals of decentralization through restoring a democratic character to the local bodies. Consequently, under such inspiration the state government vigorously worked to evolve a fresh and comprehensive legislation that culminated in the adoption of the Jammu and Kashmir *Panchayati Raj* Act in 1989. The Act, at the outset, stated that *Panchayati Raj* in the state would be "an instrument of vigorous Local Self Government to secure the effective participation of the people in the decision-making process and for over-seeing implementation of developmental programs."²⁷ The salient features of the Act are that it reduced the voting age from 21 to 18 years, provided for holding of elections within six months of the suppression of a *panchayat*, provided for

direct election of the *Panchs* (assembly of five respected elders chosen and accepted by the rest of the villagers) and *Sarpanch* (chairperson), and constituted *Panchayati Adalats* (courts) comprising five members who would be nominated by the prescribed authority out of the panel prepared and recommended by the *Halqa Panchayat*. It empowered *panchayats* to prepare plans and implement schemes for poverty alleviation and employment generation, agriculture and allied activities, rural industrialization, health, universalization of elementary education, and so on.²⁸ The Act did not bar holding elections on party lines.

With all the merit in the *Panchayati Raj* Act, it remained dysfunctional as the situation that the state has been in since the passage of the Act in 1989 has kept democracy suspended in the state for a long time. Due to the eruption of militancy in J&K, this Act has remained only on paper. The *Panchayati Raj* elections of 2001 under the 1989 *Panchayati Raj* Act were conducted in a very difficult situation. In Jammu, because of the relative peace in that province, there was a somewhat enthusiastic response to the process. However, in Kashmir almost all opposition groups questioned the credibility and relevance of the elections in the given situation of turmoil. Some elements even went to the extent of terming the whole exercise “meaningless in the face of the unresolved political issue in Kashmir. Some of the separatist groups including the APHC (All Parties Hurriyat Conference) urged people to boycott the elections.”²⁹ As a result of this, while, by and large, there was a high degree of the participation of voters in the elections in Jammu and Ladakh, in the case of Kashmir the participant percentage was much smaller. The popular indifference, ongoing violence, and militancy had a tremendously negative impact in the Kashmir Valley. Due to this, hardly any electioneering could be seen. It is not only that very few voters came forward to cast their votes, but also that the people were not willing to contest the elections. The number of contestants who came forward to file their nominations was much smaller than the total number of constituencies. Some nominations were even filed without the knowledge of the concerned candidates.³⁰ In spite of this, a number of constituencies were declared vacant because no contestant came forward to contest the election there. For example, in Budgam district of Kashmir, 85 percent *Sarpanch* constituencies and 89 percent of *Panch* seats were declared vacant. In most of the constituencies, *Panches* and *Sarpanches* were declared elected un-opposed. In Budgam, in 101 out of 119 *Sarpanch* constituencies, no candidate filed nomination papers. Similarly, 807 out of the 903 *Panch*-level constituencies in this district

were vacant, while 96 constituencies had uncontested returns.³¹ This kind of attitude reflects not only the situation created by militancy, but also general withdrawal of people from the political process and a deep sense of social discontent. This also considerably undermined the electoral process and the functionality of *panchayati* System in the State.

It is only in 2011 that fresh *panchayati* elections were held in a somewhat changed and relatively peaceful atmosphere. No faction of the Hurriyat asked people to boycott the election process. Even Chief of the Hizbul Mujahiddin, Sayed Salahudduin, publicly recognized the need for local governance being kept outside the purview of political contestations so that some of the basic concerns of the people are attended to at the grassroots level. Therefore, a reasonably good number of people participated in the hope of seeing a semblance of governance restored at the grassroots level. After completing the electoral process in June/July 2011, the government has yet not been able to initiate measures that would empower these bodies and allow them to be fully functional. In light of the past experience of their functioning and in view of the basic political constraints, not many people here seem hopeful of these institutions kicking off to their full potential.

As I stated earlier, Sheikh Abdullah's assumption of power in 1975 was a positive development more because his return to power carried with it the promise of restoring the special position of the state in its original form. His impressive electoral victory in 1977 in what was considered to be the most fair election in the state's history was largely an outcome of the National Conference's use of symbolism for playing with the imaginations of the people with respect to the restoration of the original shape of the state's autonomy and opening of the Srinagar-Rawalpindi Road, etc.³² Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah's son Farooq's impressive electoral performance in the state in 1983 was not only an outcome of the same legacy, but also had the added dimension of an open defiance of Indira Gandhi's government's tendency of appropriating the center and the state of India in her person.³³ I underline that the roots of the present crisis in the state, to a great extent, can be safely traced back to Farooq's unjustified and even "unconstitutional" dismissal in July 1984 and installation of a regime that for its survival had to impose curfew for about 70 days of its initial 90 days' existence to preempt any protest demonstrations in the Valley.³⁴ This exposed the hollowness of the Accord that had brought the National Conference back to power with the promise of restoring the autonomous

position to the state that had been lost since 1953.³⁵ It was during the subsequent governor's/president's rule in 1986–1987 that extremist trends in Kashmir politics started emerging and gaining strength. Parties with proved secular, nationalist credentials like National Conference started losing ground and new forces with more radical, nonsecular tinge started gaining ground in the Valley. These forces later regrouped under the name of the Muslim United Front (MUF).

From his earlier dismissal as chief minister, Farooq Abdullah had drawn the preposterous conclusion that in order to stay in power, it was necessary to secure and enjoy the goodwill of the government at the center, and that the popular mandate was immaterial. This prompted him to enter into an alliance with the Congress party that was in power in New Delhi. This alliance totally undermined him and his capacity of representing the distinctive Kashmiri aspirations and identity urges of the people in the state. In other words, this alliance blocked the normal and moderate channels of expression of Kashmiri sentiments, thereby paving the way for extremist/more-radical forces to replace them as vanguards of the people and their interests in the state. This situation helped in strengthening the MUF to make it a major force in Kashmir politics. So much so that the Farooq Abdullah-led National Conference (NC)-Congress alliance had to resort to large-scale rigging in order to secure a clear majority in the State Assembly, which prevented the MUF from winning a respectable number of seats in the State Assembly. By doing this, a golden opportunity of exercising an influence of moderation on the MUF was missed by denying it an opportunity of participating in the democratic process and, thereby, co-opting it into the system. Instead, this exposed the NC-Congress alliance further and people got completely alienated. They lost faith in democracy, and the younger elements felt that in order to get justice, the only alternative left to them was to resort to armed violence. More significantly, it marked the resurgence of a separatist movement in the Valley with a vigor never witnessed earlier.³⁶ So we need to note that the present problem in Kashmir has not been born out of militancy; on the contrary, militancy was the outcome of the Kashmir problem. The source of all protests is some sort of serious dissatisfaction with the existing political arrangement. It takes a violent form only when normal and peaceful channels of expressions of dissent get blocked and constrain the disgruntled to revolt.³⁷

After 1987, the situation in Kashmir went beyond the normal political discourse in which the predominant majority of people lost faith

in the electoral process. The situation in the state became much worse in 1989, when there was a popular uprising combined with the beginning of militant activities. The first group of young men who took to violence comprised mostly those who had actually worked on the side of the MUF during the 1987 elections. These people were subjected to severe torture for their association with the opposition alliance. The objective situation, thus, created provided a good opportunity to Pakistan to get involved in Kashmir as never before. Political experts have almost unanimously held the view that the most important factor contributing to the post-1989 turmoil in Kashmir has been the total incredulity of its electoral practice.³⁸

In this context, even the 2002 and 2008 State Assembly elections, in spite of these becoming instruments of change in government, still restricted competition among only those who at one time or another had been a part of the ruling/governing elite. The 2002 State Assembly elections were different in that in the history of the state these were the first elections that resulted in the change of government through the electoral process.³⁹ The 2008 State Assembly elections have been similar in this respect.⁴⁰ The two elections were held in the context of the improved security situation in Kashmir. The people, who had become weary of violence and its traumatic consequences, were looking for a change to peace, healing, and reconstruction. It introduced a younger leadership to the scene that has introduced a relatively newer idiom into state politics, defined by its own assessment of the ground situation in the state, and does not necessarily repeat and parrot the language of the masters in New Delhi. These are some positive changes that have been initiated in Kashmir politics, which are likely to contribute a positive element to the politics and governance of the state. But all this does not mean a substantive change in the basic context of politics in Kashmir, referred to earlier in this chapter. We still have fundamental political questions unresolved. All major political formations in the state have admitted to the limited nature of their mandate while seeking support of the people. We continue with laws that are not in tune with democratic theory and practice. Both assembly elections, 2002 and 2008, resulted in a sort of coalition politics within the state, which many people believe has contributed to the forging of certain kinds of regional equations, further disempowering the Valley of Kashmir. Since 2002, the Indian National Congress, representing mainly the Jammu region, has remained a constant factor in the government as a kind of king maker with backing from Delhi, whereas the political divide in the Valley between the People's Democratic Party (PDP) and the National Conference (NC) has

marginalized both parties in terms of their capacity to bargain from a position of any strength. It is because of this factor that the NC, in spite of being the single largest party in the assembly, remained outside power from 2002 to 2008. After the 2008 elections, Congress entered into an alliance with the NC, leaving the earlier coalition partner, PDP, to fend as the main opposition within the legislature. Because of this, a sense of powerlessness, marginality, deprivation, and neglect has deepened in the Valley.

Normally democracy and carte blanche given to the army cannot go together. A high degree of militarization of the civilian space is still reflective of the abnormal political and security situation. Today, there is an institutional arrangement in the form of the Unified Command whereby, for all practical purposes, the civilian authority in the state, at least with reference to the security issues, has, in essence, remained subordinated to a supra-constitutional arrangement predominantly consisting of the top brass drawn from all military, paramilitary, and police agencies operating in the state. Such a heavy military presence has not helped in any way to solve the Kashmir dispute. The relative calm and peoples' distancing from violence was equated with restoration of normalcy in the state. It was not realized that we, the people of Kashmir, still continue to be trapped within the vicious circle of mistrust, vulnerabilities, protests, and excesses. In spite of periodical reminders of the gravity of the continuing situation, no initiative followed. The government in New Delhi practically gave up all efforts of finding a solution to long-term problems, in both its internal and external dimensions. Therefore, the unprecedented, widespread, and almost unstoppable protests during summer 2010 came as a great shock to many in India. 2010 marked a new type of public protest. It was widespread, encompassing almost all urban and rural segments of Kashmir. It was driven by public rage, guided by angry youth, and coordinated mainly through social networking. It initiated a whole new generation of Kashmiri teenagers into a culture of protest against the existing political dispensation. It exhibited the limitations of the enormous security establishment in restoring normalcy in Kashmir. Instead it demonstrated how military and paramilitary agencies through their inept handling fueled the public resentment rather than facilitating the restoration of the public order. It also exposed the helplessness of the civilian authority in the state to make any positive impact on the situation. The summer 2010 protests once again vindicated the need for addressing the issue of Kashmir in all its dimensions with full seriousness, statesmanlike vision, and courage of conviction. Till

that is done, we will continue to suffer within the political environment that lacks normalcy and, in spite of the institutional façade, lacks in democratic substance, rule of law, and effective and responsive governance.

Frequent popular uprisings, more than anything else, vindicate the fact that Kashmiris' alienation has not been alleviated. These uprisings have emphasized the urgency of serious dialogue aimed at resolving the issue. Recent developments have once again endorsed that the Kashmir issue is indigenously rooted and needs to be addressed as a problem of the people in tandem with its Indo-Pak dimension. A casual glance at the newspapers suggests that nowadays there is more civilian protest than militant activities in Kashmir. In addition to these aspects, the continued dispute on and in Kashmir has greatly undermined the normal and natural process of its economic growth. It is indicative of the abnormal context of politics within which we are operating. We still have a major chunk of people and leadership in Kashmir that stand outside the political mainstream.

In this context of uncertainty and conflict, the political leadership has always lacked the authority to govern effectively. It has not been able to deal with corruption, at one time introduced as a mechanism of rewarding loyalty. The economy has got into serious distortions, and the environment is seriously under threat. There is a lot of healing and reconstruction work to be done. The lack of trust of the people vis-à-vis the political system is manifested in their recourse to frequent street protests, rather than approaching universally recognized agencies of legal redressal. These are severe limitations within which our governance is working, and in my opinion, will continue as handicap in its working despite the good intentions that our leaders in the government may have. So there are no shortcuts in Kashmir. It requires a bold initiative to address Kashmir in all its dimensions, so that the state is restored to its normal political context for effective functioning of democracy in its essence.⁴¹ In the words of former Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee, in the path of peace and for a lasting solution to the Kashmir problem, we need not "traverse only on the beaten track of the past. Mindsets will have to be altered and historical baggage jettisoned."⁴²

NOTES

1. Editor's Note: A particularly draconian decree, the Jammu and Kashmir Public Safety Act (1978), permits law-enforcing agencies to detain a person for up to a period of two years on grounds of vaguely

defined suspicion. The Act originally stipulated that a detainee could be kept in custody for up to a year without being formally charged if public order was in jeopardy and for up to two years if the security of the state was jeopardized. A modification to the Act in 1990 made it nonobligatory for the authorities to provide the detainee with reasons for his or her arrest. The Armed Forces (Jammu and Kashmir) Special Powers Act was enacted in 1990, giving the union government in New Delhi and its representative in the state, the governor, the authority to arbitrarily declare parts of J&K "disturbed areas" in which the military could be willfully deployed to quell legitimate political activity.

2. The princely order of the Maharaja was ethno-culturally rooted in the Dogra segments of the Jammu population. Numerically speaking, this segment constituted the dominant part of about 20 percent of the total Hindu population of the state. Maharaja Hari Singh's ancestors had received Kashmir as a sort of reward for their services to the British during their campaign against the Sikhs. They did very little to win over the people of Kashmir, particularly its predominant Muslim segment. In 1931 Kashmiris launched an organized uprising that shortly spread to other parts of the princely state for the establishment of a popular order, culminating in the Quit Kashmir agitation in 1946. For a comprehensive account of the nature of Dogra rule, see Mirdu Rai, *Hindu Rulers, Muslim Subjects: Islam, Rights, and the History of Kashmir* (New Delhi: Permanent Black, 2004). See also Robert Thorp, *Cashmere Misgovernance* (London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1870); Prem Nath Bazaz, *The History of Struggle for Freedom in Kashmir* (New Delhi: Pamposh Publishers, 1954); M. Y. Saraf, *Kashmiris Fight for Freedom*, vol. 1 (Lahore: Ferozsons Ltd., 1977); and host of other writings on the subject.
3. They suffered these disadvantages on account of the partisan character of the regime, and the resultant discrimination in services, heavy taxation on handicrafts, forced labor, and so on. See Mirdu Rai, *Hindu Rulers, Muslim Subjects: Islam, Rights, and the History of Kashmir* (New Delhi: Permanent Black, 2004); and G. H. Khan, *Freedom Movement in Kashmir: 1931–1940* (New Delhi: Light & Life Publishers, 1980).
4. As said earlier, numerically speaking this segment constituted less than 20 percent of the total population of the state.
5. This commitment was reiterated by the Government of India on a number of occasions and in different contexts, locally, nationally, and internationally. See Sisir Gupta, *Kashmir: A Study in India-Pakistan Relations* (London: Asia Publishing House, 1966); and Robert G. Wirsing, *India, Pakistan, and the Kashmir Dispute* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994).
6. After the 1963 Chinese aggression, the former princely state of Jammu and Kashmir was divided into three parts under the control of

three different sovereign states. Out of the total area of 222,236 sq. km of what constituted Jammu and Kashmir till 1947, 35.15 percent, that is, 78,114 sq. km is presently under the control of Pakistan; 2.29 percent, that is, 5,180 sq. km, has been ceded by Pakistan to China; 16.92 percent (3,755 sq. kms.) was occupied by China during the 1963 aggression; and 45.64 percent (101,387 sq. km) remain with India. "Some Facts and Figures About Jammu and Kashmir," *Manthan*, New Delhi (October 1991).

7. Noor Ahmad Baba, "Reconnecting Kashmir: Need for Reopening Traditional Routes," *Epilogue*, Jammu, September 2008, 39–40.
8. There are a number of United Nations Security Council resolutions affirming the right of the people of the state to decide their own future political dispensation through a plebiscite in line with the Indian commitment.
9. See Sumantra Bose, *The Challenge in Kashmir: Democracy, Self-Determination, and a Just Peace* (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1997), 23–54; Sten Widmalm, *Democracy and Violent Separatism in India: Kashmir in a Comparative Perspective* (Uppsala: Uppsala University, 1997).
10. See G. N. Gauhar, *Elections in Jammu and Kashmir* (New Delhi: Manas Publication, 2002).
11. Former Chief Election Commissioner Lingdoh's admission undermined whatever credibility State Assembly elections in J&K might have had when he said that the 1977 State Assembly election was probably the only credible election held in Kashmir. The democratic part of liberal democracy, that is, rule of law, a multiparty system, periodic elections, peaceful change of power, and inalienable civil rights, receives far more emphasis than its institutional component.
12. Noor Ahmad Baba, "Kashmir Special Status and Political Dynamics of Centre-State Relations," in *Politics of Autonomy in Jammu and Kashmir*, ed. Hari Om, R. D. Sharma, Rekha Chowdhary, Jagmohan Singh, and Ashutosh Kumar (Jammu: Vinod publishers, 1999), 220–232; see also Sumantra Bose, *The Challenge in Kashmir* (New Delhi: Sage, 1997).
13. Because of their lack of confidence in the people, the central leadership has from the beginning allowed itself to remain tied down to a narrow and personally loyal elite in the state. For this purpose, it has furthered attempts to scuttle any possibility of allowing the circulation of the elite through free and fair elections. This began with the first ever elections that the state held under universal adult franchise for the Constituent Assembly of the state in 1951. After 1953 the popular face of the trusted elite in power became narrower, so much so that it became an embarrassment to the government in New Delhi. Prime Minister of India Jawaharlal Nehru is reported to have written to Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad after the 1962 polls, advising

him to lose a few seats in the future so that India's international image as a democracy wouldn't be tarnished. M. J. Akbar, *India: the Siege Within: Challenges to a Nation's Unity* (New York: Penguin, 1985), 258.

14. At the outset, because of the partition of the state and the migration of most of the Muslim Conference leadership from various areas of the state, the Valley and the peripheral areas of Jammu were bereft of any organized opposition. Opposition elements and forces were demoralized, traumatized, and organizationally in shambles. In this situation, the repressive character of the ruling regime ensured that nobody even filed nomination papers against the official candidates in the Valley. Thus, well before the polling began, "Sheikh Abdullah's followers were sure of full 75 seats," Joseph Korbel, *Danger in Kashmir* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1954), 221–222.

15. See G. N. Gauhar, *Elections in Jammu and Kashmir* (New Delhi: Manas Publication, 2002). Editor's Note: Later in 1953, Abdullah adopted a combative tone and appointed a subcommittee comprising members from the Muslim, Pandit, Sikh, and Dogra groups. This subcommittee propounded four viable options for Kashmir's future, all of which involved holding a referendum and independence for part or whole of the disputed territory. The subcommittee recommended, on the suggestion of Maulana Masoodi, the general secretary of the National Conference, that the people of Kashmir be offered the option of independence besides the option of acceding to either India or Pakistan. Abdullah decided to publicly advocate the third option as a feasible choice. But in the summer of 1953, an unbridgeable rupture occurred in the NC top brass. This rift pitted Abdullah and Mirza Afzal Beg (Valley Muslims) against Shyamal Saraf (a Kashmiri Pandit), Giridharilal Dogra (a Jammu Hindu), and Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad (a Valley Muslim). Abdullah's pro-independence stance received a severe blow when the dissident faction within the NC was joined by the Constituent Assembly speaker G. M. Sadiq and D. P. Dhar, a Pandit deputy minister of interior. The fall-out of this rift was the dismissal of Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah as prime minister by the titular head of state, Karan Singh, and his arrest under a law called the Public Security Act. Abdullah would be shuttled from one jail to the next for the next 22 years, until 1975. This coup was authorized by Jawaharlal Nehru. In September 1953, Nehru, who earlier had underscored Abdullah's importance to the resolution of the Kashmir issue, did a political volte face: he justified Abdullah's undemocratic eviction from office before the Indian parliament by asserting that the latter had "autocratic" methods that resulted in the loss of the majority of his cabinet and had caused trauma to the electorate. Despite his political maneuvers, Nehru and his ilk were unable to provide democratic justification for Abdullah's

shoddy removal from office. Although the election that was held in June of 1957 had a semblance of political equity, Abdullah's *bête noir* and a politician whose notoriety was by then unsurpassed, Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad, won his seat without any contest. Thirty National Conference candidates, including Bakshi, had overwhelming victories without an iota of opposition and another 10 National Conference candidates were elected after the nomination papers filed by opposing candidates were invalidated. Not surprisingly, the official responsible for vetting nomination papers was an unscrupulous Bakshi adherent, Abdul Khaleq. In the Jammu region, there was a contest of sorts for 20 of the 30 seats—the NC won 14 seats, the Praja Parishad bagged 5, and a party representing "low-caste" Hindus secured 1. The organization of a well-manipulated electoral process had enabled New Delhi to ensure the victory of the stooge faction that it patronized. Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad, who had been indisputably elected as the leader of the National Conference legislative party, was reinstalled as prime minister. The dominance of Bakshi and his henchmen was firmly entrenched not just in the Legislative Assembly but also in the legislative council. The monopolization of the two houses of the Assembly by the political faction sponsored by New Delhi legitimized the full-scale intervention of the central government allowing the incorporation of non-Kashmiri officials in important administrative positions and the subsequent marginalization of the well-educated segment of Kashmiri Muslims. The Pandit population of the Valley, which was a small minority, enjoyed privileges and perks in the political, civil, and economic structures of which the Muslim majority was deprived. During these fateful years in the history of Kashmir, an irreparable rift developed in the ruling clique when Bakshi, in his signature style, did not incorporate any members of the Communist faction headed by G. M. Sadiq into his cabinet, which he formed subsequent to the 1957 elections. Bakshi's inability or unwillingness to appease this faction motivated Sadiq to herald the creation of a separate organization, the Democratic National Conference, the rebel Communist group, which comprised 15 legislators. The prospect of an alliance being bolstered between the military regime in Pakistan and the Government of the People's Republic of China spurred New Delhi to bring about a rapprochement between the two warring factions, Bakshi's and Sadiq's, in 1960. Consequently, Sadiq along with his cohort was reincorporated into the cabinet. A couple of years after this reconciliation, elections were held in the state in 1962. Bakshi and his cabinet colleagues Sadiq, Mir Qasim, and Khwaja Shamsuddin won their Assembly seats without even a peep of opposition. Various political parties in the state leveled allegations of sham processes, malpractices, and illegal methods at the electoral process in J&K. But

Bakshi, again in his signature style, pooh-poohed the allegations and complaints.

16. Editor's Note: In order to quell Chief Minister Farooq Abdullah tacit declaration of autonomy, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi resorted to undemocratic and unconstitutional means as his government approached the end of its first year in 1984. In 1984, the Congress government in New Delhi orchestrated the formation of a new political party, comprising 12 National Conference legislators who unconstitutionally quit their party and formed a new government with the support of the Congress legislators in the J&K Legislative Assembly. The leader of this break-away faction was Ghulam Mohammad Shah. The 1984 coup de grâce was reminiscent of the 1953 putsch. Farooq's appeal for fresh elections was denied by J&K's New Delhi appointed governor, Jagmohan. The dismissal of the Farooq government was perceived as a blow to the morale of the Kashmir people who had placed him on the political pedestal previously occupied by his father, Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah.
17. Noor Ahmad Baba, "Kashmir Special Status and Political Dynamics of Centre-State Relations," in *Politics of Autonomy in Jammu and Kashmir*, ed. Hari Om, R. D. Sharma, Rekha Chowdhary, Jagmohan Singh, and Ashutosh Kumar (Jammu: Vinod publishers, 1999), 220–232. For a detailed account of the erosion of J & K's autonomous status, see *Report of the Autonomy Committee*, Jammu, 1999.

Editor's Note: Subsequent to India acquiring the status of a republic in 1950, the incorporation of Article 370 into the Indian Constitution ratified the autonomous status of J&K within the Indian Union. Article 370 stipulates that New Delhi can legislate on the subjects of defense, foreign affairs, and communications only in just and equitable consultation with the government of J&K, and can intervene on other subjects only with the consent of the J&K State Assembly.

18. There are several states in India that have enacted such provisions under the normal legal provisions provided under the Indian Constitution. Editor's Note: The law concerning state subjects was promulgated in the princely state of Jammu and Kashmir on April 20, 1927, by Maharajah Hari Singh. This injunction was meant to protect the interests of the local landed class and the peasantry against wealthy people from outside the state who had the wherewithal to buy the locals out of hearth and home. Only state subjects could buy and own real estate in the state. In 1957, the new Constitution of the State changed "State subject" to "Permanent Resident." Permanent Resident status was accorded to individuals who had been living in the state for at least a decade before May 14, 1957.
19. This mind set could not die-down even with Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah's turn-around in 1975.

20. Balraj Puri, *Kashmir Towards Insurgency* (New Delhi: Orient Longman, 1993).
21. For an account of the corruption during the Bakshi regime (1953–1963), see Government of Jammu and Kashmir, Home Department, *Report of the Commission of Inquiry*, Srinagar, 1967.
22. Sumantra Bose, *The Challenge in Kashmir: Democracy, Self-Determination, and a Just Peace* (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1997), 23–54.
23. The New Kashmir plan was adopted by the Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah-led National Conference at its Annual Session held in September 1944 in Srinagar. It had two parts: the first one dealt with the proposed constitutional structure of the state; the second part dealt with the economic planning of the state. See M. Y. Saraf, *Kashmiris Fight for Freedom*, vol. 1 (Lahore: Ferozsons Ltd., 1977), 643–647.
24. Ibid.
25. Editor's Note: Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah's trusted lieutenant, Mirza Afzal Beg, negotiated with the Government of India for Abdullah's release from incarceration and his position as Head of State, and signed another "Delhi Accord" with the center, which amounted to capitulating to the wishes of New Delhi and the Indian premier, Indira Gandhi. The Accord reinforced the integration of J&K into the Indian Union, which had occurred in 1953. Although the center proclaimed that the state would continue to be governed under Article 370, between 1954 and the mid-1970s, New Delhi issued 28 constitutional orders ratifying the integration of J&K into the Indian Union, and 262 Union laws had been implemented in the state, thereby eroding its autonomy even further. In effect, the Congress government at the center made every attempt possible to render the state government defunct. Indira Gandhi's government condescended to allow Abdullah's state government to legislate on issues of culture, religion, and Muslim personal law. This Accord was designed to divest Abdullah of his convictions, political platform, and strength. There was some renewed interest in the revival of the reform process.
26. For details of the single line administration. See M. Sultan, "Democratic Decentralization: Past, Present, and Future," in *Towards Understanding the Kashmir Crisis*, ed. Shri Prakash and Ghulam Mohammad Shah (New Delhi: Gyan Publishing, 2002), 189–220.
27. *The Jammu & Kashmir Panchayati Raj Act, 1989*.
28. Noor Ahmad Baba, *Theory and Practice of Panchayati Raj in Jammu & Kashmir* (Srinagar: State Resource Centre, Kashmir University, 2002).
29. Rekha Chowdhary, "Panchayati Elections in J&K," *Economic and Political Weekly*, May 19, 2001, 1674.
30. Several such cases were reported in the local press.

31. Rekha Chowdhary, "Panchayati Elections in J&K," *Economic and Political Weekly*, May 19, 2001, 1674.
32. Noor Ahmad Baba, "Origins and Dimensions of Kashmir Problem," in *Towards Understanding the Kashmir Crisis*, ed. Shri Prakash and Ghulam Mohammad Shah (New Delhi: Gyan Publishing House, 2002), 51–60.
33. Noor Ahmad Baba, "Indian Union and the Problem of Ethno-Regionalism," in *South Asia: Democracy, Discontent and Societal Conflicts*, ed. Gopal Singh (Delhi: Anamika, 1998), 306–313.
34. For a comprehensive background and the fraudulent nature of the Farooq Abdullah's dismissal in 1984, see B. K. Nehru, *Nice Guys Finish Second* (New Delhi: Viking, 1997); also see, Noor Ahmad Baba, "Indian Union and the Problem of Ethno-Regionalism," in *South Asia: Democracy, Discontent and Societal Conflicts*, ed. Gopal Singh (Delhi: Anamika, 1998), 306–313.
35. Noor Ahmad Baba, "Kashmir Special Status and Political Dynamics of Centre-State Relations," in *Politics of Autonomy in Jammu and Kashmir*, ed. Hari Om, R. D. Sharma, Rekha Chowdhary, Jagmohan Singh, and Ashutosh Kumar (Jammu: Vinod publishers, 1999), 220–232; and Rekha Chowdhary, "Panchayati Elections in J&K," *Economic and Political Weekly*, May 19, 2001, 1674.
36. In the words of Bose, "I stress that the roots of the crisis that erupted in 1989–90 lie in a post-1947 history of denial of democratic rights and institutions to the people of J&K, particularly those of IJK [Indian Administered Jammu and Kashmir," Sumantra Bose], *The Challenge in Kashmir: Democracy, Self-Determination, and a Just Peace* (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1997), 7.
37. See Ved Marwah, *Uncivil Wars: Pathology of Terrorism in India* (New Delhi, Indus, 1995), 72. See for further details, Noor Ahmad Baba, "Origins and Dimensions of Crisis in Kashmir," in *Towards Understanding the Kashmir Crisis*, ed. Shri Prakash and Ghulam Mohammad Shah (New Delhi: Gyan Publishing, 2002), 51–60.
38. See Sumantra Bose, *The Challenge in Kashmir: Democracy, Self-Determination, and a Just Peace* (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1997), 23–54; Sten Widmalm, *Democracy and Violent Separatism in India: Kashmir in a Comparative Perspective* (Uppsala: Uppsala University, 1997).
39. Editor's Note: Toward the end of 2002 the Indian government, tarnished by the widespread and condemnable allegations of human rights abuses by its military and paramilitary forces, organized assembly elections in the state in order to form a new state government. I was in the Kashmir Valley a couple of months before that election, in which the National Conference (NC) suffered a miserable and humiliating defeat. The first phase of the elections covered constituencies in Baramullah and Kupwara in the Kashmir Valley, Rajouri and Poonch

in Jammu, and Leh and Kargil in Ladakh; the second phase covered constituencies in Srinagar and Badgam in Kashmir Valley and Jammu; the third phase covered constituencies in Pulwama and Anantnag in the Kashmir Valley, and Udhampur and Kathua in Jammu; and the fourth phase of the elections covered constituencies in Doda in the Jammu division. The voter turnout in most constituencies was dismal, and demonstrations in favor of autonomy and against integration into the Indian Union were held at several places. The NC performed poorly, winning 9 out of 37 assembly seats in Jammu, 18 out of 46 seats in the Kashmir Valley and 1 out of 4 seats in Ladakh. The Congress secured 15 seats in Jammu and 5 in the Valley. In a curious turn of events, the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) was able to secure just 1 seat in the predominantly Hindu Jammu province. National and local newspapers reported despicable attempts at intimidation and coercion by Indian paramilitary troops. Interestingly, almost a million and a half citizens entitled to vote were just not registered and were therefore not included when estimating these figures. Apparently women did not participate either, in large numbers or enthusiastically. There were districts, however, in which the voting was impartially carried out. The politicization that was palpable in Kashmiri-speaking areas had not occurred in the predominantly Gujjar or Ladakhi constituencies, which did not harbor the antipathy toward the Indian state and its institutions that a large section of the Kashmiri Muslim population did. The outcome of the 2002 State Assembly elections was the formation of the Mufti Sayeed-led People's Democratic Party (PDP)-Congress coalition government.

40. Editor's Note: As I revised the conclusion to my book, *Islam, Women, and Violence in Kashmir: Between India and Pakistan*, the 2008 J & K Assembly election results were declared in December 2008 and an NC-Congress coalition government was installed in January 2009. As the results of the assembly elections show, none of the mainstream political parties elicited a particularly ecstatic or loyal response from the electorate. Out of 46 assembly seats in the Kashmir Valley, the NC won 20, the People's Democratic Party (PDP) won 19, and the Congress secured 3 seats. Out of 37 assembly seats in Jammu, the NC won 6, the PDP won 2, the Congress made quite a showing by securing 13, and the Hindu right-wing Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) performed incredibly well by winning 11—a tremendous leap from the 1 seat it had won in Jammu in the 2002 assembly elections. In Ladakh, the NC won 2 out of 4 assembly seats, the Congress won 1 seat, and the PDP and BJP were nonexistent in that region. In a replay of history, the Congress with a total of 17 assembly seats and the NC with a total of 28 assembly seats, the same number it had in 2002 when it shunned the possibility of power-sharing and chose to sit in the opposition, have formed a coalition government headed

by Farooq Abdullah's son and current NC president, Omar Abdullah. The NC has managed to regain its lost dominance in the urban areas of the Kashmir Valley, whereas the authority of the PDP has remained unchallenged in the rural areas of the Valley. The BJP continues to be a political pariah in both the predominantly Muslim Valley and the predominantly Buddhist Ladakh, evidenced by its inability to win a single seat in either. The PDP, which has donned the robe of messiah of the rural populace of the Valley, also was unable to cut a figure in Ladakh. The Awami National Conference, which participated in polls after a hiatus of 22 years, was unable to make inroads into a single constituency in J&K. The outcome of the election has reinforced the religious, regional, and provincial ruptures in the political fabric of the state. The dominance of the Congress has been buttressed by the fractured verdict and the zealous overtures made to it by the two mainstream regional parties, the NC and the PDP.

41. As a result, it has now been the democratic part of liberal democracy, that is, the rule of law, a multiparty system, periodic elections, peaceful change of power, and inalienable civil rights, that receives far more emphasis than its liberal component, which is substantive equality, freedom, justice, tolerance, and accountability. Such a notion of formal democracy poses no serious threat to the entrenched power structures, as is the case with the alternative theoretical formulations about the concept of democracy in its substantive forms.
42. Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpyee, "Time to Resolve Problems of the Past; Time to Move Towards a Better Future," January 11, 2001, [http://www.indianembassy.org/special/cabnit/Primeminister/pm_January_01\)2001.htm](http://www.indianembassy.org/special/cabnit/Primeminister/pm_January_01)2001.htm)

CHAPTER 6

POLITICAL ASSERTION OF KASHMIRI IDENTITY

Gull Mohammad Wanî

In this chapter, I situate myself within the debate about the value of identity politics in Kashmir in pre-and postcolonial times. Kashmiri identity is not only highly politicized, but also loaded with past memories, alienation, mourning, and also the emancipatory political movements of the 1940s. Kashmiri identity has remained resistant to the incursions of alien non-Kashmiri rule from 1585, when the Mughals annexed Kashmir. It has remained equally impervious to the politics of politico-constitutional integration of Indian states after the independence of India. In contemporary times, there is an attempt to rethink and reconstruct not only Kashmiri identity but other politicized identities as well, in order to facilitate the creation of a desired and integrated future. My sociopolitical surroundings convince me that accommodative and integrative edges of Kashmiri identity can be reenergized if there is a commitment to address the traumatic past. Further, Kashmiri identity also needs to be retheorized on the basis of a shared vision of the future. In Kashmir, the ground reality is that there are issues between people and not in people. Solidarities need to be built across communities around the address of injustices. The way forward for identity politics is not a brutal rejection of the past, but in situating a viable future in a yet distant but evolving regional order.

The idea of community and sense of belonging to a human group are ingrained in the human condition. Human beings are generally gregarious, and they associate with others. The ability to communicate

through shared symbols and signs has been a precondition for the various forms of societal organizations, which human beings have devised in order to live together. Most centrally through language, but also various other cultural means, communication has advanced among human beings. The propensity to associate with those that one identifies with has simultaneously involved the exclusion of exogenous groups and peoples. Such identification and classification have been practiced in all human societies, whatever their level of development, structuration, and stratification. Such a practice could not have been of much consequence were it not to serve also as a way of laying claims to territory, property, autonomy, and other possessions and privileges in opposition to the claims of other groups. Group identity and claim to specific territory can be described as the essence of nationalist sentiment. Kashmiris have expressed this sentiment on several occasions in their long history.

However, the roots of the present-day communal anxiety for the preservation of Kashmiri identity date back to 1586 and 1846. On the former occasion, Mughal Emperor Akbar eliminated the semi-independent Kashmiri principality in his zeal to impose direct Mughal rule throughout the empire, and later when Kashmir was sold to the Dogra Maharaja, Gulab Singh, through the Treaty of Amritsar.¹ The Mughals, as a colonial power, tried to psychologically ostracize Kashmiris during their rule. A song popularized by the Mughal armies sent by Emperor Akbar even today echoes a caustic tone. Even if you are suffering, it says, from widespread famine, do not expect any help from three ethnic groups: the Kumbus, who will cheat you through their cunning; the Afghans, who will only spite you; and the Kashmiris, who will only narrate their own sob stories in response to your troubles and end up trying to get something out of you rather than giving you anything.² The essential distrust between center and periphery articulated centuries later was engendered essentially during the Mughal period. The first clash of cultures between Delhi and Kashmir resulted in the former sneering at the latter, and the Kashmiri wishing nothing more than to be left alone to shape his/her identity through indigenous institutions. The 1846 Treaty of Amritsar further increased the marginalization of Kashmiris. A few British voices rose in sympathy. For instance, Robert Thorp writes,

Towards the people of Cashmeer we have committed a wanton outrage, a gross injustice, and an act of tyrannical oppression which violates every human and honourable sentiment which is opposed to the whole spirit of modern civilization and is in direct opposition to every tenet of religion we profess.³

Both these ugly historical events caused a psychological vacuum among Kashmiris and inflicted irreparable violence on their system of governance and values.

The installation of Dogra rule in the aftermath of 1846 brought about the creation of a new system of agrarian exploitation, with a parasitic urban growth based upon it. The system of land grants, *Jagirs* and *Chaks*, that was institutionalized created a deeply entrenched feudal hierarchy. The new polity combined political authority with economic power. However, the clash between Kashmiri identity and Dogra usurpation came to a head when ferocious opposition to the treaty fomented an uprising. The political upsurge of 1931 can be understood better against the backdrop of socioeconomic and political conditions created in Kashmir since 1586. For the past three and a half centuries, Kashmir had fallen victim to foreign aggressors, first the Mughals, then the Pathans, and then the Sikhs and the Dogras. At the time when political consciousness started taking shape in Kashmir, the condition of both the peasantry as well as artisans was pathetic. Walter Lawrence, settlement officer at the time, recorded that when he started the settlement of land, everything save air and water was under taxation.⁴ Most oppressive was the system of *Begaar* (forced labor). The oppressed masses suffered in silence, yet attempts were made to organize resistance of a limited nature from time to time. For instance, in 1847, shawl weavers went on strike protesting against heavy taxation policies of Maharaja Gulab Singh. In 1865, they further demonstrated and demanded increase in wages. The silk factory workers vociferously protested in 1925 against the oppressive working conditions. The silk industry provided employment to a considerable number of denizens of Srinagar city and surrounding areas.⁵ As a result of the importance of silk to the economy of the state, the silk industry remained a government monopoly managed by the Department of Sericulture. The lower class interests became the focal point of movements that were to emerge in the 1910s, 1920s, and 1930s. These movements intensified the Kashmiri yearning for creating a substantive national identity and sense of self; in that endeavor to solidify a nebulous sense of nationalism, 1930 was the culminating point.

This brief account of Kashmir history would enable one to assess the basic needs and urges of Kashmiris. The history of oppression was bound to create in the minds of the people of the state an intense desire for self-government and independence. The Kashmiri had not participated in any important way in the governance of his/her country ever since the Mughal conquest. The re-assertion of Kashmiri

identity, however hazy it might have been, was thus a historical necessity.⁶ In the first organized political uprising of 1931, the plebeian masses (artisans, traders, and peasants) stormed the capital of Srinagar. The uprising threw up a new leadership for the movement, which comprised the emerging middle class that played a crucial role in the linguistic and cultural awareness of the Kashmiri community.⁷ They did it by handing down to the common people the distinct heritage of Kashmiri literary and cultural pride. The social significance of the emergent local nationalist elite lay not only in the interpretation it provided of the Kashmiri past and present, or the contribution made to the literary and cultural traditions, but above all in its politically sagacious attempt to make this knowledge a part of a wider popular consciousness. The spread of nationalist consciousness in this way opened up a space for an inclusive political movement, earlier initiated by the All Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference (1932) into a nationalist mold under the aegis of the by now converted All Jammu and Kashmir National Conference, in 1939. The change in the ideological basis of the movement should be regarded as a symbolic advance of the secular nationalist forces in the state and a stage in the radicalization of the middle class.

In the 1940s, the nationalist movement in J & K came under the telling spell of Marxism. The political consciousness in the Valley was rising above parochial circumscriptions and assuming a rather radical character. As already noted, in the annals of the history of Kashmir there are numerous examples of the solidarity of workers in their struggle against the exploiters. The decisive influence of labor ideology in the freedom struggle came through the organization of the trade union movement *Mazdoor Sabha*, which was organized in the Valley. This was followed by the emergence of various other unions of drivers, carpet weavers, tonga drivers, and so on, all under the *Mazdoor Sabha*. In the clarity of the clarion call given for solidarity, a sense of national self, and raising consciousness by the movement, the leaders of *Mazdoor Sabha* educated the workers about the objectives and meaning of the nationalist liberation movement. The left wing in the J & K National Conference became politically active, and fervently propagated the philosophy of Marxism and Communism, opening up a study circle in Dalgate, Srinagar, in the process. Thus, by 1943, there had emerged a big group of Communist Party of India (CPI) progressives in the National conference who were able to influence its future strategy in a decisive manner. These left-wing progressives in the National Conference were instrumental in the adoption of the *Naya Kashmir* (New Kashmir) manifesto by the organization as

the future goal. The National Conference adopted the plan in 1944. Prominent Kashmiri left leader N. N. Raina commented,

No sector of national movement in the sub-continent conceived of anything like this document. The fundamental rights resolution of the Karachi session of the Indian National Congress or even the Lucknow and Faizpur sessions, respectively, in 1936 and 1937, are miles behind in their democratic content from the point of view of common people.⁸

Reactionary elements within and without the state criticized the plan, and Mirwaiz Yousuf Shah of the Muslim Conference, allied with the All India Muslim League, labeled the *Naya Kashmir* manifesto anti-islamic. Kashmiri Pandits, represented by the Yuval Sabha, also voiced their opposition to the plan, which threatened to dislodge their privileged positions within the administration of the state.⁹ The program, at the end of the day, proved to be closer to the heart of Kashmiri aspirations than any opposition voiced against it. In the foreword to the manifesto, Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah attempted to reclaim his status and the position of his party, National Conference, as the voices of Kashmiris, for the upliftment of whom he and his organization were willing to work arduously and perseveringly. Progress is a continuous struggle—a tempestuous struggle—for which the National Conference, in the initial years of the freedom struggle, fought tooth and nail. The struggle has continued but it should have a definite future program:

This struggle of ours is the struggle of the workers against stone-hearted exploiters who as a class of discriminators have lost the sense of humanism.... In our New Kashmir we shall build again the men and woman of our state who have been dwarfed for centuries of servitude, and create people worthy of our glorious motherland.¹⁰

It is in this context that the sweeping land reforms of 1947–1950 can be understood. In 1950, the J & K government headed by Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah enacted its most popular land reform act known as Big Estates Abolition Act. This legislation set a maximum limit of 22½ acres as holdings of land owners. Further, the mobilization of the masses during the Quit Kashmir Movement of 1946–1948 and political accession of Kashmir to India should be understood in the context of the 1950s land redistribution. I emphasize that the 1940s and 1950s comprised a period of political mobilization, agency, and intellectual understanding of national identity enabling the articulation of the notion of *Kashmiriyat* by the National Conference. According

to the J & K Information Bureau, among one of the first goals that Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah's government set for itself was to involve all Kashmiris in a nation-building program. The vocabulary of nation, nationality, and nationalism was invoked to empower Kashmiris with a sense of local Kashmir nationalism. In this context Mridu Rai writes,

selected cultural fragments from an imagined past were collected to construct a *Kashmiriyat* that would draw in both Pandits and Muslims. This was evident, for instance, in the periodization adopted by Sheikh Abdullah and his associates in their recounting of the history of the valley. Their reconstruction of the “biography” of Kashmir moved not from periods of Hindu to Muslim to Sikh rulers but from an age of Kashmiri rule, through a long interregnum of “foreign” dominance beginning with the Mughals in 1586 before the end of Dogra hegemony marked a triumphant return to rule by Kashmiris. Day after day, and week after week, Kashmiris were told that they had been “slaves” of alien rulers for more than five hundred years until their final liberation after 1947.¹¹

The espousal of a secular ideology contributed to the emergence of national awareness among Kashmiris, which was above sectarian considerations. Votaries of *Kashmiriyat* never lost sight of their religious affinities, nor were these deemed incompatible with a regionally shared culture. Small wonder that the national poet of Kashmir Ghulam Ahmad Mehjoor's patriotic poem was adopted by the National Conference as the *Qaumi Tarana* (national song) in those important years to build bridges of understanding and reconciliation between communities:

Who is the friend and who is the foe of your native land? . . . Hindus will keep the helm and the Muslims ply the oars; Let you together row (ashore) the boat of this country.¹²

Far from being an abstract concept invoked from above by the political elite, then *Kashmiriyat* has come to symbolize, for all, an encompassing Kashmiri identity. Kashmiris' great nationalist leader of the past century Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah thus expressed the basic societal value in his 1946 defense statement before the Srinagar Court of Session judge:

The fundamental rights of all men and women to live and act as free citizens to make laws and fashion their political, social [,] and economic fabric so that they may advance the cause of human freedom and progress are inherent and cannot be denied though they may be suppressed for a while. I hold that sovereignty resides in the people, all relationships, political, social [,] and economic derive authority from the collective will of the people.¹³

In the post-1947 period, the granting of a special constitutional position to Kashmir under Article 370 of the Indian Constitution as an internal arrangement, and the politics of self-determination enunciated within the United Nations framework further sharpened Kashmiri consciousness. However, regional geopolitics had its own compulsions. The collapse of the short-lived independent Kashmir state from August 15, 1947, to October 27, 1947, in the northern flank of the Indian subcontinent revealed the tremendous obstacles in the way of Kashmiris' aspirations for a separate state.¹⁴ The diminishment of Kashmiri national objectives from outright separate state to mere autonomy under the Indian constitutional structure has not yet produced worthwhile results. Meanwhile, widespread Kashmiri disaffection is accelerating and looms large as the most threatening ethnic problem in the politically volatile South Asian region. In this chapter, I aim to investigate two primary variables that seem to impinge on Kashmiri self-determination. The concept of self-determination is defined and applied in a way that is conducive to integration and not to disintegration, in a way that will lead to lasting peace rather than recurrent war. The two variables, which, I argue, hinder the evolution of Kashmiri self-determination, pertain to the level of development of Kashmiri identity and the geopolitical dimension of Kashmiri identity.

Before proceeding with the analytical process, it is necessary to point out that my focus in this chapter is on the Kashmir province of J & K. However, as in a dynamic political environment, the value of *Kashmiriyat* is extended to the larger entity of the state horizontally and vertically. The experiences of Kashmiris living outside the Valley are to be taken into account wherever necessary, so that *Kashmiriyat* is reasonably renegotiated with those who feel alienated from it.

THE STATUS OF KASHMIRI IDENTITY

The strengths and flaws of a homogeneous Kashmiri identity have been analyzed, deconstructed, and reconstructed by several writers on Kashmir.¹⁵ However, the intensity of the Kashmiri nationalist drive has seldom been addressed within a viable theoretical framework. Hence, my initial task here is to theorize Kashmiri identity.

THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

Predictably, there is no agreement on the nomenclature and sequence of the building blocks that constitute nationalism. Anthony Smith observes, "although the concept of a nation combines political, economic and territorial components [,] it remains largely ambiguous and

charged with emotion.”¹⁶ This ambiguity in the concept of nation does not prevent a number of themes from “recurring frequently in the literature and to serving as sign posts. To begin with, the emergence of nationalism, presupposes the ability of a group to develop its ethnic distinction. This will not occur unless certain primordial ties that are essential for creating a sense of community are located. These include a unique history, religion and customs.”¹⁷ Eugene Kamenka considers patriotism (denoting loyalty to one’s own people) and national consciousness (referring to a sense of pride in group distinction from other groups) as insufficient for the rise of nationalism.¹⁸ John Plamenatz believes that nationalism “arises when people are aware not only of cultural diversity but of cultural change [,] and share some idea of progress which moves them to compare their own achievements and capabilities with those of others.”¹⁹ Peter Taylor stresses the need for “one final and absolute authority in a political community,” if the objectives of nationalistic tendencies are to be achieved.²⁰ Tonus Parming and Mee-Yan Cheung draw an analogy between nationalism and the shift from “particularistic to universalistic identities,” a process that involves steady changes in “mass communication systems, mass public education system, spatial and social mobility.”²¹ The aforementioned statements smoothen the transition to Karl Deutsch’s perception of nationalism as a function of a technological innovation that succeeds in creating an elaborate system of division of labor in which “men” function as a team.²² Thus, differentiations in technological patterns allowed numerous ethnic groups in Europe to develop their own versions of nationalism. Ernest Gellener builds on Deutsch’s concept of technology, which entails a broadened concept of labor and social mobility, and asserts that nationalism promotes cultural universalism, which is the product of industrialization. He dismisses the view that nations are natural God-given entities; instead, he sees them as the result of historical evolution that causes the demise of pre-industrial, agrarian societies.²³ Anthony Smith’s view of a unified system of labor division and unimpeded geographical and social mobility converges with Deutsch’s and Gellener’s. As nationalism matures, it integrates four salient features: “a dynamic culture, a unique solidarity, a vision and a policy.”²⁴ The continuous innovation and evolution of these features require the ability of the state to monopolize “legitimate,” institutionalized education and to disseminate it generally to all of its citizens.²⁵ For Smith, nationalism does not lead to statehood; rather it is the latter that gives rise to the former. Therefore, the construction of nationalism is a conscious effort spearheaded by the political elite to safeguard the achievements

of their systems' powerful technology. Gellener concludes that the price of growth is "eternal innovation," which makes nationalism contingent on technology.

In this chapter, I am not concerned with the precedence of nationalism or statehood in the evolution of ethnicity. My position is based on the awareness that the formation of the existing South Asian state system after colonial withdrawal and emergence of India and Pakistan as nation-states ignored the legitimate autonomy urges of Kashmiris. Therefore, I focus on the prevalence of the manifestations of nationalism among Kashmiris. While discussing the variables of Kashmiri identity, one cannot ignore the divergence of opinion among experts, historians, and sociologists about the mapping and conceptualization of Kashmiri identity. The identity issue has assumed increasing importance since the beginning of the armed insurgency in 1989 and the current political upheaval.

ETHNIC DISTINCTION AND CULTURAL HERITAGE

I argue that the Kashmiri's self-awareness as a distinct ethnicity is rooted in history. Kashmiri Sanskrit authors were the first to write about the creation of the distinct country and its people with a unique cultural heritage. Over the decades, researchers have found that in the making and evolution of Kashmir certain fusions have taken place between Dravid (Darad) beliefs and those of Aryans. In this context Akhtar Mohiuddin writes:

The roots of the identity of the Kashmiri people shall have to be found in much earlier civilizations than are otherwise being taken into account. May be it is the bone and blood of the very ancient Dravid (whatever goes with it) civilization which has survived as the ethnic/cultural core [,] and around which the present edifice has been built in collaboration with the Aryans, the Ionian Greeks, the Konkan, Brahmans, the Gypsies, and the Central Asians. The migrants had to attune their genius to this core and get themselves absorbed and assimilated when contributing towards the growth and vitality of this unique people, or also be condemned to remain aliens.²⁶

Contributing to this discussion of a pluralistic, dynamic identity, Peer Giyas-u-Din observes, "Identity is a continuous anthropological, sociological, and cultural process from the first glacial period and the beginning of the second ice-age in the south west of the Himalayas."²⁷

Culture is an important aspect of ethnicity. There is a common perception among Kashmir observers that Kashmiri culture was

denigrated for fear that it would boost Kashmiri separatist claims. I would like to point out that linguistic erosion has been deployed by New Delhi to dilute the sense of a distinctive Kashmiri identity. It is interesting that while only 2 percent people speak Urdu, it continues to be the official language of J&K instead of Kashmiri. In the turbulent period following the 1953 undemocratic dismissal of the first democratically elected state government, the official celebration of the birth anniversary of Kashmiri poetess Habba Khatoon as a state holiday was revoked. In 1952 Kashmiri was taught as a compulsory subject; the Kashmiri script evolved, but was abolished after 1953. Hundreds of Kashmiri text books were destroyed.²⁸ The location of Kashmiris as a frontier people caught between two hostile neighbors, India and Pakistan, after 1947 was not particularly conducive to the enrichment of their culture. As is now obvious, Hindu extremism in India and Islamic extremism in Pakistan are heavily impinging on local Kashmiri culture. In contemporary times, the sensitivity and vulnerability of the language issue has been foregrounded. For example, a fringe element within the Kashmiri Pandit migrant community is frantically harping the wrong tune that Devanagari, and not the officially approved Persian script, be adopted for the Kashmiri language. The community may strike an equation with the majority community in India but is bound to get even more severed from the Muslim majority in Kashmir. It is educative for all community leaders in Kashmir to understand that the script for Bengali is the same even after the division of Bengal into West Bengal and East Pakistan, later Bangladesh, in 1947. In addition, Kashmir's feudal system and clannish way of life, too, was responsible for inhibiting Kashmiris from imbibing Western ideas that were propagated in the nineteenth century.

In the Kashmir Valley dwells the ethnic group known as Kashmiri, distinct from the ethnic groups of the plains of the Indian subcontinent. About his first impression of the inhabitants of Kashmir, French surgeon Francois Bernier, who visited Kashmir with Aurangzeb, said, "on entering the kingdom after passing the Pirpanchal mountains, inhabitants in the frontier villages struck me as resembling Jews."²⁹ Historically, the people have been celebrated for their wit and considered much more intelligent and ingenious than other peoples of the Indian subcontinent. Interestingly, abusive stereotypes about Kashmiris abound among former British colonizers, Central Asians, and other South Asians. It is reported that the Mughal Emperor Jahangir disparagingly observed that Kashmiris never bathed and audaciously called them dirty. An ugly stereotypical opinion holds that Kashmiris do not keep their promises and [are] devoid of

any work culture. Walter Lawrence (settlement commissioner) called them *Zulum Parast* or worshippers of tyranny.³⁰ According to him, Kashmiris have a seditious, intriguing nature. Abul Fazal wrote, "The bane of the country is its people."³¹ I observe that Kashmiris have been dealt with very harshly by history. Prolonged victimization and political uncertainty seem to have brought all their worst attributes to the surface. Tyndale Biscoe (British missionary) astutely observed that if the British had to undergo what the tremendous atrocities had been inflicted on Kashmiris by successive invading groups, the British might have lost their manhood.³² I posit that there is nothing inherently wrong with Kashmiris. As an educated Kashmiri from a rural area whose mobility owes much to the revolutionary land reforms in the state, I note that opportunity and advancement have been denied to Kashmiris for centuries. I observe that a Kashmiri has been constructed by the political discourse disseminated by the ruler. Frederick Drew, an eminent British geologist hired by the Maharajah of Kashmir to report on the mining wealth of the former princely state of Jammu and Kashmir, states,

the Kashmiri people are doubtless physically the finest race that inhabit the territories we are dealing with [,] and I have not much hesitation in saying that in size and in feature [,] they are the finest race on the whole continent of India. Their physique, character [,] and their language are so marked as to produce a nationality different from all around as distinct from their neighbors as their country is geographically separated.³³

All said and done, there is a widely held opinion that Kashmiri culture fell short of providing the needed impetus for supporting the nascent Kashmiri nationalism as well as the programs of its political movements. Kashmiri is the largest spoken language of the masses not only in Valley, but in Poonch, Rajouri, Doda, Kishtwar, Bhaderwah, Ramban, Banihal, and other areas of the Jammu region. Kashmiri middle class, a group to which I belong, is growing increasingly conscious of promotion of the native language. It is encouraging that during my field trip and interviews with migrant Pandits in Jammu, I found a growing desire for the protection of the Kashmiri language, particularly in the generation that grew up outside Kashmir after the mass exodus of Pandits in 1989–1990.

The Kashmir Valley is predominantly Muslim. According to the census of 1971, Muslims constitute 94.0 percent of the populations of the Valley and Hindus constitute 4.7 percent. Sikh and Christian population also live in minority. The ethno-cultural distinction of

Kashmiris is reinforced by their religious practices. Kashmiris have willingly embraced several religions one after another: *Naga* worship, *Buddhism*, *Brahmanism*, and Islam. All these influences enabled a blending of cultural and religious ideologies, increasing a tolerance of other beliefs. Moreover, even after their conversion to a new faith, the people of Kashmir rarely renounced or abandoned the old ethno-cultural values and modes of life that their ancestors had cherished for thousands of years. Needless to say, a Kashmiri Muslim shares many intellectual and cultural commonalities with a Kashmiri Pandit, which are unique to the Kashmir setting. I would like to underline that Muslims in Kashmir have retained their pre-Islamic last names, such as Koul, Bhat, Razdan, Dar, etc. Moreover, there exist many similarities in the rites of death, birth, and marriage between the two communities. The application of *mehandi* (henna) and the generous offerings of walnut and salt in the rites are some other features shared by both Pandits and Muslims in Kashmir. Even after their migration from Kashmir in the wake of militancy, Pandits have shown a preference for “*Halal* Meat” (*Halal* designates food prepared as prescribed by Islamic law, sold by Muslim butchers) in Jammu and other predominantly Indian Hindu cities to which they have migrated. Both Kashmiri Muslims and Hindus were historically at the vanguard of movements calling for the preservation of Kashmiri identity. Jawaharlal Nehru, the first prime minister of independent India, of Kashmiri Pandit descent, recognized Kashmir as a well-defined historical, cultural, and linguistic unit. He was proud of the fact that Kashmiri Pandits were “more recognized in India as Kashmiris.” Nehru badgered Lord Mountbatten, the last Viceroy of British India, so often and so passionately on Kashmir that Mountbatten once described Nehru, in an official report, as “Pathological.”³⁴ Kashmiri Pandits were the first to raise the issue of *Mulki* (native) and non-*Mulki* (nonnative), which resulted in the appointment of the State Subject definition committee and its acceptance by Maharaja Hari Singh in 1927. Justice A. S. Anand (ex-chief justice of India), while quoting Clive Parry, writes that the notion that the law of state nationality did not exist certainly did not hold good for the state of Jammu and Kashmir.³⁵ The only change that took place post-1947 is that the Muslims of Kashmir inherited the advocacy of protection of rights of the sons of the soil.

An important feature of the social life of Kashmir is the almost total absence of caste distinction or tribalism among Muslims in the Valley. Crime before the onset of militancy was nonexistent in Kashmir. My 20 years of modest research on Kashmir has led me to

the conclusion that Kashmiri militants, to begin with, had no criminal background as found in some other insurgent movements in the region. Kashmiri society is characterized by its close-knit network of relationships. A small society with a strong sense of internal solidarity and external exclusiveness has its own norms of social behavior. The joint family system still prevalent in the Valley ensures that the norms of social behavior are observed. The institution of family, however, is in transition with nuclear families emerging, but they still form branches of the extended family. One of the significant consequences of social solidarity in the Valley is protectionism in thought and practice. Regarding the nature of politics in such a society, Z. M. Qureshi makes an insightful observation,

Our survey gives out an unmistakable impression that the amount of political awareness, the understanding of political issues, and the insistence on expressing political opinions are high and widespread in the valley. The egalitarian character of society and an intimate level of political communication in a framework of the close-knit society significantly contributed to the emergence of Kashmiris as politically the most conscious community in India.³⁶

Kashmiri nationalists recognize that highlighting the attributes of their culture is indispensable for mobilizing the masses in order to achieve ethnic recognition and to test the possibility of political authority. The past few years have marked a sharp increase in Kashmiri cultural and intellectual activity. Unimpeded immersion in their own culture will contribute to its further refinement as well as its ability to facilitate the evolution of Kashmiri nationalism. Although the current level of development of Kashmiri culture and language leaves a lot to be desired, it would be erroneous and prejudicial to claim that it cannot support a distinct Kashmiri nationalism.

TECHNOLOGICAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

The topography of Kashmir has been described as unsuitable for founding an economically self-reliant state. Modern economic and production linkages that are indispensable for the creation of such an entity are said to be missing in Kashmir. In view of its partition by the nation-states of India and Pakistan, and later China, former Jammu and Kashmir state does not constitute an integrated economic unit. Subcontinental political boundaries dictate that Kashmir's economic ties correspond to the existing politico-economic entities. Poor transportation networks within Kashmir force most Kashmiris

to conduct business transactions with only the nearest non-Kashmiri centers. Apples, saffron, handicrafts, walnuts, and other products for which Kashmir is famous are sold in Indian urban centers only. The much hyped trade across the Line of Control is still modest and has enormous challenges ahead.

On the basis of this assessment, one cannot convincingly conclude that Kashmir is economically nonviable. Its land contains excellent water resources, mineral deposits, forests, handicrafts, and so on. Although the region is mountainous, its Valleys are fertile and have the capacity to yield a produce that exceeds local needs. In the post-1947 period the center/state economic relations did not result in lucratively exploiting the potential of the rich resources of Kashmir so as to make J & K self-reliant. Instead, a crippling dependency was perpetuated and economic populism became part of India's Kashmir policy. Successive regimes in New Delhi encouraged the trickling of central aid into the state, which led to the building up of a highly subsidized economy in Kashmir. Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah was the first Kashmiri leader after 1947 who worked for J & K's self-reliance. He worked toward accomplishing this seemingly unachievable goal by the execution of two measures of great significance and mammoth proportions, abolition of big landed estates and the distribution of land among the landless, and entitling everyone, regardless of caste, creed, and gender, to a free education. He presided over a benevolent state acting in an optimal way to benefit society as a whole. The then young and burgeoning new middle class in rural Kashmir, to which I belong, was the greatest beneficiary of both land reforms and free education. I am witness to the dispossession of the privileged class of feudal lords, which hitherto had enjoyed an unchallenged monopoly on socioeconomic, political, and cultural realms in J & K, and subsequent diffusion of power. It is a different and unfortunate matter that circulation of power was not matched by the creation of solid democratic institutions that could have acted as shock-absorbers in Kashmir, and might have prevented the alienation of people and subsequent adoption of violence as an instrument of political negotiations. It was the new educated middle class, children of a revolutionary reform movement, unsurpassed by any other revolutionary movement in the Indian subcontinent, that became the vanguard for the assertion and promotion of Kashmiri identity. However, post 1947, political instability and uncertainty in Kashmir did not allow the economic horizons of a large section of the populace to blossom; economic prospects in Kashmir remained contingent on the whims of political masters in New Delhi. In contemporary times the economic dimension of

Kashmiri identity has assumed a lot of significance and every strata of the leadership, including the separatists, has become increasingly conscious of it. Former Chief Minister of J & K Farooq Abdullah believes that the people of the state should not wait for the outcome of the ever belligerent negotiations between India and Pakistan, and must pay due attention to the development of the state.³⁷ Kashmir has a vast hydel potential of over 15,000 MW, of which only 7.85 percent has been harnessed so far. Official figures suggest that the state suffers a loss of Rs. 6,500 crores annually due to the Indus Water Treaty. The treaty negotiated between India and Pakistan in the 1960s was essentially a partition treaty resulting in the state government's loss of control over rivers flowing through J & K. The Indus System of Rivers comprises three western rivers—the Indus, the Jhelum, and Chenab—and three eastern rivers—the Sutlej, the Beas, and the Ravi; the treaty gives India exclusive use of all of the waters of the eastern rivers and their tributaries before the point where the rivers enter Pakistan. Likewise, Pakistan has exclusive use of the western rivers. The two nation-states have purportedly agreed to cooperate in all matters relating to the treaty. Out of 5,175 MWs of its existing generation capacity, the National Hydroelectric Power Corporation (a Government of India subsidiary) is drawing the highest booty of 1,560 MWs of energy from J & K alone, while the rest of India is contributing just 3,615 MWs to the corporation's power kitty. Curiously, whereas in states like Madhya Pradesh, Himachal Pradesh, and the North-East, most of NHPC power projects are joint ventures with the respective state government, sharing energy on fifty-fifty basis, J & K is the only exception where the corporation is required to provide only 12 percent of electricity as royalty for the state. Kashmiris are increasingly feeling the misery of power shortage, being ill-equipped, and the inability to build up modern infrastructure because of it. The tiny civil society of Kashmir has also in recent times debated all issues pertinent to the development of the state. In many of my discussions with traders and civil society actors, I found that Kashmiri nationalism is graduating toward economic nationalism. The late separatist leader Abdul Gani Lone described Kashmir "as the market colony of India."³⁸ Yasin Malik, another separatist leader, writes in his book, *Our Real Crime*, "if all sources like water, power, tourism, forests, handicrafts, carpets, agriculture, horticulture, sheep husbandry will [sic] be exploited, the State of Jammu and Kashmir would be economically independent."³⁹ There is an increasing need and demand to depoliticize economic decisions. A technological breakthrough that would make the natural resources and overland routes of Kashmir available for regional

markets and traffic is, hypothetically, not a distant possibility, provided the politics of the subcontinent permits it. Wajahat Habibullah, former chief commissioner of India and former district commissioner of nine districts in Kashmir, is quick to observe in his article on the economic dimension of the Kashmir conundrum that “Many angry young men with whom I spoke said that being part of India had prevented Kashmir from becoming part of the global market. They had not considered specifically how they might find a way of participating in the opportunities that globalization affords, but they were confident that they could hold their own in the world market.”⁴⁰ The need of the day is to increase the linkages between Jammu and Kashmir and the surrounding countries. Ultimately, the growth of J & K requires a vibrant private economy. It is important to learn from the experience of the state of Punjab, where despite the pervasion of a politically conducive climate for investors, entrepreneurs are still wary of investing in the state given its location along a troubled frontier. Again, I underscore the urgency of an ultimate resolution to the Kashmir conflict for the generation of a meaningful economic renaissance.

GEOGRAPHICAL COMPACTNESS

For centuries the Kashmir Valley has been a specific geographical zone, encircled as it is by high mountains. As I have pointed out earlier, geography has played an essential role in preserving the distinct identity of Kashmir. Geography has largely determined history, culture, living style, and stages of development of Kashmiri identity. Enclosed by mountain ranges from 10,000 feet to 18,000 feet high, Kashmir is the largest Valley in the lap of the largest mountains in the world. In a long historical sweep, the physical boundaries of Kashmir have waned and waxed during different intervals of its history. At one time, the borders of Kashmir extended up to central Asia. Twelve hundred years ago, in the eighth century, Kashmir had a unique position in the Indian subcontinent. The King of Kashmir, Laltaditya, ruled not only Kashmir but very large parts of northern and central India as well. During different periods of history, Kashmir has forged transnational ties through trade and commerce. Several historical accounts graphically provide the details of caravans carrying merchandise to Bukhara, Samarkand, Kholan, and Sinkiang in central Asia across the borders of Kashmir. The extension of borders and trade relations of Kashmir with other parts of the world largely influenced the native culture and language. Aurel Stein’s comment is insightful in this regard:

Kashmir owes its historical unity and isolation to the same facts which gave to geographic location a distinct [,] and in some respects [,] almost unique character. We find here a fertile plain embedded among high mountain ranges, a Valley large enough to form a kingdom for itself [,] and capable of supporting a highly developed civilization.⁴¹

The political and sociocultural discourses that have shaped my subjectivity lead me to believe that a still powerful force that explains the continuity of Kashmiri life is the love and devotion Kashmiris have for their motherland. Kashmiris have been iconicizing and feminizing the Valley as "*Mouj Kashir*" (mother Kashmir) from time immemorial. This passionate emotional attachment to the homeland is reflected in folklore and poetry, which greatly eulogize the springs, rivers, gardens, and the sacred shrines in Kashmir. For example, Kashayp Bandhu, a prominent Kashmiri Pandit freedom fighter, writes poignantly about his "heretical idolization" of Kashmir that inspires him to revere its sanctity, making it, according to him, more scared than the River Ganges, which symbolizes purity and goodness for Hindus; cremation along the banks of the Ganges with the subsequent immersion of ashes in its waters is believed to ensure the deceased's salvation. Bandhu's iconization of the Valley is indubitably clear in his tacit renunciation of prescribed Hindu rites and prostration to his paradisiacal native land:

*Bulbul Na Yeh, Wasiyat Abbab Bool Jayen
Ganga Ke Badle Mere Jhelum Mein Phool Jayen*

[He wishes that if he dies outside the Valley, his ashes after cremation should be carried back to Kashmir for immersion in the River Jhelum, and not in the River Ganges.]

Unfortunately, it is the iconicized Valley that now is increasingly being seen as the greatest enemy of the people living here. The strategic and ideological importance of Kashmir has, so far, proved a curse for the people. The two antagonistic nations-states, India and Pakistan, have always focused on Kashmir from the above prism. Any solution to this intractable conflict depends upon the goodwill of the two countries. Contemporary Kashmiri intelligentsia realizes that Kashmir can be a bridge for forging ideological and strategic ties in the thought processes of both India and Pakistan. The local intelligentsia also voices the opinion that Kashmiris can make use of the strategic location of the area and turn it to their advantage. These opinions, however

well-intentioned and viable they might be, do not diminish the conflictual and abrasive nature of the military and nationalist discourses that are pervasive in Kashmir, and do not make the reality more palatable: Kashmir is surrounded by three regional powers, two of which are mega-states, India and China, and the third is Pakistan, the eighth biggest country in the world in terms of population—all of which are exerting pressure on the state in their own strategic interests.

ETHNIC SOLIDARITY

In the precolonial period, the development of Kashmiri nationalism was obstructed by the fragmented and fissured solidarity of peasants, shawl weavers, and small factory workers. The virtual absence of a viable intelligentsia, too, did not enable the construction and legitimization of Kashmiri nationalism, or facilitate the showcasing of its liberative aspect. Unfavorable historical circumstances did not allow the transformation of Kashmiri society from communal to associational, which became a faulty building block that continues to obstruct the evolution of indigenous movements from mere ethnoculturalism to an evolved and critical nationalism. It is regrettable, to say the least, that intra-Kashmir political divisions retained their old vitality as group solidarity remained mere wishful thinking. Political unity, which seems to have largely eluded Kashmiris, has been aspired to by visionary nationalists and creators of the public discourse of a “New Kashmir” from as early as the twentieth century, when Kashmir’s national poet Ghulam Ahmad Mehjoor exhorted the people to relegate their divisions to the background:

Who is friend and who the foe of your native land
 Let you among yourselves thoughtfully work out
 The kind and stock of all Kashmiris is one
 Let you mix milk and sugar once again
 Hindus will keep the helm and the Muslims ply the oars,
 Let you together row ashore the boat of this land.⁴²

As a matter of fact, lack of group solidarity is the most conspicuous characteristic manifested by Kashmiris ever since ethnic consciousness began to rise among them in the early twentieth century. I would argue that lack of solidarity among Kashmiris can be largely attributed to the social contradictions between common Kashmiris and self-serving leaders. In contemporary times, quasi-clannish leaders are

engaged in bitter feuds among themselves, which has aborted the development of Kashmiri national consciousness into full-fledged critical nationalism. These clan leaders seek support and legitimacy from either of the two antagonistic nation-states of India and Pakistan to preserve their fiefdoms. Another very important reason for lack of Kashmiri solidarity is the exploitation of internal feuds by outside powers. Earlier in the sixteenth century, the Shia-Suni discord and other sectarian conflicts were taken advantage of by the Mughal Emperor Akbar, which resulted in the annexation of Kashmir. During the mass movement opposing the hegemony of the Dogra Maharajah in 1931, the solidarity of Kashmiris witnessed cracks, first because a negligible number of Kashmiri Pandits joined the freedom movement and second because the factionalism in the political movement personified in the clash of *Sher* (lion; a moniker for the followers of *Sher-e-Kashmir* Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah) and *Bakra* (goat; a moniker for the goatee sporting followers of the Muslim conference leader Mirwaiz Yousuf Shah). The latter received overt and covert support from the Dogra Maharajah's administration, while the former shared his socialist ideology with Jawaharlal Nehru remained mostly dependent on his singular support. Consequently, by the middle of 1932, there developed an active and, at times, violent political rivalry in the Kashmiri ranks in Srinagar between the supporters of Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah and the followers of Mirwaiz Yousuf Shah. In the post-1947 period, the political disunity of the leadership caused enormous damage to the construction of Kashmiri identity. The Indian state contributed to this disunity, all in the name of national interest. The Kashmiri leadership could little realize that disunity among its ranks had opened the flood gates for the erosion of autonomy and identity for which they had labored hard. In this context, late former Chief Minister of the state Syed Mir Qasim wrote: "I must inform my readers that whenever New Delhi feels a leader in Kashmir getting too big for his shoes, it employs Machiavellian methods to cut him to size."⁴³ Political stability and democratic institutions in J & K suffered a major setback in 1953 when prominent Kashmiri leader and prime minister of the state Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah was ousted in an brutally undemocratic coup d'état, and arrested by his own deputy, Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad. A split in the political leadership between those hankering for closer integration with Indian union and those clamoring for greater autonomy to Kashmir virtually remained a permanent streak of state politics. In the post-1947 period, the ethnic solidarity of Kashmiris equally further undercut by the identification of Kashmiri Pandits for various sociopolitical reasons with

the larger Hindu religious majority of India. Contrary to their stand before 1947 that Kashmir is for Kashmiris, most Kashmiri Pandits did a volte face and sought greater political and cultural integration of the state with the Indian union. I would argue that a myopic notion of self-interest and the self-aggrandizement of a large section of the Pandit community, Kashmiri Pandits have preferred to play down their ethnicity in order to make their presence in other parts of India more palatable and integrative.

In the ongoing political movement, commonly called *Azadi* (independence) movement, the issues pertinent to Kashmiri solidarity have assumed renewed centrality: firstly, because of the mass exodus of Kashmiri Pandits in 1989–1990 at the beginning of the armed insurgency; the Pandit migration has been described as causing an unmendable rift in Kashmiri identity, with one part swayed by the growing *Hindutva* wave in India, while the other was submerged by Muslim fundamentalism.⁴⁴ Deeply conscious of this division, every strata of Kashmiri leadership ranging from mainstream to separatist has appealed to the Pandit community to enable the healing of the wounds caused by its dispossession and dislocation by returning to the Valley. Prominent separatist leaders, Yasin Malik and Shabir Shah, have addressed Pandit migrants in Jammu and other parts of India to which they have migrated, and pleaded with them to return to the Valley in order to resurrect its composite culture. But I cannot dismiss or overlook the fear that some Kashmiri Pandits still harbor when contemplating returning to the Valley. Needless to say, Kashmiri Pandits now feel a renewed urgency to maintain their *Kashmiryat* after having experienced dislocation and the accompanying psychological loss of self. I do not see the redressal of the Kashmir Pandit identity crisis in a sterilized and exclusionary Pandit “*Panun Kashmir*” (“Our Own Kashmir”) homeland which some radical sections of Pandits are demanding, but their contribution to the evolution of an inclusive Kashmiri identity and its enrichment. My field work and interaction with a cross section of both Pandits and Muslims as the State coordinator for the Centre of the Study of Developing Societies (CSDS), New Delhi, was quite insightful: common people are opposed to the officially touted policy of rehabilitation of Pandits in security zones; it is only a fringe element within the Pandit community which has reservations on living in their villages from which they migrated. As the State coordinator of CSDS, I conducted two post-poll surveys in 2002 and 2008 during the respective Legislative Assembly elections. While conducting these surveys, I realized that it is important to draw a line of demarcation between personal and community relations.

While personal relations between Pandits and Muslims remain cordial to a great degree, there is no denying the growing polarization between the two communities. Moreover, it is not religious or economic considerations, but political ones and future resolution of the Kashmir conundrum that impinge upon intercommunity relations and the return of Kashmiri Pandits to the Valley. The other reason for the growing imperative of Kashmiri solidarity is the unconstrained mushrooming of political organizations and their leaders, some self-proclaimed, others consensually chosen, on the political landscape of the state. The Hurriyat Conference (a conglomerate of separatist parties), for example, is divided despite its senior leaders having signed a document of consensus stating their intention to confront mainstream hegemonic ideologies as a united front. State and nonstate actors, with the instrumentality of political violence, have sharpened the divisive components of Kashmiri identity. This trend needs to be constrained, or else every village in Kashmir will get divided into conflicting camps. It is amazing that in the Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's Apex Committee for Rehabilitation of Kashmiri Pandits, the microscopic community is represented by 30 organizations. On the positive side, however, despite the overt fragmentation of the Kashmiri community, I would point out that in crucial political and social matters, the Kashmiri community, Pandits and Muslims, exhibits unanimity. Although the adverse effects of weak solidarity on Kashmir nationalism are undeniable, the influence of the former on the latter is not atrophic. Kashmiri nationalism survives even if by Western criteria it is embryonic. In the changing context of a détente between the nation-states of India and Pakistan, Kashmiri identity is reasserting itself and is working toward occupying an independent space. But the creation of a viable space for Kashmir identity is possible only if the geopolitical knots of this seemingly intractable conflict are disentangled. Working toward this end, one of the formidable suggestions made by policy makers and scholars in India and Pakistan and by some diasporic South Asian scholars is to "deconstruct Indian and Pakistani nationalist narratives and agendas in relation to kashmir."⁴⁵

The erosion of the pluralist moorings in Kashmiri identity, particularly due to the exodus of Kashmiri Pandits, has, over the years, generated a heated debate on the nature of *Kashmiriyat*, mostly among policy makers and scholars. As I pointed out at the outset, no discussion of identity politics vis-à-vis Kashmir can be adequately answered unless cognizance is taken of that debate, with a view as to how *Kashmiriyat* came to be defined over time in response to wider social, cultural, economic, and political developments in

the Valley. Both Kashmiri identity and *Kashmiriyat* have been used interchangeably over the years. Both concepts embody and represent all that makes Kashmir distinct in terms of history and culture. There is divergence of opinion about the conceptualization of *Kashmiriyat*. To G. M. Zahid (well-reputed Kashmir expert), “*Kashmiriyat* is constitutive of universalism, humanism, and brotherhood.” H. D. Sankalia, eminent archeologist observes, “Kashmiri identity is a continuous anthropological, sociological, and cultural process from the first glacial period and the beginning of second ice-age in the north-west of the Himalayas.”⁴⁶ Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah, who was its zealous advocate, believed that *Kashmiriyat* is rooted in culture and language. I, a child of the revolutionary mass mobilization and socialist measures executed by Abdullah’s regime in the 1950s, believe that Abdullah symbolized *Kashmiriyat*: a spirit of independence and willing espousal of a secular ideology. He challenged hegemonic ideologies and institutions, and even spurned the largess of subsidized food for the Valley as the “gold” with which political manipulators sought to purchase the soul of Kashmir. Kalhana added a rich dimension to the concept of *Kashmiriyat*. He wrote, “the country may be conquered by the force of spiritual merit but not by the force of soldiers. The inhabitants are afraid only of the world beyond.”⁴⁷ Contrary to these exhortations is the articulation of *Kashmiriyat* by those who view its propagation as an intellectual trap. Radicalized sections of Kashmiri youth find it a sort of proxy politics by discredited political leaders. In the widely read local English daily *Greater Kashmir*, Idris Shahid wrote, “It is just another word to say to the Kashmiri to break from your religion. It is a subtle way to dig at the foundations of a people’s faith, especially at a time when they are increasingly drawing to the [Islamic] religion and trying to understand [the] Quran.”⁴⁸ He further writes that prior to the armed insurgency in the 1990s, one would hardly hear about and find the concept of *Kashmiriyat* in Kashmir’s political parlance. In any case, one could argue that the above perspectives on *Kashmiriyat* not only are contextual, but have evolved from certain vantage points and reflect ideological positions of people and institutions. In recent years, I have witnessed the statist conceptualization of *Kashmiriyat*, which has generated suspicion in the average Kashmiri mind. The Indian Army undertook the renovation of *Sufi Ziarats* (shrines) and the organization of *Sufiana* music festivals with the express purpose of weaning Kashmiri Muslims away from what is understood as Islamic fundamentalism. Further, the notion of *Kashmiriyat* as a unified cohesive vision of Kashmir’s past is also being challenged by some scholars and critics. However, while interrogating

or deconstructing the concept of *Kashmiriyat*, an astute observer cannot ignore the rich and unique culture of Kashmir, and social and political experiences of the people. I observe that *Kashmiriyat*, like most “third-world” nationalisms, is janus-faced: one face looking to the future, the other to the past. *Kashmiriyat* can be deployed as a weapon of nonviolence. Although the formation of the subcontinental state system by the colonial apparatus, imperial cartographers, and nationalists of the Indian National Congress and the Muslim League, tied the proverbial gordian knot in Kashmir, I believe that *Kashmiriyat* reflects the desire to contain India/Pakistan rivalry in the region at this particular time.

REGIONAL GEO-POLITICS AND KASHMIRI IDENTITY

The development of Kashmiri nationalism has been constrained by geo-political considerations which Kashmiris have not been able to surmount. The role of geo-politics in holding back the transformation of certain populations is considerable. World orders of the post-eighteenth-century burgeoning of nationalisms have consistently sacrificed the aspirations of a number of ethnic groups. Obviously, this was seen as essential for the imposition of delicate regional and international balance of interests. In different parts of the world but especially in developing countries, most of which lacked both democratic legitimacy and political stability, ethnic minorities rose as potent challengers to the sanctity of the state’s territorial integrity. More often than not, minorities have been viewed as threats to political integrity, economic resources, regime stability, and to the dominant group’s values. There is some truth to this perception, since the purported vulnerability makes minorities more susceptible to manipulation as geo-political pawns. Regional powers are adept at employing ethnic minorities to perform mercenary like functions. However, short-term gains that may accrue to minorities inhibit the development of consciousness into genuine nationalism. The impact of geo-politics on retarding or preventing the growth of Kashmiri identity has always been there, more particularly in the aftermath of 1947. Despite the political ambition of Dogra Maharaja Hari Singh to steer clear of the India/Pakistan question, and declare the independence of the former princely state of J & K, carefully avoiding accession for about 20 days after the creation of the nation-states of India and Pakistan, the compulsions of geopolitics forced him into political exile and the State into a murky chaos. Within months of the partition of the Indian subcontinent in 1947, India and Pakistan went to war over Kashmir.

The war ended with the division of the province between the two antagonistic post-colonial states. Since then, as earlier also, Kashmir's strategic importance has waxed and waned. While Kashmir was at the centre of the first two India/Pakistan wars (1948 and 1965), it was not an issue of high priority for either nation-state until late-1989. With the end of the Cold War, regional security problems assumed great importance. In the absence of global strategic conflict, international security is largely regional security.⁴⁹ Since 1989, regional instability and regional nuclear programs have increased. Both are integrally connected to the nonresolution of Kashmiri aspirations. Many Indian policy makers believe that Pakistan intends to use its new nuclear capability to make a grab for Kashmir, since escalation to conventional war would be risky. They also point towards a connection between the Afghan war and militancy in Kashmir, and thus American responsibility for India's Kashmir problem. The mainstream Indian logic is that if Washington, D.C., had not pumped money and material into Afghanistan, Kashmir could have been separated from the Afghan fall out. But this ignores India's mismanagement of the Kashmir political scenario. Apart from the external dimension, Kashmir reflects the growing and larger crisis of India's political institutions. Demands for state-level autonomy were often portrayed as threats to national integrity and provided a justification for the imposition of Central Rule, which further alienated the local elites and populations, adding to provincial resentment. The failure of diplomacy to resolve the Kashmir dispute is quite noticeable given the amount of International and subcontinental attention paid to it, especially after 1948, 1962, and 1965 wars. It took the 1990 armed insurgency with the declared nuclear prowess of India and Pakistan to foreground the international dimension of the Kashmir conflict, again, with the United States playing an active role. The major side effect of Kashmir getting entangled with the geo-politics of the region has been the retardation of the growth and consolidation of Kashmiri identity. The idea of an autonomous Kashmir is still unwelcome to India as a major regional power. Unfortunately, the fate of Kashmiris has been combined in cynical fashion with their utility as pawns in regional power games. J & K can claim very few representative, democratic governments. A one-time admirer of Pandit Nehru and the beginnings of a "democratic, secular" India, Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah was constrained to say as early as 1968: "The fact remains that Indian democracy stops short at Pathankot (the last major town in Eastern Punjab). Between Pathankot and Banihal Pass you may have some measure of democracy, but after Banihal, there is none. What we have in Kashmir bears some of the worst features of colonial rule."⁵⁰

However, it is only in the larger context of the India/Pakistan détente over the years that there seems a possible space for Kashmiri identity to reassert itself. India and Pakistan are deepening their engagement over Kashmir, and the peace process has already received endorsement from all sides, including major world powers. The peace process on both tracks (India/Pakistan and Srinagar/Delhi) will, hopefully, empower Kashmiris and enable them to be equal stake holders in the resolution process. Currently, South Asia is passing through a transitional phase, the contours of which are nebulous. It goes without saying that Kashmiris must not find themselves again in a no-win situation. Maximizing their gains from unexpected but opportune regional developments that may arise in the future should be one of the priorities of the Kashmiri leadership. Self-determination for Kashmiris should not mean a suicidal fight against the collective forces of so-far rigid subcontinental political systems. A new regional order capable of establishing cross-economic, political, and cultural interests among the people of the region has obvious merits: countries of the Indian subcontinent constitute, when combined, a viable economic structure. Water resources, which have the potential to be a mainstay of India/Pakistan economies, are abundant in Kashmir. This should allow Kashmiris to assert their identity on the basis of possession of economic resources, and a societal dimension: the Indian subcontinent is religiously and ethnically diverse. A new order that does not necessarily dissolve the existing state boundaries, simply adds a new political layer and a more dynamic conception of sovereignty, which acknowledges its interdependence and tolerates pluralism may achieve regional stability.

What the days ahead hold for Kashmiri aspirations depends on largely uncontrollable regional developments, and on the strength of Kashmiris' own movement for the assertion of their rights. Although the peace process, at present, is in limbo, but South Asia watchers are optimistic about the positive outcome in future talks. The widespread use of violence by state and nonstate actors over two decades of insurgency and counter-insurgency in Kashmir resulted in the depolitization of society and institutions of governance. For the revival of democratic political processes, it is necessary that there be a paradigm shift from religio-political to politico-economic. Equally important for the new regional order is regional governance. The transfer of state functions to across the Line of Control coordination institutions would be possible if state capacity is enhanced through regional governance. This will surely help in combating political turmoil and unrest. The larger question of the reassertion of Kashmiri identity in the evolving regional order is eventful, to say the least.

NOTES

1. In 1586 Mughal Emperor Akbar annexed Kashmir. Kashmiri historians generally locate the genesis of Kashmiri identity crisis to the Mughal annexation of Kashmir. For further details see Balraj Puri, "The Era of Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah," *Economic and Political Weekly*, 18, no. 6, 1983, 186–190. Also see Chitralekha Zutshi, *Language of Belonging, Islam, Regional Identity and the Making of Kashmir* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004).
2. M. J. Akbar, *Kashmir: Behind the Vale* (New Delhi: Roli Books, 2003), 31.
3. Robert Thorp, *Cashmere Misgovernement* (London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1870).
4. Walter Lawrence, *The Valley of Kashmir* (London: H. Frowde, 1895), 2.
5. India, Census Commissioner, Sir Herbert Hope Risley, *Census of India, 1901* (India, Office of the Superintendent of Government Printing, 1902); India, Census Commissioner, *Census of India, 1911* (Calcutta: Superintendent Government Printing, 1912).
6. Sisir Gupta, *Kashmir—A Study in India-Pakistan Relations* (London: Asia Publishing House for the India Council of World Affairs, 1966), 29.
7. The educated Muslims of Kashmir started a Reading Room Party near Fateh Kadal in Srinagar in 1931, where most of them would meet to discuss the current topics of the day. For details see P. N. Bazaz, *Inside Kashmir* (Srinagar: Kashmir Publishing Company, 1941), 98.
8. N. N. Raina, *Hegemony of the Working People: A Specific Feature of Our Freedom Movement*, Studies of Kashmir Council of Research, Special Number vol. III (1978): 13.
9. *Khalid*, Srinagar, April 30, 1945.
10. "Naya Kashmir Manifesto," National Conference, Jammu and Kashmir, 1944.
11. Mridu Rai, *Hindu Rulers, Muslim Subjects: Islam, Rights and the History of Kashmir* (New Delhi: Permanent Black, 2004), 282. Inder Malhotra, "The Separatists," *Seminar*, no. 58, 1964, 30.
12. Ghulam Ahmad Mehjoor, *Qaumi Taraana*, cited in P. N. Bazaz, *The History of the Struggle for Freedom in Kashmir: Cultural and Political, from the Earliest Times to the Present Day* (Karachi: Karachi National Book Foundation, 1976), 296.
13. Excerpts from the longer quotation carved in marble at Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah's tomb, Hazratbal, Srinagar, Kashmir.
14. During this period Maharaja Hari Singh had not acceded to either Dominion, India or Pakistan, but was practically independent. But the situation took an ugly turn and Maharaja had to flee from Kashmir.

15. For a detailed discussion on the analysis, deconstruction, and re-construction of Kashmiri identity, see Chitralekha Zutshi, *Language of Belonging, Islam, Regional Identity and the Making of Kashmir* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004); Mridu Rai, *Hindu Rulers, Muslim Subjects: Islam, Rights and the History of Kashmir* (New Delhi: Permanent Black, 2004); Balraj Puri, "The Era of Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah," *Economic and Political Weekly*, 18, no. 6, 1983, 186–187; Gull Mohammad Wani, *Reflections on Kashmir Politics* (New Delhi: Ashish, 1993).
16. Anthony Smith, *State and Nation in the Third World* (Sussex: Wheatsheaf Books, 1983).
17. Edward Shils, "Primordial, Personal, Sacred and Civil Ties," *British Journal of Sociology*, 8, no. 2 (1957): 130–145.
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19. John Palmentatz, "Two types of Nationalism", in *Nationalism: The Nature and Evolution of an Idea*, ed. E. Kamenka (New York: St Martin's Press, 1976), 23–36.
20. Peter Taylor, *Political Geography* (London: Longman, 1985).
21. Tonu Parming and Mee-yan Chenny, "Modernization and Ethnicity," in *National and Ethnic Movements*, ed. J. Dofny (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1980), 131–141.
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26. Akther Mohi-ud-Din, "Identity of the Kashmiri People," *The Journal of Central Asian Studies*, 1, no. 1 (1990): 66.
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29. Francois Bernier, *Travels in the Mughal Empire* (London: Archibald Constable, 1891), 430.
30. Walter Lawrence, *The Valley of Kashmir* (London: H. Frowde, 1895), 2.
31. Abul Fazl, *Ain-i-Akbari*, vol. 2, trans. Colonel, H. S. Jarrett (Calcutta: Asiatic Society of Bengal, 1948), 413. H. Blochmann, trans., *The Ain-I Akbari by Abu'l-Fazl Allami*, vol. I (Calcutta:

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33. Quoted by G. M. Rabbani, *Kashmir: Social and Cultural History* (Delhi: Anmol, 1986), 99–100.
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45. Chitrelekha Zutshi, *Language of Belonging, Islam, Regional Identity and the Making of Kashmir* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 15.
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C H A P T E R 7



KASHMIR IN THE INDIAN PROJECT OF NATIONALISM

Rekha Chowdhary

While writing this chapter, I locate myself in the academic debates related to nationalism in general and the Indian project of nationalism in particular. This chapter is an extract from an ongoing work that aims at exploring the relationship between Indian and Kashmiri nationalism. In its holistic perspective, the larger work seeks to problematize the very project of nationalism, especially in the context of its singular and homogenized nature. It is in this context of the singularities and homogenized nature of nationalism that the work goes on to explore the nature of Kashmiri nationalism, finding it similarly limited by its exclusivity and its failure to extend itself to the larger political realities of the state.

I also seek to locate myself in the political debate on Kashmir from a personal perspective, as a resident of the conflict-ridden state of Jammu and Kashmir. The complexity underlying the conflict, I believe, would continue to haunt the state so long as the conflict focuses on the “statist” and “territorial” model. To resolve the conflict, the first prerequisite is the recognition of cultural diversity, on the one hand, and political divergence, on the other. By critiquing “nationalist” perspectives, I seek to emphasize the value of plurality, on the one hand, and the centrality of the people, on the other. The conflict situation that has engulfed the state of Jammu and Kashmir for the past 60 years and that has been intensified during the recent phase of militancy and separatism can be explained from external as

well as internal angles. While the claim that Pakistan has been making over Kashmir due to its Muslim-majority character and its contestation of the accession of the state to the Union of India in 1947 points to the external dimension of the conflict, there is a purely internal dimension of the conflict that can be traced to the Indian project of nationalism. Seen from this angle, the present phase of separatism in Kashmir can be explained with reference to the failure of Indian nationalism to accommodate the ethno-nationalist identity politics of Kashmir. This ethno-nationalist identity politics, I argue, did not have an essentially contradictory relationship with Indian nationalist politics to begin with. On the contrary, there was a rather harmonious construction of the relationship between Kashmiri political identity, on the one hand, and Indian nationalism, on the other. It is the failure of the Indian nationalist project to nurture Kashmiri ethno-nationalist identity that has resulted not only in a deep-rooted sense of alienation in Kashmir but also in the shaping of this identity in a direction that is incongruous with Indian nationalism.

Despite being predominantly Muslim, the Kashmiri leadership rejected the two-nation theory and the inevitability of joining Pakistan. It took a deliberated and conscious decision of joining India and negotiating autonomy within the asymmetrical federal model. The background to this decision was provided by an indigenous movement that had been organized against the local feudal order embodied in the Dogra Monarch. Though parallel to the Indian National Movement, the leadership of the local movement evolved a very positive association with the national leadership and found with it a commonality of principles and ideology. National leaders, particularly Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru, not only keenly watched the movement, but also provided encouragement and support to the National Conference and its leader, Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah. With the movement gaining intensity, the association of the national leadership also became stronger. Both Nehru and Gandhi identified with the “Quit Kashmir Movement” launched by Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah’s National Conference in 1946 and later appreciated Sheikh’s logic toward accession. They agreed with him that the ultimate right of deciding the future of the state lay with the people and not with the ruler. Before his visit to Kashmir in 1947, Gandhi stated, “I am not going to suggest to Maharaja to accede to India and not to Pakistan, the real sovereign of the State are the people of the State. If the ruler is not a servant of the people [,] then he is not the ruler.”¹ He also stated, “The people of Kashmir should be asked whether they want to join Pakistan or India. Let them do as they want. The ruler is nothing. The people are everything.”²

During his visit, Gandhi supported the people's movement and asked the monarch to release Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah and hand over power to the people by establishing a "constitutional government." After completing his visit, he declared, "the Maharaja does not enjoy the confidence of his people." He wrote to Nehru: "The Treaty of Amritsar was a sales deed. After the termination of its term, the people of Kashmir should have their own sovereign."³ Nehru likewise was supportive of Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah's call of "freedom before accession" and not only encouraged him in his struggle against the Maharaja, but also acted as his "defense Counsel" when Sheikh was arrested by Maharaja.⁴

Hence, by the time the question of accession arose, a very constructive relationship between Indian nationalists and the Kashmiri leadership had already evolved. Kashmiri nationalists could not relate in a similar manner to the leadership of the Muslim League. As opposed to the National Conference, Mohammad Ali Jinnah identified with the Jammu-based Muslim Conference and declared it to be the representative body of the Muslims of the state.⁵ Rather than supporting the "Quit Kashmir Movement," he condemned it. He was "extremely reluctant at this period of time to involve himself directly (or the Muslim League which he headed) in the internal affairs of the Princely State; such action would in his eyes have been constitutionally improper."⁶ It seems that he had no objection to rulers enjoying the right to decide the issue of accession. As Balraj Puri argues, "The leadership of the Muslim League and the new dominion of Pakistan assured the princes including the Maharajah of Jammu and Kashmir that they were free to take any decision on the future affiliations of their state."⁷

The relationship between the National Conference and the Indian National Congress, however, went much beyond personalities and was founded on common ideological standpoints and principles. To understand this relationship, it is important to highlight the evolution of Kashmiri nationalism as it was manifested in 1947. The movement against the feudal order, embodied in the Dogra Monarch Hari Singh, initially articulated the religious identity of the Kashmiri people and represented the oppressed peasantry and artisans of the Valley as Muslim subjects of the Hindu ruler. But gradually, the purely religious basis of identity formation was transcended. By 1947, Kashmiri nationalism had also acquired a regional personality and economic content. While the basic concern around which Kashmiri nationalism evolved remained the same (that is, negotiating benefits for the disadvantaged Kashmiris and protecting their interests), the discourse changed drastically.

THE EVOLUTION OF KASHMIRI NATIONALISM

To understand the nature of the Kashmiri response in 1947 and in the later period, it is important to focus on the evolution of Kashmiri nationalism during this early period. In the early politicization, the Kashmiri leadership did use religion as an important tool both for defining the sense of Kashmir deprivation as well as for political consolidation and mass support. The fact that the religious affiliation of the ruler was different from that of the mass of Kashmiris, their socioeconomic backwardness was located in the religious prejudices of the ruler. This gets reflected in Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah's initial response:

I started to question why Muslims were singled out for such treatment? We constituted the majority, and contributed the most towards the State's revenues, still we were continuously oppressed. Why? How long would we put up with it? Was it because a majority of government servants were non-Muslims, or, because most of the lower grade officers who dealt with the public were Kashmiri Pandits? I concluded that the ill-treatment of Muslims was an outcome of religious prejudice.⁸

In sharpening the Muslim consciousness of Kashmir, the role of the Muslims outside the Valley was quite significant. Outside the state, there was a lobby of Muslims that was actively involved in voicing the problems of Kashmiri Muslims. Kashmir, according to Yunus Samad, has, historically, been a sensitive issue in Muslim Punjab. To a substantial extent, this has been due to the influence of the Kashmiri *Biradari* (brotherhood). According to him, a large number of Kashmiris migrated to Punjab due to natural disasters as well as Dogra oppression. A number of these Kashmiris were also influential people belonging to the *rais* families of the class of professionals. These people of Kashmiri origin in Punjab at the beginning of the 1930s mobilized other Muslims of Punjab, and with their help initiated an organized campaign in support of the Muslims of Kashmir.⁹ It was the result of such a campaign that the All-India Kashmir Muslim Conference was formed. This organization operated from Lahore and was actively involved not only in campaigning for the Muslims of Kashmir, but also in providing them with material and emotional support.

Accordingly, it was the "Muslim" interest that was pursued in the early period of the political movement. The All Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference, which was established in 1932, had declared goals related to educational and employment opportunities for the Muslims of the state, and it also demanded the control of the Muslims over religious institutions.¹⁰ In establishing this organization, the

construction of a united Muslim response within the state was actively pursued. This kind of initial political response was inevitable for the educated youth of Kashmir, who were exposed to the ideas of pan-Islamism during the course of their education in Indian universities, specifically Aligarh. It was inevitable for them to find a common cause with the Muslims of the rest of India, specifically those within the state.

However, what brought religion to the center-stage of the political movement in the early period was the role of the clergy and the mosque in public life at the time. Since much of the public space overlapped with the religious space, political discourses were initiated mainly from religious spaces. The religious space, as highlighted by Chitralekha Zutshi, was itself quite animated with an ongoing conflict between Mirwaiz Maulvi Mohammed Yusuf Shah and Mirwaiz Hamdani, on the one hand,¹¹ and between the traditional clergy and the emerging modern forces within that religious space, on the other. So overarching was the role of religion that even Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah made use of the mosque to mobilize the people. His initial popularity was due to his immaculate recitation of the Holy Quran in the mosque.¹²

In the early stages of the evolution of political consciousness in Kashmir, religious institutions were, therefore, to play a significant role. The religious institution of the Mirwaiz was quite active in Kashmir. The Reading Room Party¹³ worked with full cooperation of the two Mirwaizeens. Such involvement provided Kashmir with many of its political leaders including Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah, Mirza Afzal Beg, and G. M. Sadiq. However, as Prakash Chandra notes, “the conflict in this period was mainly between the forces of Islamic medievalism led by Mirwaiz Maulvi Mohammed Yusuf Shah and the religious forces of popular protest and modernism led by Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah. Although the movement led by Sheikh Abdullah itself used the populist mumbo-jumbo of Islam, it was at the same time, an expression of real distress and of protest against this real distress.”¹⁴

The mass expression of the people of Kashmir on July 13, 1931, the day known as the landmark in the political movement in Kashmir, also manifested a politicized Muslim identity. The unprecedented outburst shook the traditional amity and goodwill between the Hindus and Muslims. However, despite its apparently communal manifestation, the significance of this first mass political response of Kashmiris cannot be considered to be limited to its communal dimension. One may reasonably argue along with Gias-ud-din that the 1931 revolt

was, besides a Muslim revolt, also “an . . . authentic revolt of the people of the state against the political, social and economic oppression by the ruling class and their henchmen. The rebellious elements were the Muslim intelligentsia, the trading class and the mass of the peasantry who were groaning under the feudal rule.”¹⁵ Explaining the role of religion during this time, Prakash Chandra argues that it was necessitated not only by the social backwardness of Kashmir but also by the class character of the leadership. The leadership of the time was provided either by the people of traditional feudal background or by the “emerging petty bourgeoisie” or educated youth. Although the two classes were placed in a struggle for ascendancy, they both “shared the same idiom for different ends.” To quote Chandra,

In this warfare between the dominant classes of feudalism and subordinate classes of anti-feudal struggle (educated youth and general masses) the mass-mobilization was therefore carried out through Quranic discourse. The issue became who knows the basics of Islam and how much . . . In interpreting economics and politics, the objective of the fundamentalists was to maintain *status quo* by giving the popular slogan of “Islam in danger” against the people themselves. On the other hand the vanguard of the subaltern classes—the petty bourgeois Reading Room Party in particular—tried to discover in the so-called “true Islam” an instrument of social change which went against Islamic orthodoxy itself.¹⁶

It was with the expansion of the political space that dependence on the religious space could be overcome. And though the mosque continued to provide the space for political mobilization, the prevalence of street politics diminished its earlier significance. The political discourse, thereafter, started acquiring a more secular nature. As noted by Puri, “Outgrowing its initial demand for more government jobs for Muslims, the Kashmir movement, under its own momentum, aspired for political power through responsible government, democratic rights and freedom of expression and association.”¹⁷

By the 1940s, the movement came under leftist influence, and economic concerns came to define the political discourse.¹⁸ The National Conference was penetrated by communist influence in the 1930s and 1940s. Communist leaders from Punjab had been actively monitoring the political movement in Kashmir. It was due to their close alliance with the National Conference during this phase of the political movement that not only did a left-oriented cadre emerge within the party, but also the concrete ideological structure of the party was chalked out on the lines of the communist ideology. The *New Kashmir Manifesto*, the blueprint of the National Conference, was a document set in the language typical of a communist document. It was to

become the manifestation of the political ethos of Kashmir. On its adoption by the National Conference, it acquired the status of the political vision of the community as a whole. It provided the people a conception of a “New Kashmir” purged of its miserable past, which was reminiscent of external political control, economic oppression, and social backwardness, on the one hand, and its loss of political and moral dignity, on the other. The objective of “land to the tiller” was incorporated into the National Conference politics and helped the leadership to divert the minds of the majority of people from the communal issues to economic ones. As observed by Wolf Ladejinsky, Sheikh would let people “concentrate their thoughts and energies on problems which really matter, the economic problems.”¹⁹

The linkage of the peasantry with the National Conference is very important for understanding the process of secularization of political identity in Kashmir. Land being one of the major issues for the mass of economically oppressed and exploited peasantry, the politics of land reform had a definite impact on the political psyche of the people. This could be perceived from the nature of Kashmir’s politics in the 1940s. With land reforms adding a substantive social content, politics in Kashmir shed its communal nature and acquired a socially purposive and politically efficacious nature. Muslim religion of the farmers did not loom any longer as a serious issue as large segments of the farm population had been “successfully induced to shift their attention from religious to economic matters.”²⁰ This new politics, devoid of its narrow limitations of religion, was to create a sense of political collectivity that was to inform the political consciousness of Kashmir, for times to come. No more was this collectivity to be recognized as specifically a Muslim one. On the contrary, this was a *Kashmiri* collectivity whose Muslim background was incidental. Its particular context of an indigenous political movement against the Dogra rulers helped evolve within this collectivity a conception of a distinct and a self-contained entity, which had evolved its own idea of nationalism, a “Kashmiri nationalism.”

KASHMIRI NATIONALISM AND INDIA: 1947

The political content of Kashmiri nationalism was defined by the idea of “self-rule.” It basically involved the idea of indigenous control over political power and was essentially related to a deep-rooted feeling that Kashmir has been ruled by aliens for centuries together. Since the time of the Mughals, the control over political power had been with outsiders. The Mughals were followed by the Afghans, Sikhs, and Dogras. It was in this context that a discourse of “political dignity” had evolved

during the course of the political movement. The “political dignity” of Kashmir was projected to have been compromised due to external political control, of which the Dogra rule was now a symbol. Dogra rule, in fact, was portrayed as a mark of a more severe indignity of the community—not merely due to its externality but because of the way it had come to acquire control over Kashmir with the payment of a paltry sum of 75 lakh rupees. Projected as a symbol of the enslavement of the community, this fact of history was invoked to raise political emotions and organize a movement with the aim of the reversal of such a history and the assertion of the right of Kashmiris to control their own political destiny.²¹

The discourse of “self-rule” became more articulate during the mid-1940s. This discourse, while contesting the legal and moral right of the Dogra ruler to make decisions about the political future of Kashmir, demanded the transfer of power to the representatives of the people before the decision was made to accede Kashmir either to India or to Pakistan. A reflection of this discourse can be seen in a telegraphic message sent by Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah to the Cabinet Mission:

Today, the people of Kashmir cannot be pacified with only a representative system of governance. They want freedom. Total freedom from the autocratic Maharaja. One hundred years ago Kashmir was sold for 75 lakh Nanakshahi rupees to Raja Gulab Singh by a sale deed of 1846 wrongly called the Treaty of Amritsar. Less than 5 lakh pound sterling changed hands and sealed the fate of over 40 lakh men and women and their land of milk and honey, without the slightest regard to public sentiment. We challenge the political and moral status of this sale deed, this instrument of subjugation, handed by the East India Company agents to a bunch of Dogras.

This is a historic moment. The future of the Indian people is being determined, while the Cabinet Mission is working out a constitutional framework of the country. The right of accession is a contentious issue between three parties, the people, the rulers and the federation. We Kashmiris have to put it in its historical perspective. A sale deed does not have the status of a treaty. Therefore after the termination of British rule Kashmir has the right to become independent. We Kashmiris want to inscribe our own destiny and we want the Cabinet Mission to reaffirm the correctness of our stand.²²

No concrete idea was formulated by the Kashmiri leadership on what would be the exact form of self-rule. On the question of what was actually being envisaged by the National Conference—whether a form of an independent Kashmir or an autonomous political unit within the Indian state—there was a lot of ambiguity.

The political stalemate of Kashmir contributed by Maharaja Hari Singh's indecisiveness added to this ambiguity. As late as October 1947, Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah was insisting on the representative government's right to make a decision on accession. This becomes clear from his speech on October 2, 1947:

We the people of Kashmir must now see to it that our long-cherished dream is fulfilled. The dream of freedom, welfare and progress. No decision, however, is possible while we are slaves. It is, therefore, imperative to set up, without delay, a representative Government which chalks out a plan to safeguard the rights and interests of the people of the State. "Freedom before Accession," should become our resounding slogan.²³

What would be the preference of Kashmiris was not made clear by Sheikh. He had clearly rejected the idea of Pakistan. Though indicating his emotional and ideological proximity to India, Sheikh still kept the options open without clearly committing himself to the idea of accession with India. This is the way he addressed the question after his release from prison in October 1947:

We are facing the question of accession to India or Pakistan, or keeping our separate identity. I am the President of the States' People's Conference which has a clear policy. I am also a friend of Pandit Nehru and I have the greatest respect for Mahatma Gandhi. It is a fact that the Indian National Congress has extended full support to our movement. But the question of accession will be decided in the best interest of the people of Kashmir. Our first priority is to get rid of the Dogra domination.²⁴

Sheikh had nursed the idea of independent Kashmir but, at the same time, had also expressed his apprehension regarding the possibility of a secure future for an independent Kashmir. Former Vice Chancellor of the University of Kashmir Riyaz Punjabi argues that two different shades of opinion existed about the future of Kashmir: while one of these envisaged independence for Kashmir, the other leaned toward the idea of an autonomous state within the Indian Union.²⁵ This is what Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah writes in his autobiography:

I had my views. If we were to accede to India, Pakistan would never accept our choice, and we would become a battleground for the two nations. My colleagues felt differently. The Muslim League, they said, will always be dominated by feudal elements which are an anathema for enlightened and progressive views. The peoples' vision of a "New Kashmir" will never be accepted by the newly created Pakistan. Chains of slavery will keep us in their

continuous stranglehold. But India was different. There were parties and individuals in India whose views were identical to ours. By acceding to India, then, wouldn't we move closer to our goal?

The other choice was an independent Kashmir! But to keep a small state independent while it was surrounded by big powers was impossible. If those powers guaranteed stability to an independent Kashmir, it was another matter. We spent hours agonizing over the three choices.²⁶

It was, however, the tribal invasion of 1947 that forced the decision on the Kashmiri leadership.²⁷ To quote Sheikh:

The new scenario compelled us to take certain political measures. We became wary of Pakistan and looked around to protect our national existence. From India, several sincere friends extended help. One such individual was Saifuddin Kithlew. He tried to convince the Congress leadership of the imperative need to help Kashmir. But the Maharaja had still not signed the formal accession, and any movement on the part of the Indian Army was considered illegal. Mountbatten felt that the Pakistan Army may also be mobilized, and since both the Indian and the Pakistani armies were still under British command, the officers would decline to fight among themselves.... It was, therefore essential that prior to the slightest move by the Indian Army, the Maharaja should sign the Instrument of Accession.²⁸

KASHMIRI NATIONALISM AND INDIAN NATIONALISM

Prakash Chandra argues that there was a common basis of the two kinds of nationalism. Kashmiri nationalism, according to him, was a part of the pan-Indian nationalism that was evolving due to the conditions of feudalism and imperialism. However, he states that besides the commonality, there was also some specificity about Kashmiri consciousness:

After being put into the melting pot of the colonial-feudal regime, the diverse ethnic elements of Jammu and Kashmir came closer to forming a national basis for their freedom struggle. There started a bourgeois class formation, transcending the barriers of caste, religion, tribe, etc. This also led to the evolution of a dual consciousness (existing side by side), one of which was the pan-Indian consciousness, and the other a regional consciousness.²⁹

He argues that the larger context of Indian nationalism did not inhibit the growth of Kashmiri regional consciousness. On the contrary, there was a linkage between Indian nationalism in general and Kashmiri nationalism in particular.

Local nationalism was the product of territorial homogeneity, the folk-cultural specificities, the common heritage of Kashmiri civilization and its linguistic identity, uniformity of artistic, literary and aesthetic tradition, and similarity in ethical-psychological make-up as well as in dress, food habits etc. based on climatic-geographical conditions and socio-cultural mores evolved so far. The Kashmiris, whether Hindus or Muslims, thus, vitally differ in some respects from their counterparts in the sub-continent. It is this regional consciousness and the quest for its survival and growth which gave rise to subsequent demands for special status, and at times even chauvinist slogan of sons of the soil was raised to prevent the swamping of the Kashmiri identity by a massive inflow of people from the Hindu-Hindi mainland.³⁰

Chandra, therefore, talks about the autonomous nature of Kashmiri nationalism, which resulted in the “emergence of a specific popular consciousness in the minds of the people, which was in many ways different from the dominant form of national consciousness in India, especially in respect of the anti-feudal struggle.”³¹

India appealed to the political sensibilities of the Kashmiri leadership for a number of reasons—the secular nature of the state that matched the plural character of society; the promise of democracy and accommodation of social and political divergence; the ideological commitment for a progressive politics of social transformation, both for maintaining the distinct identity of Kashmir as well as for pursuing the goals of radical land reforms; thus, association with India seemed to be worthwhile. It was in pursuance of this later goal that after assuming power, the National Conference could legislate some of the most radical land-reform legislations in a short period between 1948 and 1950. These legislations, while helping the party build linkages with the rural peasantry, were useful in providing a meaningful and politically efficacious character to Kashmiri politics, shifting the attention of people from religious to economic issues. And yet most importantly, these were helpful also in endorsing Kashmir’s bond with India. The question of “accession” was perceived from the perspective of sustenance of land reforms.³²

How positively attuned the Kashmiri leadership was to India could be seen from the following statement of Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah in the immediate post-accession period. Referring to the troubled times in Kashmir when it came under the attack of the Pakistani tribal invaders, he stated in the United Nations:

Under those circumstances, both the Maharajah and the people of Kashmir requested the Government of India to accept the accession. The Government of India could easily have accepted the accession and could have said, “all

right, we accept your accession and we shall render this help.” There was no necessity for the Prime Minister of India to add the provision, when accepting the accession that “India does not want to take advantage of the difficult situation in Kashmir. We will accept this accession because, without Kashmir’s acceding to the Indian dominion, we are not in a position to render any military help. But once the country is free from the raiders, marauders and looters, this accession will be subject to ratification by the people.” That was the offer made by the Prime Minister of India.³³

In the same speech, Sheikh Abdullah asserted the legality of the accession:

The Security Council should not confuse the issue. The question is not that we want internal freedom, the question is not how the Maharaja got his state, or whether or not he is sovereign. These points are not before the Security Council. Whether Kashmir has lawfully acceded to India—complaints on that score have been brought before the Security Council on behalf of Pakistan—is not the point at issue. If this were the point at issue then we should discuss that subject. We should prove before the Security Council that Kashmir and the people of Kashmir have lawfully and constitutionally acceded to the Dominion of India, and Pakistan has no right to question that accession. However, that is not the discussion before the Security Council.³⁴

WHAT ATTRACTED KASHMIRI LEADERS TOWARD INDIA?

According to Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah, there was a kinship of ideals between India and Kashmir. Sheikh acknowledged the influence of the Indian National Movement on the Kashmiri movement. Sheikh described the kinship of ideals between the two movements in a radio broadcast on September 2, 1947, in the following words:

We have always expressed our gratitude to the Indian National Movement, which inspired our people to fight for freedom. As a result of our association with this movement, we successfully faced innumerable ordeals and sacrifices. This kinship of ideals and political objectives induced our people to link themselves with India at the time of a severe crisis, when attempts to isolate us politically and geographically had almost succeeded.³⁵

He referred to the same kinship of ideals during his opening speech in the Constituent Assembly of the state.

As a realist I am conscious that nothing is all black or all white, and there are many facts to each of the propositions before us. I shall first speak on the merits and demerits of the State’s accession to India. In the final analysis, as

I understand it, it is the kinship of ideals which determines the strength of ties between two States. The Indian National Congress has consistently supported the cause of the State's peoples' freedom. The autocratic rule of the Princes has been done away with and representative governments have been entrusted with the administration. Steps towards democratization have been taken and these have raised the people's standard of living, brought about much-needed social reconstruction, and above all built up their very independence of spirit. Naturally, if we accede to India there is no danger of a revival of feudalism and autocracy.³⁶

In their struggle against feudalism and monarchy, Kashmiri leaders found enough support in India. The Indian National Movement had clearly taken a position against both. It was an established fact that the princely rulers would not be able to retain power and the institution of monarchy would not have any future in independent India.³⁷ Similarly, the ideological position of the Congress toward the feudal basis of the agrarian structure was also very clear. It had clearly committed itself to land reforms. There was no such ideological clarity in the recently evolved Muslim League. There was no ideological positioning of this party vis-à-vis the land reforms. On the contrary, there were enough indications that the power structure may reflect feudal interests.

The land reforms that were pursued by the National Conference were, therefore, the major concern for the Kashmiri leadership, and this led them to have a positive approach toward India. Giving this as a major reason for a relationship with India, Sheikh thus stated in the Constituent Assembly:

We are also intimately concerned with the economic well-being of the people of this State. As I said before while referring to constitution-building, political ideals are often meaningless unless linked with economic plans. As a State, we are concerned mainly with agriculture and trade. As you know, and I have detailed before, we have been able to put through our "land to the tiller" legislation and make of it a practical success. Land and all it means is an inestimable blessing to our peasants who have dragged along in servitude to the landlord and his allies for centuries without number. We have been able under present conditions to carry these reforms through, are we sure that in alliance with landlord-ridden Pakistan, with so many feudal privileges intact, that these economic reforms of ours will be tolerated. We have already heard that news of our Land Reforms has traveled to the peasants of the enemy-occupied area of our State, who vainly desire like status and like benefits.³⁸

Apart from the concerns for the land reforms, it was the ideals of secular democracy that attracted the Kashmiri leadership toward India. Sheikh expressed his great faith in the secular democracy of India and

felt that Kashmiris by rejecting the two-nation theory would be comfortably placed in India. His faith in secular democracy is reflected in the following sentences:

The real character of a State is revealed in its Constitution. The Indian Constitution has set before the country the goal of secular democracy based upon justice, freedom and equality for all without distinction. This is the bedrock of modern democracy. This should meet the argument that the Muslims of Kashmir cannot have security in India, where the large majority of the population is Hindu. Any unnatural cleavage between religious groups is the legacy of Imperialism, and no modern State can afford to encourage artificial division if it is to achieve progress and prosperity. The Indian Constitution has amply and finally repudiated the concept of a religious State, which is a throw back to medievalism, by guaranteeing the equality of rights of all citizens irrespective of their religion, color, caste, and class.

The national movement in our State naturally gravitates towards these principles of secular democracy. The people here will never accept a principle which seeks to favor the interests of one religion or social group against another. This affinity in political principles as well as in past association, and our common path of suffering in the cause of freedom, must be weighed properly while deciding the future of the State.³⁹

Association with India, therefore, rather than thwarting the goals of Kashmiri nationalism, was seen as a support through which most of its goals could be fulfilled.

It was through the instrumentality of federalism with its twin principles of “self-rule” and “shared-rule” that Kashmiri aspirations could be accommodated within Indian nationalism. The ideal association with India was through federal principles. It is this federal context that Sheikh emphasized in 1950:

We are proud to have our bonds with India, the goodwill of those people and government is available to us in unstinted and abundant measure. The Constitution of India has provided for a federal union and in the distribution of sovereign powers has treated us differently from other constituent units. With the exception of the items grouped under Defense, Foreign Affairs, and Communications in the Instrument of Accession, we have complete freedom to frame our Constitution in the manner we like.⁴⁰

One can clearly see that Kashmiri leadership was quite optimistic about Kashmir’s relationship with India. If there were any misgivings, these were about the relationship with Pakistan. Sheikh clearly stated that Pakistan had nothing else to offer except a Muslim homeland. But

since this Muslim homeland was to be “feudal” in its orientation, it was not an attractive option. Despite being predominantly Muslim, the idea of two-nation theory stood clearly rejected.

As opposed to this, the Kashmiri leadership was quite positively oriented toward the idea of joining India. This is the way Sheikh located Kashmir in its relationship with India during the early post-accession period:

The position today, as heretofore, is that our State is a constituent unit of the Indian Union and the relationship is based on the same terms as were laid down in the Instrument of Accession. The State has transferred three subjects of defense, Foreign Affairs, and Communications and for the residuary powers inherent in it, it has complete freedom to exercise an autonomous position.

I am fully convinced that this position, consistent with the principles of democracy, could be secured for the State only through a continued association with India, where the large majority of the people are striving to democratize their mode of economic and political development. The support given to our decisions by the Indian people is an effective guarantee that we shall have the fullest opportunities of adopting progressive policies for the benefit of the masses.⁴¹

In the early 1950s, therefore, one finds that there was a mixed response in Kashmir toward India—appreciation as well as expectations. Nehru’s frequent intervention on the issue of Kashmir’s security stating that any aggression on Kashmir would be treated as an aggression on India helped create a sense of confidence and trust in India.⁴² Also Nehru often referred to the agency and consent of the people in the context of Kashmir’s relationship with India, which was also a matter of satisfaction to the people. However, it was also expected that India would take the responsibility not only of the security of Kashmir but also of its economic progress and development.

The post-1947 period, in any case, provided a sense of security and stability in Kashmir. This was due to three major reasons: first, power was internally located, and Kashmiris had the satisfaction that they were able to control and direct their own political destiny, and that they were not being governed by an outside power (like the Mughals, Pathans, Sikhs, and Dogras). This was very important in the context of the political discourse that had evolved during the 1930s and 1940s. According to this discourse, Kashmiris had lost their dignity due to the external control over power. Along with this, there was a greater satisfaction over the material economic changes that were taking place. The National Conference government had

succeeded in concretizing various radical measures proclaimed in the “New Kashmir Plan.” These measures were primarily aimed at alleviating the condition of the rural poor. *Jagirs* and big landed estates were abolished and ceiling was placed on the possession of agricultural land. Old debts amounting to millions of rupees were liquidated, cottage industries were subsidized, and small entrepreneurs were helped financially to start small-scale manufacturing units.

The progressive nature of the land reforms of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) has been widely acknowledged. Wolf Ladjensky compares the land reforms in Kashmir with those implemented in other states and observes, “whereas virtually all land reforms in India lay stress on the elimination of the *Zamindari* tenure system with compensation or rent reduction and security of tenure, the Kashmir reforms call for the distribution of land among tenants without compensation to the erstwhile proprietors; whereas land reform enforcement in most of India is not so effective, in Kashmir, enforcement is unmistakably rigorous.”⁴³

As Puri notes, the 1948 reforms had a huge impact, “34,000 kanals [sic] of land were resumed. On the basis of continued possession of land, the cultivators were granted the right of protected tenancy. It was also provided that the existing rent could not be enhanced. The share of the tenant of all-*abi* (irrigated) areas was fixed at 3/4th and that of the owner at 1/4th and in case of *khushki* (dry) lands, the share of the tenant and the landowner was fixed at 2/3rd and 1/3rd respectively.”⁴⁴

However, the most important land reform initiative was taken in 1950. On July 13, 1950, the state announced the implementation of the principle of “land to the tiller.” All land “except for residential sites, orchards and certain kinds of plantation and land, plus an area of 20 acres for personal cultivation” was to be “transferred to the actual tillers thereof in ownership right, subjected to payment of land revenues and other dues.”⁴⁵ This announcement was followed up by “Abolition of the Big Landed Estates Act,” “which provided that a land owner could retain (besides orchards) only 182 kanals of cultivable land. The excess land was to be distributed among the tenants.”⁴⁶ How substantive was the impact of this Act was made clear through the following news report in *Hindustan Times* at the time:

Nearly 200,000 acres of land had come under the direct ownership of tillers in Jammu and Kashmir till the end of the last financial year (April 1953), according to figures given by a government publication. The number of tillers who have actually received land is over one and half lakh and the total number of persons benefitting as a result of it nearly six lakhs. In addition to this,

over ninety-two thousand acres of land, which had come to be vested in the State under the provision of the Big Landed Estates Abolition Act, are being distributed to refugees and landless peasants The land vested in the State is also being distributed, priority being given to refugees and landless people Among other steps taken by the State Government in the direction of land reform the publication makes particular mention of the abolition of 396 jagirs and 2,347 mukkarraree holders (recipients of cash grants), which relieved the State and the peasants of a burden of Rs 10 lakhs annually; amendment to the Tenancy Act and the democratization of village institutions. The Debt Conciliation Boards set up in July 1950 had, within a period of 2 years and 3 months, scaled down the debts of the poor by about 80 per cent.⁴⁷

According to Puri, “these reforms have some very marked characteristics compared to their counterparts in the rest of India. They were hastily conceived and rapidly implemented. That is their chief virtue and also their main defect. Most of them were the result of executive orders of the Cabinet. Legislation to ratify them came later and that too did not take long.”⁴⁸

LINKAGE BETWEEN LAND REFORMS AND ARTICLE 370

A logical linkage existed between the land reforms and Article 370. The land reforms pursued by this state were more radical as compared to those in other states of India. One of the most radical aspects of the reforms was that the landowners from whom the surplus land was expropriated were not compensated, as in case of the rest of India. To quote Prakash Chandra, “National Conference in Jammu and Kashmir opted for the Indian form of democracy . . . with an assurance of autonomy and special status, (article 370 of the Indian constitution), so that in the implementation of bourgeois democratic reforms and especially the land reforms in Jammu and Kashmir, the Indian legal apparatus would not become an obvious structural fetter like in the rest of India.”⁴⁹ Sheikh’s own understanding of J&K’s relationship with India, especially in the context of federalism, was very clear. According to him, rather than reinforcing unitary systems, federal processes allowed for maintaining harmony at local levels, while allowing the center to contribute to nation building. In an interview with Prakash Chandra, Sheikh stated,

The Indian political system can function more efficiently at a regional and trans-regional level of federal units than at an all India level under unitary form of government. The actual function of an all India centre [sic] should be to maintain harmony of various local levels of Indian society by weaving

them into a single whole nation. The centre [sic] should know its weaving-nationalist task and should not force its values and ideas on local cultures in such a way that they feel threatened and insecure.⁵⁰

Article 370 and Asymmetrical Federalism were seen as instruments of linkage between Indian and Kashmiri nationalisms. Within the centralized model of Indian federalism, the Kashmiri leadership felt the need to negotiate “autonomy.” An asymmetrical federalism with a constitutionally guaranteed special status for J&K was the outcome of such a negotiation.⁵¹ Protected by the cover of Article 370, the state was able to initiate far-reaching land reforms benefitting the mass of Kashmiris and, as a consequence, generating popular support for the federal arrangement.

Although Kashmir’s relationship with India was smooth, there were differences in the way the relationship was viewed and the way the constitutional arrangements were perceived. That difference would have existed even in the pre-1947 period. As Puri notes, “Kashmiri nationalists tended to treat Indian nationalism as their ally, while Indian nationalists considered Kashmir to be their part.”⁵² Similar was the difference in approach toward accession and center-state relations. To quote Puri:

The rest of the nation regarded it just as another instance of the process of integration of the princely states. But for the Kashmir Muslims it was an enabling provision to seek the help of a powerful neighbor to protect their identity from an aggressor. The eulogistic reference to what was called Indo-Kashmir friendship by the Kashmiri leadership in that period underlined the separateness of the Kashmiri identity. The Kashmir leadership, therefore, exercised its legal right, under the Independence Act and the Instrument of Accession, to retain its autonomy within the Indian Union which other princely states, under their own compulsions, had agreed to surrender to the Centre [sic].⁵³

He further notes:

Kashmiri leaders grudgingly conceded, under the persuasion of the central leaders, to cede more subjects to the centre [sic] but resisted further pressures to conform to the uniform pattern of centre [sic]-state relations in the country. Article 370 of the Indian Constitution and the Delhi Agreement between Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and Kashmiri leader Sheikh Abdullah in July 1952 eventually formalized the state’s constitutional relations with the centre [sic].⁵⁴

However, despite the differences between the central and Kashmiri leadership, there was a general acceptance about the logic of Kashmir's relationship with India—the logic of autonomy. It was through this logic that the goals of Kashmiri and Indian nationalism were synchronized. However, this logic was upset in 1953, when Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah, the popular leader of Kashmir, was ousted from power and detained in the "national interest." However, even before Sheikh was pushed out of power, the logic of Kashmir's relationship with India was contested from the "nationalist" perspective. It was the politics of the Hindu Right emphatically voiced by the Bharatiya Jana Sangh that problematized Article 370 as a symbol of "incomplete integration" of the state with India. Shyama Prasad Mukherjee raised an objection to limited applicability of the Constitution to the state as well as to the office of "Prime Minister" (head of government) and "Sadar-e-Riyasat" (head of state) of the state. In these, he saw the signs of sovereignty ingrained in J&K, which he termed "Republic within a Republic." It was in line with this argument of Mukherjee that the Jana Sangh placed the demand for abolition of Article 370 as central to its political agenda. While making this demand, the party initiated a discourse invoking the nationalist concern for "unity" that was seen to be challenged by "duality" and "difference," which, according to the Hindu Right, Article 370 represented. Privileging "uniformity" as the essential characteristic of "national unity," the party therefore opposed the idea of constitutional or any other kind of exception made for this state.

Uniformity as the basis of the nationalist agenda came to be more clearly articulated in 1952, when a Jana Sangh-sponsored agitation in Jammu (the winter capital of J&K) popularized the slogan "*ek Vidhan, ek Pradhan, ek Nishan*" (one Constitution, one president, one symbol). The slogan in its elaborated form "*Ek desh me do vidhan, do pradhan, do nishan—nahin chalega*" (in one nation, two constitutions, two presidents, and two symbols would not work) clearly emphasized the singularities and uniformities as the basis of "nation." Though the agitation failed to impress the national leadership of the time and was even declared as communal by Nehru, it, however, succeeded in generating a "nationalist" political discourse around the issue of "integration" of the state of Jammu and Kashmir. This discourse, while remaining central to the politics of rightist Hindu organizations, was extended to other political parties including the Congress, which made all-out efforts to revoke the earlier logic of constitutional autonomy guaranteed to the state and bring it at par with other states of India. The "integration"

discourse reversed the logic of Kashmir's relationship with India. With the concept of "autonomy" being questioned, the congruity that existed between Kashmiri aspirations and Indian nationalist goals was no more available. By implication, therefore, Kashmiri nationalism was placed in an antagonistic relation with Indian nationalism.

With emphasis being shifted from "constitutional autonomy" to "constitutional integration" as the basis of J&K's relationship with India, the logic that the Kashmiri leadership had in its preference for India was weakened. Consequently, the consent that earlier was readily available for accession of the state with India was also withdrawn. With internal contestation, especially after the undemocratic detention of Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah, the legitimacy of India's position vis-à-vis Kashmir was also impaired. It was in this context that the "national interest" assumed primacy over everything else in Kashmir and everything was justified in its name—whether it was the absence of democracy, suppression of civil liberties, or disregard of popular responses. The consequence has been the accumulated discontent that has been erupting from time to time.

NOTES

1. Stanley Wolpert, *Gandhi's Passion: The Life and Legacy of Mahatma Gandhi*, cited in Tariq Ali, "Bitter Chill of Winter," *London Review of Books*, 23, no. 8, April 19, 2001, accessed July 10, 2003, <http://www.lrb.co.uk/v23/n08/tariq-ali/bitter-chill-of-winter>
2. Ibid.
3. Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi, cited in Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah, *Flames of the Chinar*, trans. and intro. Khushwant Singh (Delhi: Penguin Books, 1995), 85.
4. Ali, "Bitter Chill of Winter."
5. In the annual session of the Muslim Conference in 1944, Jinnah declared that "ninety-nine percent of the Muslims who met me were of the opinion that the Muslim Conference alone was the representative organization of the state Muslims." Balraj Puri, "The Era of Sheikh Mohammed Abdullah," *Economic and Political Weekly*, February 5, 1983, 187.
6. Alastair Lamb, *Kashmir Disputed Legacy* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1993), 97.
7. Puri, "The Era of Sheikh Mohammed Abdullah," 186–187.
8. Abdullah, *Flames of the China* (1995), 12–13.
9. Yunus Samad, "Kashmir and the Imagining of Pakistan," *Contemporary South Asia*, 4, no. 1 (1995), 65–77.

10. Rekha Chowdhary, "The Muslim Identity and the Politics of Fundamentalism in Kashmir," QEH Working Paper Series—QEHWPS19, <http://www3.qeh.ox.ac.uk/RePEc/qeh/qehwps/qehwps19.pdf>, p. 11.
11. Chitralekha Zutshi, *Languages of Belonging: Islam, Regional Identity and the Making of Kashmir* (Delhi: Permanent Black, 2003).
12. As a ban was imposed by the Dogra regime in all types of activities, whether social, religious, or political, it was from the mosques only that the small class of intelligentsia could mobilize the masses.
13. Editor's Note: When the first few Kashmiri Muslims to have obtained degrees at institutions of higher education, such as the Aligarh Muslim University in British India, returned to the state in the 1920s, they were imbued with "newfangled" ideas of nationalism, liberty, and democracy. A group of these young graduates, who were well educated but denied opportunities that would have enabled them to climb the socioeconomic ladder, started convening regular meetings at a house in Fateh Kadal, Srinagar, and from these seemingly innocuous gatherings evolved the "Fateh Kadal Reading Room Party." Members of the Reading Room Party wrote articles for various publications in which their subversive voices expressed resentment against the arbitrary and discriminatory practices of the Dogra regime.
14. Prakash Chandra, "The National Question in Kashmir," *Social Scientist*, 13, no. 6 (1985), 35.
15. Gias-ud-Din, "Kashmir: Islam, Ideology and Society," in *5000 Years of Kashmir*, ed. Balraj Puri (Delhi: Ajanta, 1997), 83.
16. Chandra, "The National Question in Kashmir," 35–36.
17. Balraj Puri, "The Era of Sheikh Mohammed Abdullah," 186.
18. Under the leadership of Indian Marxists, particularly K. M. Ashraf and B. P. L. Bedi, a strong leftist group emerged in Kashmir in the early 1940s. This group was also actively involved in the politics of the National Conference. Ghulam Mohammad Sadiq was the most prominent member of this group, who held a very influential position within the party.
19. Wold Isaac Ladejinsky, "Land Reform: Observations in Kashmir," in *Agrarian Reform As Unfinished Business: The Selected Papers of Wolf Ladejinsky*, ed. W. I. Ladejinsky (New York: Oxford University Press, 1952), 185.
20. Ibid., 188–189.
21. No concrete idea was formulated by the Kashmiri leadership as to what would be the exact form of self-rule. On the question as to what was actually being envisaged by the National Conference—whether a form of an independent Kashmir or an autonomous political unit within the Indian state—there was a lot of ambiguity. Sheikh had nurtured the idea of an independent Kashmir but at the same time had also expressed his apprehension regarding the possibility of a secure

future of an independent Kashmir. Riaz Punjabi argues that there were two different shades of opinion about the future of Kashmir, one envisaging independence for Kashmir and the other leaning toward the idea of an autonomous state within the Indian Union. Riyaz Punjabi, "Kashmir Imbroglio: The Socio-Political Roots," *Contemporary South Asia*, 4, no. 1 (1995), 39–53.

22. Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah, *Flames of the Chinar*, trans. and intro. Khushwant Singh (Delhi: Penguin, 1993), 78.
23. Ibid., 86.
24. Ibid.
25. Punjabi, "Kashmir Imbroglio," 39–53.
26. Abdullah, *Flames of the Chinar* (1993), , 82.
27. Editor's Note: The ruthlessness of the Pakistani tribal raiders' miscalculated attack drove various political forces in the state to willy-nilly align themselves with India. Although the raiders, or *Qabailis*, were unruly mercenaries, they were led by well-trained and well-equipped military leaders who were familiar with the arduous terrain, and the leaders launched what would have been a dexterous attack if they had not been tempted to pillage and plunder on the way to the capital city, Srinagar. The brutal methods of the raiders received strong disapprobation from the people of the Valley who had disavowed a quintessentially Muslim identity and replaced it with the notion of a Kashmiri identity. The raiders antagonized their coreligionists by perpetrating atrocities against the local populace, including women and children. The undiplomatic strategies of the tribal leaders and Pakistani militia expedited the attempts of the All-India National Congress to incorporate Kashmir into the Indian Union.
28. Abdullah, *Flames of the Chinar* (1993), 94.
29. Chandra, "The National Question in Kashmir," 42–43.
30. Ibid.
31. Ibid.
32. Explaining the relationship between Indian nationalism and Kashmiri nationalism, Prakash Chandra uses the concept of "little nationalism" and argues, "The autonomous pattern and the crystallization of the Kashmiri community of culture helped the growth of a distinct 'little nationalism,'" Chandra, "The National Question in Kashmir," 43.
33. Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah's February 5, 1948, speech to the United Nations Security Council Meeting 241. <http://www.jammu-kashmir.com/documents/abdulun48.html>
34. Ibid.
35. "Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah's Broadcast," *The Statesman*, September 2, 1952.
36. Opening statement made by Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah to the Constituent Assembly of Jammu and Kashmir in 1951.
37. This is the way Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah reflected his response to India vis-à-vis the question of abolition of monarchy in the

state: "Ever since our relationship with India came into being, we had the satisfaction that we could go ahead with our progressive policies.... Even with regard to the decision concerning the ruling dynasty, I am happy to say that the Indian leaders have accommodated our viewpoint." "Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah's Broadcast," *The Statesman*, September 2, 1952.

38. Opening statement made by Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah to the Constituent Assembly of Jammu and Kashmir in 1951.
39. Ibid.
40. Ibid.
41. "Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah's Broadcast," *The Statesman*, September 2, 1952.
42. "Kashmir's Progress Linked with India's," *The Hindustan Times*, August 29, 1952.
43. Wolf Ladjensky, "Land Reform Observations in Kashmir," in *Agrarian Reforms As Unfinished Business*, ed. L. J. Walinsky (New York: Oxford University Press, 1977), 179–180.
44. Balraj Puri, "Land Reforms in Jammu & Kashmir," *Hindustan Standard*, December 7, 1953.
45. *The Statesman*, August 3, 1950.
46. Puri, "Land Reforms in Jammu & Kashmir."
47. *The Hindustan Times*, July 17, 1953.
48. Puri, "Land Reforms in Jammu & Kashmir."
49. Chandra, "The National Question in Kashmir," 37.
50. Ibid., 49.
51. Asymmetrical federalism was aimed at providing a harmony to Kashmir's relationship with India. It offered enough political space for the Kashmiri identity to express itself and to assert its autonomy within the Indian Union. Article 370 restricted the application of the Indian Constitution with respect to this state, limited the law-making power of the Indian Parliament, and vested residual power in the state. What was of utmost importance was that, unlike other states of India that were to be governed by the Indian Constitution, this state was allowed to have its own constitution. However, more than anything else, it was the negotiability of the political elite of the state that contributed to the confidence of Kashmiris about their relationship with India.
52. Puri, "The Era of Sheikh Mohammed Abdullah," 187.
53. Balraj Puri, "The Challenge of Kashmir," *Economic and Political Weekly*, January 27, 1990, 191.
54. Ibid.; writing about the approach of Sheikh, on the one hand, and that of the central leadership, on the other, *Hindu* notes how the differences continued between the two even after the Delhi Agreement of 1952. To quote it: "After the Delhi Agreement, the Kashmir premier was at pains to point out the directions in which the powers of this State would differ from those enjoyed by other Indian States which

had acceded to the Indian Union. To take but one instance, he said, ‘under the head “residuary powers” it was agreed that while, under the Indian constitution, the residuary powers vested in the Centre in respect of all States other than Jammu and Kashmir, in the case of our State they were vested in the State itself’. He went on to claim that this was not compatible with Article 370 of the Indian Constitution. Now this article, it is true, lays down among other things, that Kashmir shall be exempted from the application of Article 238 which puts the acceding states practically on a par with the other units, namely the former Indian Provinces. But the general understanding at the time of passing of the Constitution Act and since has been that this exemption was necessitated by the fact that Kashmir was not in a position to take the final decision on the question of accession. It is not without purpose that this Article 370 is included in Part XXI which deals with ‘Temporary and Transitional Provisions’, and that the article itself is headed ‘Temporary Provisions with Respect to the State of Jammu and Kashmir’. It is difficult to see how the Delhi Agreement on Residuary powers could, as described by Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah, be held to be consistent with Article 370 unless this article is taken out of the ‘provisional’ chapter and included in that part of the Constitution which lays down its permanent features. It is not surprising, therefore, to find the Revenue Minister of Kashmir and leader of the Kashmir delegation to Delhi interpreting the Delhi Agreement as implying that Article 370 should become permanent, and pooh-poohing the idea voiced in the Indian Parliament that Article 370 would cease to exist, and Kashmir would be ‘dragged down to the status of a Part B State’. Mr. Mirza Afzal Beg [leader of the Kashmir delegation] made it clear that a special position had been given to Kashmir in the Indian Constitution on a ‘permanent’ basis. Asserting that it would be a ‘betrayal’ of Kashmiris if the special provision in the Indian Constitution was modified, the Minister said, ‘It was a happy thing that the Government of India had recognized Kashmir’s special position in the Union and that it would not be fair to Kashmir to ask to accept any encroachments on its residuary sovereignty.’” *The Hindu*, August 23, 1952.

P A R T IV



SOCIOLOGICAL DIMENSIONS OF
CONFLICT, INSURGENCY,
COUNTER-INSURGENCY,
MILITARIZATION, AND A
MONOLITHIC NATIONALISM

CHAPTER 8

SOCIOLOGICAL DIMENSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS OF THE KASHMIR PROBLEM

Bashir Ahmed Dabla

The fact stands with a lot of evidence that, with the establishment and expansion of colonialism during the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries, European powers were exposed fully to a new world of the “East,” which was qualitatively as well as quantitatively different from their world. It was essentially in that context that the backward societies in the East were considered and treated as “uncivilized” and “brutal” and so were in need of undergoing the “civilizing mission” of the colonial rulers. Societies in the East were actually the “other world in totality” for colonial rulers and administrators. Some of them understood these societies, while most of them did not. Many among the colonizers misunderstood them. This kind of attitude and approach reflected clearly in their writings, which necessarily revealed biases, unrealistic feeling, colonial arrogance, the white man’s burden, and unreasonable arguments. The colonial attitude and approach was revealed in their books, articles, dairies, memoirs, other fiction and nonfiction writings, and official as well as unofficial documents. These writings characterized the colonized as “uncivilized” and “primitive.” Therefore, while people in Africa and Asia were considered uncivilized and sick, colonial rule was justified on self-developed and self-evaluated ideas and principles. This

colonial attitude continues till date, revealed in the West's response after 9/11 vis-à-vis Iraq and Afghanistan.

Even a small state like Kashmir, which had no direct experience of European colonial rule, experienced this reality. This pigeonholing of Kashmir is revealed clearly in the writings of colonial administrators, tourists, visitors, observers, and others. These people visited Kashmir for brief periods and wrote treatises on the basis of their impressionistic views and momentary interactions. Some prominent writings in this regard are as follows:

- (1) Robert Thorp, *Cashmere Misgovernment*, 1870;
- (2) Walter R. Lawrence, *The Valley of Kashmir*, 1895;
- (3) C. E. T Biscoe, *Kashmir Under Sun and Shade*, 1922.

These books are considered authentic, reliable, and realistic presentations, but have colonial limitations. Though these books highlight some human and noble features of the local people, they also convey the "colonial bent of mind," "white man's burden," and "civilizing mind set."

It was in that broader theoretical context, in addition to its other positive features, that the ethnographic approach was used to study local social realities related to individuals and societies with indigenous perception(s) and local perspectives. "Political ethnography" in the Kashmir context has proved the sole legitimate method/technique for observing ongoing political developments in Kashmir. This may prove highly useful and productive academically. Moreover, this approach emphasizes local contents and locally determined concepts in the understanding and explanation of the local situation. Broadly speaking, this approach completely suits the study of the past and present of Kashmiri society, particularly the study of militancy. In reality, we may explain and assess the prevailing situation that emerged as a result of the two-decade-long armed conflict. It follows that a specific situation in a specific context can be easily studied in this thematic/theoretical framework.

It is important to recognize that different perceptions and varying perspectives about the chronic and complex Kashmir problem prevail in mainstream as well as non-mainstream political, socioeconomic, and cultural discourses. At the global level, since this problem was internationalized, Western powers, especially the United States, the former Soviet Union, and Western Europe, developed different perceptions that generally served their global political and strategic interests. At the international-national level, India and Pakistan developed their

own perceptions about the Kashmir problem in the past, which revolved around their domestic and foreign policy objectives. At the same time, these countries developed polarized perceptions about this problem to pursue their respective domestic political agendas within their national boundaries. Although political parties, organizations, and groups in both countries differed on many issues and problems, they were unanimous and united in vehemently opposing each other's perception in this regard. At the local level, Kashmiris too have developed different perceptions regarding this problem, which are upheld by regional political parties, organizations, and groups.

While some of them maintain pro-India, pro-autonomy, and pro-self rule perceptions, others present pro-Pakistan and Islamic perceptions. Many others espouse the "complete independence" perception. In the context of plurality of perceptions about the Kashmir conundrum, in this chapter, I essentially represent an academic effort to present the perception of the indigenous people of J&K. This perception has been shared and upheld by the local intelligentsia, scholars, writers, academics, professionals, and the common masses. All the propositions and other observations that I have made in this chapter are based on the real experiences of intellectual groups and masses in Kashmir, all of whom have suffered and have been traumatized during the conflict. So this perception represents the Kashmiri people's perception about their problem.

All the observations that I have made in this chapter have been presented scientifically with the support of credible and primary source documents. At the same time, these are also substantiated by my personal experiences during the conflict. Like most people in Kashmir, I, too, have experienced the trials, tribulations, traumas, and militarization in a conflict zone, and its impact on human life. So I stand witness to all these observations.

All developments directly related to the conflict in Kashmir, especially insurgency, counter-insurgency, militarization, economic collapse, demographic manipulation, social-cultural deterioration, religious-ideological emphasis, and breakdown of change-development processes, led to a general consciousness and formation of a particular political identity and supporting ideology, which represented the political aspirations of people in Kashmir. The facts are well substantiated with empirical evidence that people in Kashmir irrespective of their status, position, background, qualification, and religious identity suffered during militancy in the 1990s. In that situation of mass harassment and torture practices, every citizen felt compelled to oppose brutality and the inhuman treatment meted out

to the populace by the J&K police and Indian paramilitary forces. Intellectuals, like lay people, too, came out against suppression and atrocities.

In fact, it was observed that, for the first time in the history of Kashmir, the local intelligentsia protested against the barbaric treatment of Kashmiris and condemned the oppression of the masses and killing of innocent civilians in armed encounters in huge numbers. While inside Kashmir, they presented systematically different ideas, views, and opinions about the Kashmir conundrum and its resolution, outside Kashmir, they focused on human rights violations in the Valley. For the first time, the Kashmiri diaspora showed a carefully thought-out political response to the developments in Kashmir.

These political and ideological developments in the post-1947 period, in general, and during the past two decades, in particular, influenced intellectuals in all aspects of life. This, in turn, contributed to increased and intensified feelings about Kashmir identity and its distinctive indigenous perspective. It also follows that militancy and militarization during the long period of 21 years affected all religious, political, ideological, economic, social, demographic, cultural, and psychological fields. Subsequently, Kashmiri society experienced the emergence of two political trends among local intellectuals and academics.

The first trend can be explained in terms of “active participation” of academics and other professionals in the people’s struggle for a just and legitimate Kashmir cause. Academics discussed, debated, explained, analyzed, wrote, published, and conveyed through electronic and print media various aspects of the Kashmir problem. At the same time, they and their organizations/institutions participated in all major political demonstrations and protests. They put forth the locals’ perspective of the issues and problems of Kashmir. In this way, they felt that they were fulfilling their political obligations as intellectual members of their society.

Second, in the process of academic exercises, these local intellectuals were able to portray, present, and highlight the distinctive Kashmiri perspective with the highest degree of clarity and specificity. They were very particular about Kashmir history, identity, ideology, plurality of cultures and religions, language, culture, demography, tolerance and dependence, cultural ethos, de-Kashmirization, and de-Islamization. In the preceding context, Kashmiri intellectuals, especially academics, emerged as “Kashmiris” and “academics” simultaneously. These identities, according to them, were not in contradiction but were “internally related.”

Like other thinking individuals in Kashmir, I, too, felt the need to uphold what I saw as the Kashmiri political-ideological position in my writings and publications in print and electronic media. In this chapter, I have foregrounded political, ideological, social, economic, cultural, and others perspectives that are largely determined by developments in the past two decades.

Like other societal groups, university students too were deeply affected by the emergence of militancy and militarization. In the environment of militancy and militarization, while the majority of students were ideologically committed to one militant group or the other, a significant number among them were actively involved as militants, supporters, sympathizers, and over-ground activists. An unofficial study, carried out by some academics and scholars, revealed that the nature and rate of participation of students in the militant movement during the 1990s were as follows:

- 05–10% worked as active and trained militants;
- 10–15% worked as helpers and over-ground activists;
- 15–50% worked as supporters and silent sympathizers;
- 50–100% were apathetic or not concerned.

While about 98 percent of the students involved in different activities of the armed insurgency were boys, only about 2 percent were girls. Other major effects of militancy were felt in the near “total loss of education.” In the 1990s, most students felt disassociated with the objectives and goals of education and empathized with militancy-related activities. No regular classes, no fair exams, no real evaluations, and no internal-sessional-practical assignments could be carried out.

On the basis of my personal experience, I posit that militarization posed an intimidating physical threat to students, as they were one of the primary targets in the counter-insurgency operations carried out by Indian security forces as well as the local police. As a result, in the 1990s and early 2000s, many students were injured, disabled, arrested without warrants, tortured, harassed, and killed. Some of them were compelled to drop the classes they were enrolled in at the university. Students, at large, faced physical and mental breakdowns. Many of them developed chronic and dreaded diseases. They also faced many psychological and psychiatric problems, particularly suicidal tendencies and deep-seated frustration. Some of the stress, trauma, and depression cases could not be treated effectively. The armed insurgency and counter-insurgency created mass anti-India sentiment among students because of brutal and inhumane treatment by

security forces outside the university, who were not held accountable. Commuter students from rural areas, in particular, were afraid of brusque treatment by the forces, daily armed encounters, bomb blasts, and so on. Militarization gave rise to local religious consciousness and a separate Kashmiri nationalist identity among the majority of students, as a reaction to the actions of security forces. The former felt that they were humiliated and degraded by the latter because of their religious affiliation, which was predominantly Islamic. Last but not least, the pervasive militarization disturbed the social, cultural, and religious ethos and relationships of students, who felt alienated and antagonized.

To give my readers a fairly accurate idea of the region and populace that I am writing about, I would like to foreground a few bland geographic and demographic statistics. The total area of the former princely state of Jammu and Kashmir was 80,900 square miles. After the partition of the Indian subcontinent in 1947 into two nation-states, India and Pakistan, the state was divided into Pakistan-administered Kashmir, with an area of 4,144 square miles; J&K, with an area of 16,773 square miles; and Ladakh, Astore, Baltistan, and Gilgit, with a total area of 63,554 square miles.¹ The total population of Kashmiris inside and outside Kashmir comprises 10 million in J&K; 10 million in Pakistan-administered Kashmir; and 4.5 million diasporic Kashmiris in different parts/countries of the world.² While the Kashmir region has a Muslim majority population of 97 percent, Jammu and Ladakh regions have Hindu and Buddhist majority populations, respectively. The minority communities in Kashmir comprise Kashmiri Pandits, who form about 2 percent of the total population, Sikhs form about 1 percent, and Christians form about 0.4 percent of the total population.³ In Jammu and Ladakh regions, Muslims form 41 percent and 27 percent of the total populations, respectively.⁴ On the whole, Muslims constitute 99 percent and 68 percent of the total populations of Pakistan-administered Kashmir and J&K, respectively.⁵ While the principal spoken languages in Jammu and Kashmir are Kashmiri, Dogri, Gojri, Pahari, Ladakhi, and Balti, Urdu is the official language. Urdu, Pahari-Potwari, Hindko, Gojri, Punjabi, and Pashto are the languages spoken in Pakistan-administered Kashmir.⁶ People in both parts of Kashmir, Indian and Pakistani, live in urban as well as rural and hilly areas. The Kashmir Valley, in particular, has been renowned for its landscape, idyllic beauty, and pastoral charms, and has been characterized as “paradise on earth” and “Switzerland of Asia” by the many visitors who have been mesmerized by its therapeutic

mountains, streams, lakes, and rivers.⁷ Although some observations have been recorded, not many outside writers have written about the extreme poverty, constant political domination, religious persecution, mass forced labor, and perpetuation of cruelty and brutality on the local populace by their alien feudal rulers.⁸

NATURE OF KASHMIR PROBLEM: KASHMIR POST 1947 POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

In modern times, the first mass-based, ideologically oriented and politically directed movement for comprehensive change among Kashmiri Muslims started in 1931 under the Muslim Conference leadership. The main objective of that movement was to highlight the pathetic and miserable living conditions of Kashmiri Muslims and to safeguard their basic rights.⁹ However, the religious leadership of the Muslim Conference could not withstand the secular and younger leadership of Kashmiri nationalists, which led to radical political transformation in Kashmir. That was clearly reflected in converting the Muslim Conference to the National Conference and adopting the *Naya Kashmir* Program as the future political manifesto.¹⁰ This change of mammoth proportions was first documented in the entire Indian subcontinent, which first talked about land to the tiller, abolition of usury system, free education to all, gender equality, and voting rights to women.¹¹ The main objective of the *Naya Kashmir* Program was to create a more representative and responsible form of government.

POST-ACCESSION DEVELOPMENTS

In the background of independent freedom movement in Kashmir, the temporary accession to India was negotiated with the stipulation that the people of the state would be given the right to decide their political future when peace and normalcy returned. But that promise was never fulfilled by India, and Pakistan did not adhere to the conditions imposed on it by the United Nations that would facilitate the holding of a referendum in J & K, which created the cantankerous Kashmir problem.¹² Kashmiri nationalists under the leadership of Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah took power in J & K in 1947, destroying the centuries-old alien feudal rule in Kashmir. Since Kashmiri nationalists were committed to a secular political and economic program, they carried out radical efforts at two levels. On the one hand, they

opposed the “two nation theory” of Pakistan and upheld a secular polity in J & K, and on the other hand, they introduced revolutionary reforms like land to the tiller, abolition of usury system, and free education for all.

I, painfully and with a deep sense of disillusionment, observe that the Indian response to these efforts was obstructionist, leading to Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah’s unfortunate dismissal and arrest in 1953, which was orchestrated by Jawaharlal Nehru’s government. The Indian response reflected the truculent and pugnacious reaction of right-wing nationalist political groups, feudal classes, and the hitherto privileged Kashmiri Pandits, who were affected by these reforms. This putsch followed by the incarceration of Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah gave new strength to the narrative of self-determination and movement for freedom in Kashmir under Abdullah’s Plebiscite Front.¹³ Subsequently, the Government of India imposed its hand-picked leaders and regimes in J & K in an unalloyed undemocratic fashion. From my political and social positionalities, I observe that all post-accession developments were determined by the 1953 coup d'état, which I would characterize as the singular event that enabled the construction of “identity politics” in Kashmir that comprised the discourses of region, religion, and culture. Although the political organizations in J & K had agendas that were at variance with one another, all of them employed these discourses strategically in order to further their respective political agenda.¹⁴

At the risk of grossly simplifying the complex political developments in J & K post 1947, I have created a taxonomy in which I divide the political happenings in the state post 1947 into four phases, in order to fathom the prevalent theories and praxes that shaped modern Kashmir. The first phase, from 1947 to 1953, was an era of Kashmiri nationalistic fervor and progressive reforms that brought welcome political, socioeconomic, and educational transformation among local Muslims after centuries of feudal oppression, subjugation, and peripheralization. The second phase, from 1953 to 1974, was an era of ambiguous democracy, centralization of the political system, and legitimization of puppet regimes in J & K, which lacked a representative character, but it was also a period of political assertion by the masses in which a legitimate political struggle was carried out for the attainment of “Right to Self Determination,” granted to Kashmiris by the United Nations.¹⁵ The third phase, from 1974 to 1989, was dominated by mass election rigging, by violent revolt by *Al-Fatah*, and by, as some critics and political theorists would argue, the political surrender of Kashmiri leadership. This phase started

with the Indira-Abdullah Accord of 1975, which, I would argue, legitimized the political surrender of Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah and his organization, the National Conference, to the diktats of the central government. Despite my skepticism about the efficacy of the Indira-Abdullah Accord and my contention that it marked a concession that irretrievably eroded the autonomous status of Kashmir, Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah, as observed by most critics, policy makers, and Kashmir observers, had given the clarion call for a Kashmiri nationalist identity in the 1930s and the 1940; he had freed the yoked peasants, most of whom were Muslims, from the shackles of an oppressive feudalism; he had pulled the disenfranchised Muslims of Kashmir from the mires of ignominy and a dehumanized existence. The leadership vacuum in J & K created by the death of Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah in 1982 was brazenly exploited by central official agencies, who unabashedly manipulated all political developments in the state, especially elections. While a democratically elected government was toppled in 1984, creating a sense of *déjà vu* and exhibiting audacious disregard for the political agency, legitimacy, and voice of the electorate, wholesale rigging in elections became a preferred practice. As a citizen with a poignant awareness of his political rights and agential role, it pains me to observe that all centrist political actions on the part of the Government of India were made, without compunction, legal and legitimate.¹⁶

REVOLT OF KASHMIRI YOUTH

The fourth phase did not erupt in a vacuum, but emerged in the immediate backdrop of developments in the third phase. It started in 1989 with an armed insurrection by indigenous Kashmiri youth against the Indian state. As I pointed out earlier, when politically savvy constituents, who are well aware of the audibility of their voice and potency of the agential roles they can assume, are denied their say and their legitimate political aspirations are muted, an armed insurgency can seem to be the only viable method of asserting their agency and political identity. I underline my unequivocal observation that Kashmiris, who were coming of age in a period of assertive centralization of political, economic, and judicial institutions, were denied their legitimate political right to participate in elections, especially in 1987.¹⁷ This situation, which unleashed the forces of insurgency, invited the wrath of Indian military and paramilitary forces, and they launched a full-scale war against militants as well as the civilian population. Indian military, paramilitary forces, and a paramilitary

division of the J & K police force deployed methods of conventional and unconventional warfare, enabling them to effectively curtail the transgressive, combative, and insurrectionist nature of the revolt effectively, and in this process the troops committed war crimes and human rights violations, which have been well-documented by international agencies like Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and the International People's Tribunal.¹⁸ I would like to point out that although the armed insurgency might have been an indigenous revolt in its initial stages, it was, later, infiltrated by the Inter-Services Intelligence of Pakistan and Afghan mercenaries.

PEOPLE'S UPRISING

After two decades of unsuccessful armed struggle against the Indian state, the Kashmiri people at large thought increasingly in terms of fostering peace, stability, and growth. With a mind set that was geared toward the creation of stability in J & K that would recognize and foster the political discourse within which the people of the Kashmir Valley had politicized their identities, an organized mass mobilization, which, contrary to mainstream assumptions, was peaceful, arose in Kashmir in the summer of 2010, in which the leadership role was assumed by the youth. Young children and women were at the forefront of that call for *Azaadi* (a mass mobilization that was infused with the narrative of self-determination) movement. The movement continued for five months and all sections of society, across the board, participated in it of their own volition.¹⁹ It was because of this uprising that the unresolved Kashmir problem, which mainstream organizations assumed could safely be put on the back-burner, reemerged at national and international levels. But during the five months of this mass mobilization, State and Central Security Forces crushed this uprising by forcefully suppressing the youth and children and by denying the basic civil and democratic rights of the entire populace. I witnessed the quelling of what I would characterize as an “indigenous” movement for the transformation of political and social institutions by state terror, in which the tragic deaths of young people marred the landscape of the state.

SOCIOLOGICAL DIMENSIONS OF ACCESSION TO INDIA: INDIANIZATION OF KASHMIR

I argue that while disregarding the complexity of the political dimension of the Kashmir issue, the Indian leadership, predominantly, carried out a systematic, forceful, but one-sided process of political

integration of the state to the Indian Union. All formal/informal, constitutional/non-constitutional, and democratic/undemocratic political decisions were taken to fulfill this grand objective. This process started with amendments to the Constitutions of both India and J & K, aimed at extending the jurisdiction of Indian laws and institutions to Kashmir, which was an unequivocal attempt to undermine the autonomous status of the state, agreed upon at the time of accession by the Government of India.²⁰ These corrosive measures to diminish the autonomous status of Jammu and Kashmir were manifested in the changes of the designations of *Sadre Riyasat* (head of state, president) and *Wazire Azam* (prime minister) of Jammu and Kashmir into governor and chief minister, respectively, like heads of state and heads of government in other Indian states; and extension of the juridical authorities of the Supreme Court of India, Election Commission of India, Comptroller General of India to the state, which were integrative and centralist measures.

The grand process of Indianization was pursued in the economic field, too, by adopting a policy of making Kashmir completely dependent on the mainstream Indian economy. This dependence increased further when neither Indian nor foreign private sectors could invest their capitals in Kashmir because of its disputed status, volatility, and simmering political discontent, and, consequently, no infrastructure could be developed. Educationally, I observe academic, mainstream Indian text books and syllabi were introduced in schools, colleges, and universities, which were oriented toward the younger generation's integration into the homogenized national mainstream of India at the cost of the multilayered history, rich cultural and literary heritage, multiethnic and linguistic diversity, and complex political history of Kashmir.

Through my scholarly work and empirical observations, I contend that the process of "Indianization" was followed even in the field of demographic transformation. It has been observed by several Kashmir observers that the political leadership of India followed the demographic agenda of transforming the Muslim majority character of J & K. The Indian leadership, to the dismay of those who espoused the cause of secularism in the state, was successful in reducing the majority character of the Muslim population from 80 percent in 1941 to 67 percent in 2001.²¹

There is sufficient empirical evidence to substantiate that Kashmir identity was a unique identity in the Indian subcontinent with distinguishing political, religious, cultural, and social features.²² Subscription to a purported secularism cannot diminish the

significance of religious discourse in the construction of a collective identity. It is with a sense of dismay that I observe that deliberate efforts were carried out to throw the predominant religious identity of J & K, in particular the Valley, off an even keel. First, formal and informal actions were initiated to distort the religious aspect of a Kashmiri identity. Second, a forceful emphasis was laid on plurality of culture, ethnicity, and religion represented by Ladakh, Jammu, and Kashmir regions, and these were employed to create regional and communal fractiousness and fragmentation for electoral gains. Third, although the plurality of identities at macro- and micro-level in J & K was an empirical reality, it was wielded as an instrument to marginalize the predominant Islamic religious epistemology of the state.²³

DEMOGRAPHIC MANIPULATION

This change was crudely reflected in the continuous decrease in the Muslim proportion of the total population of J & K and systemic erosion of the majority character of Muslims in the state. The following details about Muslim proportion of the total population in the past seven decades corroborate this hypothesis, which otherwise might seem unfounded or paranoid:

S. no.	Census year	Muslim proportion to total population in J & K
01.	1941 (est.)	80.00%
02.	1951 (est.)	70.00%
03.	1961	68.00%
04.	1971	65.00%
05.	1981	64.00%
06.	1991 (est.)	63.50 %
07.	2001	62.50 % ²⁴

This downward trend in the Muslim population of the state was matched with an upward trend of 8 percent increase in the Hindu-dominated region of Jammu during the same period, that is, 1951–2001.²⁵ This proposition is substantiated by the following observations: first, when in the mid-1980s protests against manipulation in population figures broke out in Kashmir, the state government ordered a new mid-decade census in some districts of J & K. The preliminary results of that survey contradicted the results of the 1981 official census conducted by the Government of India²⁶; second,

the chief minister of J & K, at the time, made a statement about the practice of population manipulation: “the census data has been manipulated against Muslims by the concerned agencies”²⁷; third, the Government of India, during the rule of the Bharatiya Janata Party in the 1990s, confirmed that talks had been held with the Israeli Foreign Minister, at the time, about orchestrating change in the existing demographic situation in Kashmir.²⁸

ECONOMIC BACKWARDNESS

The accession of Kashmir to India in 1947 had certain implications which proved economically harmful, on the whole. The first such pernicious implication was closure of the natural-historical trade routes of Jhelum Valley and Silk roads, and subsequent dependence on the unnatural, undulating, and dangerous Srinagar-Jammu National Highway. While the former implication denied Kashmir’s access to South and Central Asian markets, the latter strengthened economic dependence on limited Indian economic resources and markets.²⁹ The second major economic impact was that Kashmir Muslims were rendered incapable, by denying them opportunities, of rising in any major economic sector. I note, as a hard-nosed realist, that the service sector under State and Central Governments was dominated by Kashmiri Pandits, Indian Hindus, and Indian Muslims.³⁰ In that situation, local Muslims were represented by 2 or 3 percent of the total number of central employees.³¹ It is not a lop-sided observation that private organizations/agencies, private/public undertakings, and autonomous bodies systematically discriminated against Kashmiri Muslims. It was from the 1950s and 1960s that the initiative to recruit locals in state bureaucracy and administration began.³² The impact of the third implication was strongly felt in traditional and modern economic sectors, such as agriculture, tourism, handicrafts, forests, horticulture, floriculture, and power generation, which did not come up as organized and modernized economies in terms of technological improvement, professional-trained expertise, efficient management, long-term policy, and so on. Even on this day and in this age, these sectors remain undeveloped and backward.

Despite the commendable attempts of Kashmiri nationalists to introduce and implement radical reforms in 1952–1953, no revolutionary change was observed in the agrarian sector. In actuality, while these reforms gave tremendous, perhaps unjustified, benefits to villagers, the essence of these reforms was negated by the subsequent political actions of the Government of India. Contrary to

conventional analyses of the large-scale agrarian reforms in J & K, I believe that these reforms perpetuated inequities between the urban populace and the rural populace, giving rise to various classes and groups like “orchardists.”³³ The fourth implication was the policy of discrimination against Kashmir in the fields of development planning, policy formulation, and program implementation. On the other hand, the practice of positive discrimination in favor of Jammu engendered a lop-sided progress and further entrenched regional divisiveness in the state.³⁴ The worst kind of negative discrimination was reflected in the transfer of unspent funds of Kashmir region to Jammu region.³⁵

EDUCATIONAL BACKWARDNESS

Despite free education from 1952 in J & K, the literacy rate has not gone above 56 percent for males and 46 percent for females.³⁶ While the literacy level and the enrollment level of the Kashmiri Muslim community was the lowest in the state, it has the highest number of drop-outs.

CULTURAL DEPRIVATION

Throughout the post-1947 period, centrist institutions, organizations, and agencies of the Government of India were unable to recognize and acknowledge the richness and sustainability of the unique ethos of Kashmir within the Indian Union. The collective cultural memory, literary and poetical traditions, and unique subjectivity of Kashmir, underlined by the concept of “*Kashmiriyat*,” were not recognized within the larger homogenizing project of the nation-state of India, which, I empirically observe, sought to contentiously encourage assimilation into a new national narrative that emphasized the myth of one “national tradition” to legitimize a general idea of “one” people, and also to construct a modern idea of a nation-state, in which all the institutions of state power (religious, educational, judicial, military, and political) are legitimized as the expressions of a “unified” national history and culture.

SOCIOLOGICAL IMPLICATIONS OF CONFLICT SITUATION: CUMULATIVE HUMAN LOSS

As a result of armed conflict between militants and Indian security forces in Kashmir from 1989, a dangerous situation emerged that intensified with time and engulfed the entire society. All

sections/sectors of society and an entire way of life were affected. Thousands of militants and civilians were injured, disabled, killed, and some disappeared, with their whereabouts unknown to their kith and kin. In the frenzy of a militarized ethos, and in the pervasive climate of armed conflict, quite a few local elders were abused, and local youth were brutally tortured. While children were harassed and tortured, women faced threats of rape, molestation, and other offences, not just by Indian paramilitary troops, but also by the paramilitary division of the J & K police, some militant organizations, and renegade militants who were incorporated into a militia group.³⁷ Thousands of residential buildings and business establishments were gutted and destroyed. In totality, the militarization of the ethos of J & K had devastating effects, especially in the fields of economic destruction, social disorganization-disorder, educational backwardness, mass psychological depression, mental-physical health deterioration, mass humiliation, cultural aggression, and many other chronic problems.³⁸ The armed conflict in Kashmir during the past two decades has caused a cumulative human loss of more than 100,000 militants, civilians, and paramilitary force personnel.³⁹ Moreover, 302,670 persons were disabled visually, orally, aurally, psychologically, and physically.⁴⁰

OUT MIGRATION

Due to armed insurgency and counter-insurgency in Kashmir, the religious minority of Kashmiri Pandits felt threatened and insecure in the volatile, militant, and tumultuous atmosphere in the early 1990s. So from 1990 onward, they migrated from the Kashmir Valley at a mass level to Jammu and other places in India. It is generally believed that the then Head of State, Governor Jagmohan, encouraged this mass migration for petty political interests.⁴¹ Later on, some Kashmiri Muslims, too, migrated from the Valley, for political and socioeconomic reasons. In 2003, the Government of India officially informed the Indian Parliament about the number of people that had migrated from Kashmir because of militancy:

S. No.	Community of migrants	Total number of migrants	
		No. of households	No. of members
01.	Kashmiri Pandits	33,000	1,65,000
02.	Kashmiri Muslims	1,600	8,000
03.	Kashmiri Sikhs	1,656	8,280 ⁴²

In addition to a terribly negative political, economic, educational, cultural, and social impact, this mass migration brutally undermined the plural composite character of Kashmiri society. I would say that it mutilated the culture and civilization of Kashmir, and adversely affected the vision and worldview of young Kashmiris, in both the Pandit as well as the Muslim community.

DEVELOPMENT COLLAPSE

More than two decades of conflict have played havoc with existing economic conditions and led to near-total economic collapse in Kashmir. First, this negative impact is reflected in the area of development planning, as it could not be pursued seriously. Due to militancy and consequent militarization of the political and socioeconomic fabric of J & K, there has hardly been any effort to formulate and implement plans, programs, and schemes in J & K. The state government informed the J & K Legislative Assembly in 2009 that 80 percent of funds allocated for the Prime Minister's Reconstruction Plan for the state could not be utilized during 2004–2005.⁴³ Consequently, the average economic growth in Kashmir region in the past few years has not been more than 4 percent.⁴⁴ During that period, while government employees/the salaried class maintained a minimum income, other classes faced different levels of deficit and loss.

The net economic impact of the armed conflict was characterized as “catastrophic” in all sectors of the economy. The occupation of paddy and orchard lands of thousands of canals by the security forces, for the purpose of deployment, camouflage, and search operations, stopped the main economic activities on those lands. 1,800 days of strikes in 20 years, called by pro-freedom political organizations, imposed a loss of 180,000 crore rupees, and worsened the economic attrition in the Valley.⁴⁵ In these economically disturbed conditions, the unemployment problem shot up to extreme heights. According to official reports, there were 550,000 educated, professional-technical, trained, specialized and skilled unemployed youth in the state.⁴⁶

With the eruption and pervasion of militancy and militarization in Kashmir, tourism and handicraft sectors collapsed, followed by downfall in agriculture, horticulture, and floriculture. In the miserable situation in which occupancy in hotels and houseboats was negligible, and there was no tourist to purchase locally made handicraft items, all sections of society related to traditional occupations were in economic dire straits. In the situation of conflict, neglect of some core economic sectors in Kashmir, such as rail connectivity and power generation,

could not be avoided. So Kashmir remained underdeveloped in both sectors even after 62 years of India's independence.⁴⁷ To make things worse, the general environment of corruption in high offices could not be controlled, which has threatened the moral basis of state and society. Given that backdrop, one feels compelled to agree with the finding of an independent international nongovernmental organization that J & K is the "second most corrupt state" in India.⁴⁸

EDUCATIONAL BACKWARDNESS

Militancy and militarization has contributed to overall backwardness in education. One of the ugly fall-outs of the illegal occupation or burning down of schools by either militant groups or paramilitary forces, and the installation of military bunkers on thoroughfares was the increase in the drop-out rate of students. This was especially visible in the decreasing number of girl students in rural areas whose parents preferred the purported security of a confined existence for their daughters, given the rabidity of both militant groups and paramilitary forces in those areas. A survey about the impact of conflict on education in Budgam and Baramulla districts in Kashmir revealed that there were a significant number of drop-outs, even up to 40 percent, in schools, especially among girls.⁴⁹ This figure was confirmed by an official estimate in Budgam in the late 1990s.⁵⁰ Moreover, during conflict, quality education in all professional, technical, agricultural, mass media, IT, and other specialized fields has become a casualty.

MENTAL AND PHYSICAL HEALTH DETERIORATION

As a result of violent developments such as armed encounters and killings at random, most people in Kashmir suffered psychologically as well as physically. Mental Health deterioration is reflected in psychological problems related to anxiety, tension, depression, strain, and posttraumatic stress disorder. Constant tension and depression have been a permanent phenomena for common people in Kashmir during the past two decades. The daily armed clashes, cross-firings, bomb blasts, crack-downs, identity parades, search operations, and anti-militancy operations, especially "catch and kill policy," created all sorts of problems, particularly mass depression. This also led to suicidal trends and drug behavior among the youth. According to one survey, there were 18,500 cases of suicides during 1990–2008, that is, 954 suicides per year and 81 suicides per month in Kashmir.⁵¹ Another survey revealed that 35 percent of 16-35-year-old youngsters of both

sexes were found involved in drug consumption.⁵² It was poignantly observed that one generation of Kashmiri youth had been lost to the gun; the present generation would be lost to drugs, if not checked.

Physical health deterioration was also observed, and researchers inferred from the available statistics that an average Kashmiri was on medication for several dreaded diseases like cardiological, neurological, oncological, and tension-related diseases.⁵³ Researchers also inferred that a large segment of the Valley's population was the highest drug consumer in the entire country,⁵⁴ and many prescription drugs sold at pharmacies were available over the counter and were counterfeit.⁵⁵

VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN

Although some discriminatory gender practices were prevalent in Kashmiri society, I would posit that violence against women was virtually nonexistent.⁵⁶ Unfortunately, instances of domestic violence increased with the growth of modernization and change-development in Kashmir. Changes wrought by the processes of modernization and globalization had a three dimensional impact in Kashmir. First, pervasive changes took place in the industrialized and industrializing publics of Kashmir. Once a society embarks on industrialization and modernization, diminishing differences in gender roles are likely to occur. In Kashmir, a larger number of women gained access to educational institutions, and got regular remunerative jobs in governmental and non-governmental offices. Second, with the embarkation on career paths, women developed a dual role, one at home and the other at work, which were mutually conflicting, and it was difficult to maintain a balance between the two. Third, career women in Kashmir faced terrible problems, such as jealousy, conflict, torture, harassment, dowry demand, snatching the salary by the spouse or in-laws, and abuse; at work they had a different set of problems to contend with, such as eve-teasing, sexual harassment, and molestation.⁵⁷ Although career women became economically independent, they could not maintain and safeguard their interests in totality in their personal, marital lives. I conducted an empirical study thorough which I found that the violence against women manifested itself in the following ways:

- Discrimination against women within their families (60.00% respondents);
- Areas of discrimination were granting education, gifts, clothes, food, ownership, decision making, property, social treatment, and employment (46.00%);

- Lack of appreciation of women's working role outside the home (39.00%);
- Lack of cordial relations between working women and their in-laws (43.67%);
- Separation of wife and husband (28.20%);
- Wife beating by husband (31.844%);
- Torture and harassment of women by their in-laws (39.40%);
- Demand for dowry (08.91%);
- Threat of divorce [22.92 %];
- Role of women against women [32.00 %]; and
- Molestation of women [33.00 %].⁵⁸

With the onset of militancy and militarization in 1990, a criminal element was added to violence against women in Kashmir.⁵⁹ The criminalization of gender discrimination and domestic violence was reflected crudely in cases of mass rape, rape, murder, molestation, torture of women by men. While some such cases were committed by local pro-government militants, militia comprising renegade militants, local anti-government militants, many such cases were reportedly carried out by paramilitary force personnel. Crime was institutionalized by paramilitary forces in the guise of the reprehensible Disturbed Areas Act and Armed Forces Special Powers Act during the past two decades. Interestingly, Seema Kazi, a scholar formerly at the London School of Economics, has argued with credible evidence that the rape of Kashmiri women by Indian security forces was meant to "impose the collective dishonoring of Kashmiri Muslims, especially Kashmiri Muslim women" and to "compel them for a political compromise."⁶⁰

SOCIAL IMPACT OF MILITARIZATION

The highest degree of militarization in Kashmiri society was reflected glaringly in the deployment of 150,000 soldiers, that is, 17 soldiers per sq. km., and one soldier for every civilian in 1990, which rose to 400,000, just under half or 44 percent of the Indian Army, in 2004. This number was later on estimated between 500,000 and 700,000, that is, 1 soldier for every 10 civilians, recently.⁶¹ The former Deputy Chief Minister of J & K, Muzzaffar Beg, revealed in the State Assembly in 2006 that there were more than 667,000 security forces in the state for a population of 12 million.⁶² A spokesperson of the Indian Army gave the official figure of 337,000, that is, one trooper for every civilian.⁶³ In this context, the US State Department's estimate seems correct that Kashmir is the "most heavily militarized zone" and "most dangerous spot in the world."⁶⁴

To quickly sum up my argument: first, the military-civilian relationship was hostile and antagonistic. Since the Indian forces behaved like an “alien army in an alien territory” and considered the entire local population as a “potential enemy,” they were seen as an “occupation force” by the locals. Second, militarization created serious obstacles in the normal functioning of family as a social institution. In this process, traditional values, roles, marriage practices, and kinship patterns faced serious threat. Third, mass psychological depression, tension, stress, anxiety, posttraumatic stress disorder, and other related problems mainly because of rude treatment, torture, and anti-local sentiment on the part of forces created serious problems in families. Fourth, in-family environment, processes of socialization, and social control suffered extremely. Fifth, deviance and delinquency trends dominated the behavior of young children, while criminal tendencies and drug abuse spread fast among youngsters. Sixth, there emerged a trend of criminal violence against women at the hands of alien and local armed forces. Seventh, it compelled many students, especially girl students in rural areas, to stop going to schools, which were burnt by militants or occupied by forces. Consequently, there was a huge drop-out rate in the region. Eighth, it imposed economic losses on local population because of occupation of their agricultural lands, orchard, and business establishments. Finally, it gave rise to cultural exclusiveness and mutual antipathy, which proved harmful to the cause of peace and reconciliation.⁶⁵

SOCIAL DISORGANIZATION, DEVIANCE, AND CRIME

In this contextual social situation, there was a rise of social disorganization and social disorder in different aspects of life. The contemporary social disorder was besieged by disintegrating forces from within as well hostile intrusions with without. It is important to identify these forces in order to preserve a democratic way of life. The specific manifestations of this disorder that affected the social institutions of family, school, religion, and police in relation to their specific role in socialization and control, are incidental to an underlying conflict of attitudes.⁶⁶ The phenomenon of “juvenile delinquency” could not be avoided in this connection. It led to two types of behavior among youngsters: first, it led to abnormal behavior which reflected in the brazen violation of traditional values and abuse of elders who included parents, teachers, relatives and neighbors; secondly, they got involved in petty or minor crimes which included stealing, pick pocketing, thefts, eve teasing, cheating, fraud, and other offences. Most of these children

belonged to families that have no history of crime. A study of 25 such young convicts revealed that they adopted this type of behavior because of conditions created by the conflict situation.⁶⁷ Since there were no juvenile courts and juvenile homes in Kashmir, they were sent back to their parents.⁶⁸

The influence of violence reflected in the attitudes and behavior of the youth in Kashmir. In its cumulative effect, youngsters, especially those of school and college age groups got motivated to perpetrate violence in theory as well as in practice. They considered a violent way of life and “gun culture” as desirable and preferable, even in a family context. They often violated patriarchal authority as well as state authority, and never respected values and norms.⁶⁹ I am placing a greater emphasis on institutional disorganization and disruption in community consensus. In the conflict context, this also gave rise to major crimes, which were the result of certain social forces and not just evidence of deliberate moral depravity, reflected in daily reports of crime given by police, electronic/print media, and crime control agencies in J & K.⁷⁰ The worsening crime situation in the State got organized support from the paramilitary forces, paramilitary branch of the J & K police, militia comprising renegade militants, and some militant groups.

RISE OF MORAL CORRUPTION

In socially pathological and morally depressive conditions during militancy in Kashmir, a strong trend of moral corruption became pervasive. Intensified conflict became the cause as well as the effect of this phenomenon. Accordingly, an individual with some influence did not maintain any standard, rule, or value of life, and exploited those below him in status, particularly in sexual terms. The conflict situation, which was characterized with a sense of anomie characterized by a diminution of values, proved a boon for such people. They unabashedly indulged in sexual exploitation of others, particularly young women. In its organized and institutional form, this absence of regulatory social controls resulted in the infamous “sex scandal” of 2007 in Kashmir. The revelation of this scandal, which underscored the vulnerability of hundreds of young, innocent, and unemployed local girls who were used for prostitution-type sexual activities by top notch bureaucrats, politicians, higher administrators, police officials, and tycoons, highlighted the alienation and normlessness in society.⁷¹ The second manifestation of moral corruption was in the increase in pre-marital and extra-marital relationships. It was observed that

after the conflict started here, promiscuous sexual behavior increased tremendously among different sections of society, perhaps because young people thought their options were limited, and relationships were characterized by an absence of trust.⁷²

LATE MARRIAGE AND NO MARRIAGE

Another serious fall out of armed conflict is the emergence of the phenomena of late marriage and no marriage. I carried out an empirical study about late marriages in Kashmir, which revealed that while the “desirable age of marriage” on an average was 23.62 years and 20.70 years for males and females, respectively, the “actual age of marriage” on an average was 31.53 years and 27.83 years on an average for males and females, respectively.⁷³ The major causes as well as consequences of this phenomenon could be explained only in terms of factors directly or indirectly related to conflict conditions. It was observed that this change proved disastrous in terms of long-term implications on the social ethos.⁷⁴ Most experts observed that the proportion of those who didn’t marry increased during the decades of conflict. This proposition is supported by the census figures, which revealed the increasing number of unmarried people during the conflict period.⁷⁵

EMERGING SOCIAL CRISIS

The above mentioned and other social impact of armed conflict during the last two decades gave rise to many harmful and undesirable social trends. Experts have identified these trends, which included decreasing social control of family, increasing social pathology, increasing child-women labor, urban chaos and problems, brutalization of police forces, erosion of work culture, overall dehumanized environment, victimization of many individuals and groups, intolerance of pluralistic ideologies and cultures, exploitation of workers and artisans, monopoly of political elites, political alienation of masses, and corruption at all levels, as a phase of disorganization that is the natural result of certain social forces operating in the community.⁷⁶ Taking into consideration the long-term and short-term implications of these grave social problems, Kashmiri society was heading towards a “social crisis” in the near future.⁷⁷

MAJOR VICTIMS OF MILITANCY

During the militancy period in Kashmir, some particular groups, which are identified in the following sections, emerged as major victims:

Families of Ex-Militants and Civilians

After their deaths in different incidents of insurgency and counter insurgency, militants and civilians left behind widows and orphans. The number of such widows and orphans in Kashmir in the year 2009 was as follows:

- [a] Number of persons died in the conflict 80,000–1,00,000⁷⁸;
- [b] Number of widows (esti.) 32,400 (1 widow per household); and
- [c] Number of Orphans (esti.) 97,200 (3 orphans per household).⁷⁹

The life conditions of these widows and orphans were pathetic and miserable. My study revealed that they were debilitated economically, and no durable source of income was available to them. Many of them were compelled to leave their hitherto safe havens to work in handicrafts, child-women labor, domestic, and automobile sectors. Educationally, they lagged behind and faced even 40 percent drop-outs. Initially relatives, neighbors, and friends provided aid and succor, but after a while, these destitute people were left to their own devices. Most of them faced depression, tension, anxiety, suicidal tendencies, post-traumatic stress disorder, and other psychiatric problems. These indigent families faced problems like social insecurity, social disorganization, absence of patriarchal authority, and total dependence on others.⁸⁰

Families of Half-Widows

Half-widows were women whose husbands disappeared after they were picked up by security forces on suspicion of being involved in militant activities, and their whereabouts were never reported to their families. Their custodial deaths followed their “enforced disappearance.” As per unofficial sources, there were 10,000 cases of enforced disappearance documented by the Association of Parents of Disappeared Persons, a non-partisan organization comprising mothers whose unfortunate sons were victims of custodial disappearances or custodial deaths. These women, most of whom are illiterate or semi-literate, have created a conceptual framework in which they have worked through the discourse of victimhood to politicize their identities as survivors voicing their legitimate demand for justice.⁸¹ A minor study of half-widows showed that their conditions were much worse than widows because they had no legal, or moral, or social status.

The uncertainty of their marital status created a psychological burden, which left these women in limbo.

But after a period of tremendous tumult, turbulence, and decrepitude, the youth that had taken up the gun abhorred militancy and endeavored to work toward the restoration of a normal life. Despite the expressed regret of these prodigal children for their recourse to a method that had no foreseeable future, they continue to face unprecedented problems.

Surrendered Militants

After years of militancy, many local youths realized the irrelevance of gun in the cause of political self-determination for Kashmir, and dropped/surrendered their arms voluntarily, in some cases, or involuntarily, in others. After abandoning militancy, these remorseful pariahs have no parallel economic activity to perform and lead aimless and purposeless lives, thereby increasing their sense of alienation and rootlessness. As a sociologist and a Kashmiri intellectual, I recognize the urgent need to create purposeful and durable economic engagements for the rehabilitation of such people, otherwise, I fear they may turn back to militancy.⁸²

The Imprisoned Youth

During the last 20 years, thousands of youth have been arrested and lodged in different jails in the country. Their number has been estimated at 7,000–9,000.⁸³ Most of these incarcerated youths have never been tried in a court of law. An instance of the arbitrary nature of these arrests and imprisonments comes to mind: jailed for three years as “terrorists,” two Kashmiri youth were, finally, exonerated by a Delhi court, the ruling of which was that the police manufactured evidence against the purported “terrorists.”⁸⁴ Many among the indicted young Kashmiris have not been even charged with any offence. Some of those accused of heinous subversive activities were juveniles.⁸⁵

Line of Control Youth

In 1990s and afterward, thousands of Kashmiri youth crossed the Line of Control, the 740-kilometer dividing line between J & K and Pakistani-controlled northern territories that was created as a cease-fire line in January 1949 at the cessation of the first Indo-Pak war,

for getting arms training in Pakistani-administered Kashmir and join militancy. While some of them came back, others could not. In the changed political and militant situation in J & K, these former partisan advocates of a violent revolution have abandoned militancy and want to return to their homes to rebuild their lives. In the present situation, it seems highly important to allow this group to adopt a peaceful life in Kashmir. The J & K government has introduced legislation in this regard.⁸⁶

Raped Women

They represent the most traumatized victims of militancy. Rape victims were brutally dishonored and faced social ostracization. Not only they, but their children also were stigmatized and marginalized. It was observed that their marital lives became distraught, and their social and psychological conditions were pitiable.⁸⁷ These women need solid and constant help from the state as well as from the larger society.

Government-Sponsored Militants' Families

These militants were sponsored by the government against pro-freedom militants. They were used mercilessly for the elimination of militancy and perpetuation of brutal counter-insurgency operations. They stood for terror against militants, whom they massacred at large, as well as civilians whom they looted and raped under the protection of security forces.⁸⁸ These government-sponsored militants have been accused of abominable human rights violations. But after having fulfilled the objectives of their patrons, the paramilitary forces, they were left without any support and security. Promises of financial and social security made to them were not honored. In that situation, not only did these elements face social wrath and collective social punishment, but their families also suffer in all dimensions of life and live in miserable conditions.⁸⁹ In the context of this situation, these families need a fair and just treatment.

CONCLUSION

Need for Resolution of Kashmir Problem

Empirical Realities

In order to make the resolution of the Kashmir problem more meaningful, relevant, and productive, the following empirically proven

sociological realities in J & K state must be considered positively: J & K has got multiplicity of region, religion, culture, language, and ethnicity; demography of J & K represents pluralistic groups, classes, and communities at state, regional, and district levels; Kashmiris living in both parts of J & K and Pakistan-administered Kashmir must be allowed to interact and share their life experiences in order to develop political consensus among them on crucial issues; the distinctiveness of Kashmiris irrespective of their differences in region, religion, and culture must be acknowledged and upheld; the particularistic identities and subidentities of all minority groups, religious, linguistic, cultural and ethnic, must be recognized politically and safeguarded constitutionally; and taking into consideration plurality and diversity prevailing in Kashmiri society, ideas, views, opinions, issues and perspectives of individuals, groups, classes and communities involved in this problem must be considered seriously and necessarily.⁹⁰ I do not claim, by any means, that Kashmiri Muslims are the only stakeholders in a viable resolution of the Kashmir conflict.

Need for Social Rehabilitation

In the backdrop of social implications of armed conflict in Kashmir, there seems an urgent need to initiate and to follow short-term and long-term social programs by the government and local/national/international non-governmental organizations. In fact, the government of J & K must formulate and pursue broad based social policy, taking full care of suffering individuals and groups.⁹¹ Non-governmental organizations may also follow objectives and programs through their micro-level effective efforts. The recommendations of four “Working Groups,” constituted by the Prime Minister of India, Mahmohan Singh, in 2006 for recommendation on confidence building measures; strengthening of relations on both sides of the Line of Control; economic development; good governance, referred to the core suffering groups and fields for specialized and preferred treatment at the hands of the Government of India.⁹²

NOTES

1. See M. Y. Saraf, *Kashmiris Fight for Freedom* (Lahore: Ferozsons, 1977).
2. These figures are based on estimates in 1990s, see *Voice of Kashmir* (London, 1992).

3. See India, Office of the Registrar Commissioner and Census Commissioner of India, *Census of India, 2001* (Delhi: Manager of Publications, 2002).
4. Ibid.
5. See India, Office of the Registrar Commissioner and Census Commissioner of India, *Census of India, 2001* (Delhi: Manager of Publications, 2002); and M. Y. Saraf, *Kashmiris Fight for Freedom* (Lahore: Ferozsons, 1977).
6. See India, Office of the Registrar Commissioner and Census Commissioner of India, *Census of India, 2001* (Delhi: Manager of Publications, 2002); and M. Y. Saraf, *Kashmiris Fight for Freedom* (Lahore: Ferozsons, 1977).
7. While the former characterization was done by famous Mughal emperor, Shah-e-Jahan, and other rulers, the latter characterization was carried out by several visitors and writers on Kashmir during colonial period.
8. See M. Y. Saraf, *Kashmiris Fight for Freedom* (Lahore: Ferozsons, 1977); Robert Thorp, *Cashmere Misgovernment* (London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1870); Walter R. Lawrence, *The Valley of Kashmir* (London: H. Frowde, 1895); P. N. Bamzai, *The History of Kashmir: Political, Cultural, Social, from the Earliest Times to the Present*, rev. ed. (New Delhi: Metropolitan Book Co., 1973); G. M. D. Sufi, *Kashir: Being a History of Kashmir from the Earliest Times to Our Own*, 2 vols (New Delhi: Light and Life Publishers, 1974).
9. See M. Y. Saraf, *Kashmiris Fight for Freedom* (Lahore: Ferozsons, 1977); G. H. Khan, *Freedom Movement in Kashmir 1931–1940* (New Delhi: Light and Life Publishers, 1968); and Q. Rafiqi and M. Yasin, eds., *History of Freedom Movement in Kashmir* (New Delhi: Light and Life Publishers, 1980).
10. Ibid.
11. Manzoor Fazili, *Socialist Ideas and Movements in Kashmir 1919–1947* (New Delhi: Eureka Publishers, 1980).
12. See B. A. Dabla, "Impact of Indianization on Muslim Kashmir," *Sociological Papers on Kashmir*, vol. 1 (Srinagar: Jay Kay Books, 2010), 31–36; see also "Instrument of Accession," signed by Maharaja Hari Singh of the Princely State of Jammu and Kashmir; and speech of Jawaharlal Nehru in Srinagar, Kashmir in 1947.
13. This political organization was formed just after Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah's arrest in 1953, and was dissolved in 1974.
14. See B. A. Dabla, "Identity Politics and its Economic Impact on Economic Development" (paper presented at the annual conference of North-West Indian Sociological Association held at the University of Kashmir, Srinagar, Kashmir, September 2009); "Role of Region, Religion and Culture in Economic Development: The Case of Kashmir" (paper presented at the 35th annual conference of International

Sociological Association held at the University of Kashmir, October 2009.

15. See relevant UN resolutions in this regard.
16. See B. A. Dabla, "Impact of Indianization on Muslim Kashmir," *Sociological Papers on Kashmir*, vol. 1 (Srinagar: Jay Kay Books, 2010), 31–36.
17. Ibid.
18. Ibid.
19. See B. A. Dabla, "Impact of Indianization on Muslim Kashmir," *Sociological Papers on Kashmir*, vol. 1 (Srinagar: Jay Kay Books, 2010), 31–36.
20. See B. A. Dabla, "Identity Politics and its Economic Impact on Economic Development" (paper presented at the annual conference of North-West Indian Sociological Association held at the University of Kashmir, Srinagar, Kashmir, September 2009); "Role of Region, Religion and Culture in Economic Development: The Case of Kashmir" (paper presented at the 35th annual conference of International Sociological Association held at the University of Kashmir, October 2009).
21. B. A. Dabla, "Demographic Changes in Kashmir," *Radiance*, Delhi, January 2, 1994; *News from India*, New Delhi, March 21, 1994; and *Kashmir Times*, Jammu, April 2, 1994.
22. B. A. Dabla, "Ethnic Plurality in India: The Case of Kashmir," *Sociological Papers on Kashmir*, vol. 1 (Srinagar: Jay Kay Books, 2010), 65–79.
23. Ibid.
24. India, Office of the Registrar Commissioner and Census Commissioner of India, *Census of India, 1951* (Delhi: Manager of Publications, 1952); India, Office of the Registrar Commissioner and Census Commissioner of India, *Census of India, 1961* (Delhi: Manager of Publications, 1962); India, Office of the Registrar Commissioner and Census Commissioner of India, *Census of India, 1971* (Delhi: Manager of Publications, 1973); India, Office of the Registrar Commissioner and Census Commissioner of India, *Census of India, 1981* (Delhi: Controller of Publications, 1983); India, Office of the Registrar Commissioner and Census Commissioner of India, *Census of India, 1991* (Delhi: Controller of Publications, 1996); India, Office of the Registrar Commissioner and Census Commissioner of India, *Census of India, 2001* (Delhi: Controller of Publications, 2004).
25. Ibid.
26. *Greater Kashmir*, Srinagar, January 3, 1999.
27. B. A. Dabla, "Demographic Changes in Kashmir," *Radiance*, Delhi, January 2, 1994; *News from India*, New Delhi, March 21, 1994; and *Kashmir Times*, Jammu, April 2, 1994.

28. See B. A. Dabla, "Impact of Indianization on Muslim Kashmir," *Sociological Papers on Kashmir*, vol. 1 (Srinagar: Jay Kay Books, 2010), 31–36.
29. Bashir-ul-Haq, "Unfortunate Muslims of Kashmir," *Radiance*, Delhi, April, 8, 1979; and Mohammad Nazir, "Hindu rulers and Muslim subjects: Job Division," *Conveyor*, 1, no. 6, 2009, 32–43.
30. Ibid.
31. Ibid.
32. K. Gopal Iyer, "Agrarian Reforms and Rural Transformation in J&K" (paper presented at the annual conference of North-West Indian Sociological Association at the University of Kashmir, Srinagar, September 2009).
33. See *Greater Kashmir*, Srinagar, August 2009.
34. Ibid.
35. India, Office of the Registrar Commissioner and Census Commissioner of India, *Census of India, 2001* (Delhi: Controller of Publications, 2004).
36. See B. A. Dabla, "Impact of Indianization on Muslim Kashmir," *Sociological Papers on Kashmir*, vol. 1 (Srinagar: Jay Kay Books, 2010), 31–36.
37. See B. A. Dabla, *A Sociological Study of Widows and Orphans in Kashmir* (Srinagar: Jay Kay Books, 2010).
38. This estimate was presented by pro-freedom organizations, civil society agencies, civil liberty, and human rights groups, and was printed in the local media and telecast through electronic media.
39. See B. A. Dabla, *A Sociological Study of Widows and Orphans in Kashmir* (Srinagar: Jay Kay Books, 2010).
40. B. A. Dabla, *Increasing Disability in JK*. This was a brief report. Its brief entitled, "JK has 6, 00, 000 Disabled Persons" was published by *Greater Kashmir*, Srinagar, March 21, 2010.
41. See *Human Rights Perspective*, Jammu, 1991–1993. In *Human Rights Perspective*, Jammu, several articles about the concerned theme were published during the period 1991–1993.
42. B. A. Dabla, *Sociological Implications of Pandit Migration in JK* (Srinagar: Jay Kay Books, 2006).
43. *Greater Kashmir*, Srinagar, August 22, 2009.
44. *Greater Kashmir*, business edition, June–October 2009.
45. *Greater Kashmir*, September 13, 2009.
46. *Greater Kashmir*, August 24, 2009.
47. *The Times of India*, New Delhi, September 2009.
48. *Srinagar Times*, Srinagar, August 6, 2009.
49. See B. A. Dabla, *Impact of Conflict Situation on Women and Children in Kashmir: A Study of Two Districts* (New Delhi: Report prepared for Save the Children Non-Governmental Organization, 1995–1997).

50. Ibid.
51. B. A. Dabla, "Rising Graph of Suicides in Kashmir," *Honour*, Srinagar, September 2009.
52. See B. A. Dabla, Report on *Suicides in the Kashmir Valley* (Srinagar: Center for Study of Social Change and Development, 2000–2001).
53. See relevant statistics in the SKIMS, Srinagar, *Greater Kashmir*, December 3, 2009.
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58. Ibid.
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61. Ibid.
62. B. A. Dabla, "Social Impact of Militarization in Kashmir," *Kashmir Life*, Srinagar, September 19, 09.
63. Ibid.
64. Ibid.
65. Ibid.
66. See B. A. Dabla, "Changing Marriage Patterns in Kashmir," *Greater Kashmir*, Srinagar, December 2, 2001.
67. Shamayil Wani, *A Sociological Study of Juvenile Delinquency in Kashmir* (M. Phil. diss., University of Kashmir, 2009).
68. Ibid.
69. B. A. Dabla, *Cultural Developments in Kashmir* (Srinagar: Jay Kay Books, 2010).
70. B. A. Dabla, "Emerging Crimes in the Valley," *Kashmir Life*, Srinagar, July 2007.
71. See B. A. Dabla, *Tourism and Sex Practices in Kashmir*, a project sponsored by Ministry of Social Justice, New Delhi, 2007–2008.
72. Ibid.
73. B. A. Dabla, Report of Survey entitled *Emergence of late marriage in Kashmir* (Srinagar: Center for Study of Social Change and Development, 2008).
74. Ibid.
75. "Number of unmarried people increasing," *Greater Kashmir*, Srinagar, July 2009.

76. See B. A. Dabla's interview published in *Kashmir Images*, Srinagar, May 2008.
77. Ibid.
78. See B. A. Dabla, *A Sociological Study of Widows and Orphans in Kashmir* (Srinagar: Jay Kay Books, 2010).
79. Ibid.
80. Ibid.
81. See Association of Parents of Disappeared Persons, APDP documents, 1995–1996, accessed January 10, 2008, <http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/ASA20/002/1999/en/153cf5a8-e34c-11dd-a06d790733721318/asa200021999en.html>
82. See Z. Majid, "Released Militants Seek Rehabilitation," *Greater Kashmir*, Srinagar, November 22, 09.
83. See ADIP, Assistance to Disabled Persons for Purchase/Fitting of Aids/Appliances, report by the Ministry of Social Justice and Empowerment, Government of India, Delhi, http://crcsrinagar.com/downloads/ADIP_scheme.pdf
84. *Greater Kashmir*, Srinagar, September 13, 2009.
85. See *Kashmir Life*, Srinagar, December 12, 2009; and Zamrooda Habib, *Qaidi No.10* (Srinagar: Self-Published, 2009).
86. *Greater Kashmir*, Srinagar, December 2010.
87. See Basharat Peer, *Curfewed Night* (New Delhi: Random House, 2008).
88. See *Kashmir Life*, Srinagar, May 2009.
89. Ibid.
90. See B. A. Dabla, "Ethnic Plurality and Problems of Nation-building: A Study of the Kashmir Problem" in Abdulrahim P. Vijapuri, ed., *Dimensions of Federal Nation-building: Essays in Memory of Rasheeduddin Khan* (New Delhi: Center for Federal Studies, Jamia Hamdard in association with Manak Publications, 1998), 224–235.
91. B. A. Dabla, "Need for Social Policy in JK," *Sociological Papers on Kashmir*, vol. 2 (Srinagar: Jay Kay Books, 2010), 449–455.
92. "Recommendations of Four Working Groups" constituted by the Prime Minister of India to respond to needs of suffering people of Kashmir. "Recommendations of four Working Groups" refers to the recommendations of four Working Groups constituted by the Prime Minister of India, Manmohan Singh in 2007, when Ghulam Nabi Azad was Chief Minister of J & K, to look in to crucial problems which the State faced. Subsequently, the Working Groups discussed the problems in three sessions in Srinagar, Jammu, and New Delhi, and made four sets of recommendations, each set by one particular group, on the following issues related to J & K: Center-State relations; Economic and Reconstructive measures; Relief and Rehabilitation measures; Multi- Dimensional problems. Justice Saghir Ahmad's

report on “Central government-State government Relations” represented the recommendations of his Working Group. Though all sets of recommendations of the Working Groups were presented to the Prime Minister in the same year, no formal action has been initiated in this regard, especially in relation to “Central government-State government Relations.”

P A R T V



REPRESENTATIONS OF KNOWLEDGE
AND KNOWLEDGE PRODUCTION

C H A P T E R 9



POLITICS OF EXCLUSION

Hameeda Naeem

As a citizen first, then as a Muslim woman academic, and also as a political activist, I am both a victim and a witness not only to repression but also to the politics of exclusion and construction of knowledge by the neocolonial Indian state in Kashmir. But before I write about my own experiences of repression, intimidation, and coercion for speaking truth to power, and how knowledge is constructed and disseminated, I would like to recount which factors galvanized me toward political activism. From my early childhood, I have been nourished in an atmosphere in which hot discussions and debates over the Kashmir dispute were a routine matter. I have seen my father weeping over the plight of Kashmir and praying for its independence. I have seen him passionately arguing against the validity of the Instrument of Accession document to India, purportedly signed by the monarch of Jammu and Kashmir, Maharajah Hari Singh, in 1947, legitimizing the provisional accession of the princely state to the Indian Union, positing that it was managed overnight after the Maharaja had already fled Kashmir. He would also argue that Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah, first Muslim prime minister of the state, had conditionally agreed to the accession, taking it more as a defense treaty than as a permanent agreement. My father was careful to observe that Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah's government was undemocratically ousted by the Government of India, headed by Jawaharlal Nehru, and Abdullah was subsequently incarcerated. My father would underscore that Abdullah was arrested because he had dared to raise his voice against the continued presence of the Indian Army after the

tribal raiders from Pakistan, who were trained by well-equipped military leaders and launched a relentless attack to invade Kashmir in November 1947, had been smoked out. These scintillating debates were not confined to my home; they would figure prominently even in the conversations of my maternal uncles and friends that would visit our home. So from early childhood, I got passionately involved in thinking about the fate of my homeland, which paradoxically seemed to be my own, and yet very alien.

However, my first real encounter with what I would term colonial politics and the status of subjugation, which enraged me, took place when I was a high school student in Tral *tehsil*, an administrative division of some South Asian countries, District Pulwama of the Valley of Kashmir in the late 1970s. The students were demanding a college for the area and demonstrated for the same purpose on the eve of the visit of the then chief minister to our *tehsil*. Despite having witnessed unspeakable violence for the past 20 years, I still shiver with fear when I remember how some protesting male students were tortured, imprisoned, and brutalized simply for having voiced a genuine civil demand. I vividly recall that their heads were tonsured, their nails removed, and pepper sprinkled on the base of the nails. I could not understand this brutal knee-jerk reaction on the part of the police to a legitimate civic demand. I was quick to ask my father to interpret this gruesome event for me. He explained to me that since we, the people of Kashmir, had been held against our political will, any agitation even for civic rights or facilities was mistakenly deemed a challenge and an affront to the authority of the repressive state and was, thus, put down with brute force. The zeal and determination to fight for human rights, which primarily includes the right to self-determination, was born in my mind, but I was not equal to the task. The fire kept on smoldering, nourished and perpetuated by the ongoing manipulative political and repressive tactics in Jammu and Kashmir, but did not get fully conceptualized or articulated as most people were and continue to be manipulated through the dominant ideology—an invisible system of assumptions, power structures, and ideological state apparatuses by which a political system operates and which permeates everything it produces. I am of the opinion that the dominant ideology is institutionalized in a way that perpetuates Indian occupation as a natural order, and the past history is simply wiped out.

This first awakening was later fortified by my brush with various socially and politically oriented critical theories, especially those that try to explain knowledge-power nexus, various kinds of imperialisms, and, of course, my understanding of colonialism and postcolonialism.

This consciousness created in me an internal divisive process resulting in a kind of dual self—one that craves for and imagines a Kashmir of my own and the other that is caught up in alien and manipulative political and social systems, which go against my grain. As I grew intellectually, I started perceiving and analyzing every institution and political process around me as ideologically loaded, aimed at naturalizing an alien culture, academy, and manipulative political processes to coercively align Kashmir with the rest of India and creating local political elite whose allegiance to Delhi was its sole credential for governing the state by proxy. This was my state of mind for years before the armed struggle erupted in 1989. In response to people's overwhelming demand for the right to self-determination, all the other human rights were put under suspended animation and each violated with impunity by state-sponsored agencies. The horrendous atrocities on a mass scale, which included the brutal killings of my four cousins on August 15, 1993, catapulted me into human rights activism. Three cousins of mine in the age group of 20–40 were killed when they were frantically running to save their shop from the engulfing flames, as it had been set ablaze by personnel of the Indian Army in order to intimidate people against boycotting the celebration of the Independence Day of India. My fourth cousin, who was around 30 years old and mentally challenged, was burnt to death in his home with gun powder as he was almost immobile. While the rest of India was celebrating and memorializing the day it broke free of the tyrannical yoke of British rule, we, in Kashmir, were mourning its absence and the resultant repression that emanates from that situation. From this state of affairs, one can easily guess how many implicit and explicit curbs can stifle the expression of opinions and views that either run counter to the standard constructed official version of Kashmir reality or problematize it through critique.

In this chapter, I focus exclusively on how knowledge is constructed by restricting the freedom of speech and expression of intellectuals, opinion makers, media, and media persons in Kashmir, and manipulating democratic processes and even religious identity to suit integrative and statist politics. There are explicit controls on the expression of opinions and views that run counter to the official standard version of reality. First of all, I speak from my own experience. There is a shrillness of tone in my writing, a mannerism accentuated by the realization that there is a section of indigenous Kashmiri intellectuals and policy makers to back up my pronouncements.

In March 1996, I went to Geneva to present the human rights situation in Kashmir to the United Nations Commission for Human

Rights. Both before departure for Geneva and after arrival in New Delhi, I was detained at the airport, my passport was seized, and was returned after having been photocopied and registered in files of different agencies as well as the Home Ministry of India. Later, the Home Ministry of India sent directions to the J&K State Government to terminate my services at the University of Kashmir and to impound my passport. In October 2001, I was invited to participate in a panel discussion of what was then known as *Star TV English* (now *NDTV*) on Kashmir. The next day I was hounded by Intelligence Agencies, and the then Chief minister of the state Farooq Abdullah categorically told Jalis Khan Tareen, the vice chancellor of the University of Kashmir, that his government had taken strong exception to the views I had articulated on the *NDTV* panel discussion, and he was contemplating taking strict action against me. The vice chancellor, having been newly appointed, told the chief minister that in case of government harassment of one of his faculty members, he would willingly submit his resignation. The vice chancellor's authoritative refusal to kowtow to the diktats of the state government mercifully saved my academic career at the time. The same year I went to Pakistan to participate in a conference after a temporary passport was given to me for a year, for which I had to make persistent and persevering efforts. On my return, a case was made for my dismissal from the university by Intelligence Agencies that exercised their arbitrary authority in directing the government to take action against me. I vehemently pleaded the case against my dismissal, but the agencies stuck to their guns. It was, finally, Girish Saxena, governor at the time, who dismissed the case for fear that the issue of the arbitrary suspension of a faculty member at the University of Kashmir, for reasons other than academic, would get politicized. Unfortunately, even my colleagues at the University of Kashmir tried to keep at arm's length from me for fear of being accused of complicity with my activist stance. In such a debilitating atmosphere, even those who want to speak out on the situation withdraw into themselves.

I reiterate the point that I have emphatically made at various fora, and for which I have incurred the wrath of the state administration: laypeople at the state, national, and international levels are continuously being bombarded with disinformation and misinformation. Every ground reality is distorted to suit the state's own desired and capricious points of view. For example, the intensified and indigenous movement for freedom in the Kashmir Valley in the summer of 2010 was interpreted as the handiwork of the LeT (Lashkar-e-Taiba), a guerilla outfit that has pro-Pakistan leanings and espouses a

conservative religious ideology. The Indian Intelligence Agencies and Indian media, especially the satellite television channels, mislead the world that the demonstrations in the summer of 2010 were confined to three small areas of Kashmir, while the rest of the Valley was peaceful and explicitly against the resistance to the state. They claimed that the protests and civil disobedience were the handiwork of LcT militants. Nothing could be farther from the truth. I and other Kashmir observers like me witnessed that the demonstrations of summer 2010 spread far and wide, and it became impossible for the state to keep the factual situation under wraps as international media was bivouacked in Kashmir to cover the happenings. Even then every effort was made to gag the local media, both print and electronic, to stop the flow of news to other regions of J&K and India. Thousands of newspaper copies that highlighted the facticity of the civil unrest, and the virtual paralysis of the state government, in the wake of it, were confiscated. Implicit restrictions were placed on publishing and disseminating news about the public demonstrations and subsequent barbarous police retaliation, resulting in the deaths of teenagers and near-fatal firearm injuries to thousands of demonstrators. All the cable network channels were taken off the air, and the ban continued for a long time on the telecast of the local news from these channels. So far as the Indian national media is concerned, it has more often than not acted as a predator rather than the protector of human rights in Kashmir. It has so far blacklisted all the news about the genuine demands of people and killings at the hands of the “security forces.” It has, instead, acted as a mouthpiece of the Indian establishment’s hegemonic project by dubbing the mass mobilization of 2010, which demanded legitimate social and political transformations, as Pakistan sponsored.

In the past, when militancy in Kashmir was at its apex in the late 1980s and early 1990s, locals from the Valley and parts of Jammu province crossed over to Pakistan-administered Kashmir for training in arms and ammunition. Unfortunately, the militant past of the Valley colored the recent mobilization of people at the grass-roots level, and their call for a much-needed political transformation was interpreted as Pakistan-sponsored terrorism, which negated the movement’s indigenous nature and character. The mainstream media parroted lies, without compunction, by glossing over not only the rights movement launched by the people but also the crimes committed against humanity by the Indian Army, paramilitary forces, and the local police, all three of which were granted virtual carte blanche during this turbulent period. And whatever the mainstream media wrote

became the standard version of the political reality of Kashmir for the world. From 2008 onward, there really is no excuse for such mangled versions, as Kashmiris have, widely speaking, made a momentous shift from an armed to a peaceful struggle. It is people's power that speaks on the streets of the Valley and parts of Jammu province. Yet, broadly speaking, there has been a negligible change in the media stance, except for stray articles on the goings-on in Kashmir, and that too within the limits of "oppressive national interest." The investigative zeal of mainstream Indian media persons in other parts of the country gets converted in Kashmir into a desire for hunting, while Kashmiris become the savage hunted.

It salvages the reputations, public image, and credibility of those it covers by calling them [the Kashmiri protestors] LeT elements, paid agents and stone pelters. Kashmir and all its sufferings become the raw material for their creations. They create a kind of unreality. They process and filter events creating a distorted reflection that condenses the drama and pain of life in Kashmir into a form of entertainment. The unreality then has a profound impact on real events. It changes reality and in its distorted way, records the change and encourages the Indian audience to experience the same traits of insensitivity, sadism, and grandiosity as they experience themselves. The portrayal is safely contained and censored, and so well packaged that it often seems instigated. It captures, yet it robs the events of their reality. It makes everything neat when it is not. It summarizes events that are sprawled out in time and space, reduces suffering and danger to bite-sized moments and then swoops over to another scene, allowing the audience to glide effortlessly over events that really have great weight.¹

Television debates routinely distorted the issues involved in the 2010 Kashmir movement. Most of the debates revolved around the deficit of governance, which, I would posit, is actually an offshoot of the political uncertainty created by the supremacy of security apparatus, military control, manipulation of political processes like elections to the state assembly, and, above all, the unresolved Kashmir dispute. Most of the time, subterfuges are used to deflect attention from the main issue, and these replace the main direction of the debate, thereby constructing a knowledge that is suitable to power.

As against the mainstream Indian national media, the situation of local media practitioners deteriorated very sharply during the summer agitation, because manifestations of civil unrest in Kashmir invariably call forth the knee-jerk response of blaming the messenger, thereby making any form of repression of journalists and censorship of news perfectly permissible stratagems for restoring order and indoctrinating

the younger generation with a statist epistemology that distorts the basic issue. The publication and dissemination of newspapers wasn't allowed in the Valley for a dismal period of 30 days, from June until the end of September 2010. Photographers and news cameramen in Srinagar were assaulted as they sought to record the days' events. A lot of them suffered injuries of various degrees of seriousness, as security forces tried to restrain them from recording the ongoing demonstrations. On July 3, 2010, copies of the English daily *Greater Kashmir* and its Urdu edition, *Kashmir Uzma*, the largest circulating newspapers in the Valley, were seized as they were being readied for distribution. The Valley's media persons were confined to their homes for several days by an unrelenting curfew, while "media personnel flying in from Delhi were afforded armed protection and allowed considerable freedom of movement. It was as if the story of Kashmir - if at all it were to be told - could only be entrusted to the narrative skills of journalists enjoying the stamp of official approval."²

Seminars and conferences on the conflict were organized by government-sponsored nongovernmental organizations to further construct a knowledge that is a misrepresentation of the ground realities in Kashmir. Most of the participants in these seminars and conferences are those who tout official versions of the Kashmir imbroglio and uphold the parameters of the dominant discourse. Only a few non-statist voices are invited, and the concluding resolutions or recommendations reflect the paramountcy of the dominant perspective, the knowledge-power nexus. Prominent among these nongovernmental organizations are WISCOMP (Women in Security Conflict Management and Peace), CDR (Center for Dialogue and Reconciliation), Pugwash, an America-based nongovernmental organization, and many more.

Issues as well as nonissues get confounded not only in the media but also in seminars and workshops by generating an epistemology that is meant to create confusion about the basic issue, and confound not only the world but also Indians who have been deliberately kept in the dark about the real contours of the Kashmir conflict by the state machinery. That is the reason that when lay people from other parts of India visit Kashmir, they are confounded by a different kind of reality and knowledge, which the state agencies have always tried to hide from the general Indian public. They are shocked to see how the real issue has been distorted to create a scare of "national insecurity" and a threat to "the integrity of the nation." No objective analysis of either the resistance movement or the repressive tactics is allowed.

I am of the firm opinion that the advocacy or defense of human rights is not acceptable to the state. Any such effort is met with tortuous punishment, and even assassination. Some eminent people, like Advocate Jaleel Andrabi; Abdul Ahad Guru, cardiothoracic surgeon; Farooq Ahmed Ashai, orthopedist; and other lesser known people, were assassinated for advocating the right of self-determination for the people of Kashmir. Common people are manipulated by the engendering of public rhetoric on less contentious issues, which are designed to color opinions and judgments on the more combative issues.

I witness that travel documents are denied to people as a punishment for supporting the cause of the right to self-determination, thereby restricting their professional and intellectual growth and development, and disallowing news and the truth of the situation to come out from this blighted Valley. Some journalists and intellectuals are co-opted by the powers-that-be to act as local collaborators of the state machinery. Allegations of working against the “national interest” are leveled against those who not endorse the repressive policies of the state.. Such cases are innumerable. Counter-themes and terms are constructed to diffuse attention from the real problem and to construct an epistemology that is radically and essentially different from factuality.

To reiterate the thesis of my argument, analyses of television debates; the invited panelists; write-ups in the national English and vernacular papers, magazines, and reports from the government agencies; and, above all, reporting on the conflict by the national media, all are directed toward countering the voice of the marginalized. Knowledge economy is, again, constructed in a way that excludes the voice of the dominated. The following example reinforces my argument about muting the voice of the marginalized: research themes and topics in universities and other academic institutions are constructed to detract from the core of the conflict and, instead, engage with peripheral issues like the reasons people should opt for “peace” and “harmony,” or all the attention is focused on the external dimension, as the real trouble maker and the gross violations of human rights by the government’s “security agencies” are glossed over. I have observed that unprecedented militarization and its impact on the daily lives of people is not recognized as a legitimate research project, nor is the impact of Indian integrative and centrist politics. A number of topics were chosen by young research scholars on the Kashmir conflict that were not accepted by the concerned departments, like history, political science, economics, mass media, and literature.

To underscore the subscription to hegemonic discourse in academia, the Institute of Kashmir Studies was created at the University of Kashmir in 2008 with the explicit aim, I am of the opinion, to diminish the present history of Kashmir in trying to resuscitate the ancient history of Kashmir, which in my opinion is a revisionist view. It was brought under the rubric of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation Countries (SAARC) studies, and leaders of some South Asian countries were invited at its inauguration. The institute was generously funded by the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). Most of the research and doctoral work pursued at this institute is on the period of antiquity, whereas the contemporary period gets scant space in the research program of the institute, and whatever space is given, I argue, is used to misrepresent the history of the present century. There was resistance from some intellectuals, scholars, and journalists to its establishment, because it was perceived by them to be a tool of distorting our history and creating an epistemology that counters subaltern notions of the Kashmir conundrum. I am aware that this was an opinion not shared by all and sundry.

Another noteworthy point is that the Kashmir history that is taught in schools and colleges, and whatever portion figures in the syllabus of the master's program at the university, is filtered through the dominant perspective. Our children grow up almost rootless, because they are not taught anything about the historical past, collective memory, collective myths, and traditions of Kashmir. Hence, they grow up alienated from their political history, cultural history, and linguistic and literary history. Thanks to the resurgence of nationalism in Kashmir, the long-repressed history of Kashmir is forcing itself on the younger generation that gets educated about the past and present through the well-researched write-ups that have been appearing in local English and Urdu newspapers for the past many years. Besides, there is little focus on contemporary political developments in university curricula, so much so that in classrooms and research programs, our students are in touch with an unreal world. There is almost total disconnect between the outside world of Kashmir and what is being taught in the classrooms of history, mass media, literature, and the Institute of Kashmir Studies. Quality education is also denied to university students, so that they are little informed about the philosophical and critical debates in contemporary political, social, and economic disciplines, which prevents them from developing a critical understanding of contemporary reality.

The Kashmir conflict is fundamentally, I would posit, a deficit of democracy. It was not feasible for the Indian state to give greater democratic space to the people as popular sentiment was not with the political establishment. So people sought to exercise their right to choose a different political future. Political dissent, however, was perceived as betrayal, and thus forcibly suppressed. The ruling elite always resorted to various strategies to weaken the sentiment for democracy, to divide people among themselves, and to delegitimize those who spoke for different political options than the one that the establishment represents. It was, therefore, important to manage the knowledge economy, manipulate academia—the collective name for producing, manufacturing, publishing, and disseminating knowledge—and this has been efficiently done by the establishment. Management of religion was also an important part of controlling the knowledge economy.

The two ideologically oppositional forces in Kashmir, Islamist and Marxist, were brutally suppressed in the name of statist secularism. Religious dogmas were constructed and demonized to suit the agenda of the state. In order to fight Islamic epistemology, a constructed depoliticized and domesticated Sufi identity was projected as the “authentic” identity of Kashmiris. The official discourse openly supported so-called Sufi Islam, and groups that propagated this discursive formation were allowed to flourish. Historically, the ruling elite of Kashmir has actively patronized, I deem from my positionality, a culture that encouraged and politicized the veneration of relics, hagiographies, and worship of religious icons, all of which were used to generate funds for elections. I am not advocating a monologic identity for Kashmir, nor am I undermining the tremendously rich pluralistic culture of the Valley, but I would argue that the the fear and trepidation inspired by head priests at dominant mosques and shrines of the Valley have discouraged the creation of conceptual frameworks within which citizens could actively politicize their identities. Historically, venerated mosques and shrines in the Valley have been used as pulpits by politicos to propagate their political manifestoes. It would be remiss of me not to mention the sagacity of reviving a nationalist Kashmiri identity in the 1930s and 1940s by endowing the discourse of an anti-monarchical nationalism, which called for an evolved political and moral self-determination, with legitimacy by propounding it from the pulpits of esteemed places of worship. In that era, Islamic epistemology was conflated with the social and political message of mobilization, democratization, and progressive social change. In later decades, to the chagrin of progressive and, I might add, socialist

elements in Kashmir, the political and social transformative power of Islam was disempowered.

The standard operating procedure of an exclusionary regime is further manifested in the dearth of modern Kashmir history in the history text books taught in high schools and colleges. Currently, there is no department of philosophy, or critical social thought, at the University of Kashmir. Our native, official, and cultural languages—Kashmiri, Urdu, and Persian—are largely marginalized in academe. Students have little sense of history as it is not the focus of academic studies. Very few students hear the names of great Kashmiri philosophers, aesthetes, and litterateurs, and the rich galaxy of Kashmiri Persian scholars is relatively noncanonical.

At the risk of sounding clangorous, I would posit that the articulations and constructions of native identity in literary discourse, religious discourse, and cultural discourse are deemphasized. I am a witness to the richness of the research topics chosen by our budding scholars that dealt with exploring the streaks of resistance in literature produced by Kashmiri writers in Kashmiri, English, and Urdu languages, which were arbitrarily rejected by the authorized committees of various departments at the University of Kashmir.

It is unfortunate and disheartening that fundamental issues are derecognized and defanged by their incorporation into a completely different discourse. This is seen, especially, in the appropriation of the discourse of political self-determination by communalist discourse. The state has given a communalist turn to the Kashmir conflict from the very inception of the armed insurgency in 1989 and even before that, in the 1930s and 1940s, with the construction of Kashmiri nationalism. The communalist rhetoric strategically employed by state agencies has been used as an excuse to create mass hysteria that was further used to orchestrate the Kashmiri Pandit exodus in the early 1990s. Ironically, certain resistance/separatist forces, unwittingly or deliberately, have been playing foul by upholding an exclusivist interpretation of Islamic discourse while demonizing the religious “other,” the Kashmiri Brahmanical discourse. This demonization of the religious “other” is also a reaction to the communalist politics of New Delhi and complete disillusionment with Indian secularism. In the past two decades, Indian secularism has been a moribund force with the growing rabidity of an ultra-right-wing *Hindutva* in the country, which has assiduously been working on the construction of a unitary Hindu identity and making it synonymous with a unitary Indian nationalist identity. I observe with a great sense of despair that state-sponsored agencies have successfully underlined a polarized world

view in which Islamic identity and Hindu identity have been portrayed as irreconcilable and antagonistic opposites. I emphasize that the Islamist turn to the resistance movement is grounded in the artificially constructed and highly contested homogeneous Islamic identity of Kashmiris. The result has been the dilution of the political nature of the intractable Kashmir conundrum.

I would argue that from the very beginning of the Indian rule in Kashmir, elections have been manipulated to manufacture public consent for a political elite of collaborators, who more often than not have acted as puppets of the Indian state in Kashmir. There is, in fact, a complete lack of critical perspective on the practice of democracy in Kashmir, which has been acknowledged even by many Indian intellectuals, politicians, and civil society actors. The election process has become much more tortuous and repressive in J&K since the 1980s. In 1987, elections to the State Assembly were rigged, which provided a prelude to the armed struggle in Kashmir.³ This was the beginning of coalition government in the state. It is a widely held belief that the elections were massively rigged. The Rajiv Gandhi-led Congress and the Farooq Abdullah-led National Conference had to share the power thus assumed, and that duplicitous manifestation of electoral politics caused political instability, chaos, and confusion in the state. This move literally split identities and destroyed whatever cohesiveness there was in the three regions of the state: Jammu, Kashmir, and Ladakh. It is my well-informed opinion that in 1996, elections to the State Assembly were the most unholy and the most repressive process in which people in rural areas were coerced to cast their votes. I vividly recall that this process was so repressive and tormenting for the electorate that newspapers at the time wrote about the irony that the people of J&K were now demanding a right *not* to vote. A mandate was created for the Farooq Abdullah-led National Conference to form the government in charge, while the real authority was vested in the security apparatus transplanted in Kashmir by the Government of India. I, as a political activist, have witnessed that this is how a façade of democracy is created, and the same is sold to the international media and international community, which grossly contradicts the ground realities in Kashmir.

In 1996, elections to the State Assembly were a tortuous process, for the most part, as these were conducted after political, judicial, and social institutions had collapsed in the Kashmir Valley and parts of the Jammu Province. The Indian state was bent on managing and manipulating a democratic mandate for itself after a long spell of presidential rule in the wake of the eruption of militancy in the state. First of all, all

the political activists from the separatist camp were arrested, including Hurriyat leaders.⁴ I was very sick those days when my husband, Naeem Khan, a prominent Hurriyat leader, was also arrested and taken to a far-off place, while I was alone at home. So I felt compelled to go to my parents' house in Tral, in the district of Pulwama.

Elections were conducted in phases in a small place like Kashmir. All the areas were curfew bound except the one in which polling was conducted in phases. Polling was stretched over two months from September up to October, and a *tehsil* or administrative division from the Jammu Province and one from Kashmir were clubbed together for polling on a particular day to show heavy polling, in spite of hardly any polling by people in the Valley. I must emphasize that the opinions I articulate here are based on my findings, which some may discount. On the day of polling in our town, personnel of Indian Army came early in the morning to warn people, first on the megaphone and then going from door to door to threaten them of dire consequences in case they failed to turn up for voting. People knew that the punishment would be terrible, and therefore, some people showed up, out of fear, at polling booths to vote, but most of them destroyed their votes. Later, Indian Army personnel door-crashed into people's homes to check the ink marks, which are put on either the index fingers or thumbs of electors after they cast their votes, and beat and tortured those who had no ink marks. Most of the votes, according to local eye witnesses, were cast by the so-called security forces. People were summoned to army camps and persecuted routinely for months together for not having cast their votes. It was in this scenario that people cried for a right not to vote.

Before 1998, the people of J&K would willingly come out to vote, because UN resolutions on Kashmir specifically say that until a plebiscite for the future political dispensation is held in the state, election to the State Assembly for the formation of an ad hoc government should be put in place in order to constitute a legislative and administrative authority. But after 1989, the Government of India brazenly propagated far and wide that elections had ratified Indian control on Kashmir, which, I would like to make my reader aware, is a blatantly gross misrepresentation of the will of the people. I might sound abrasive, but as an analytical and politically informed activist, I contend without fear of retribution that even the 2002 and 2008 elections to the State Legislative Assembly were manipulated in such an elaborate way that it needs a separate volume to expound on the skullduggery and chicanery experienced by constituents during those events. From conversations with relatives, acquaintances, and observes

of the electoral process and from my personal experience, I underline that the army went from door to door in villages and towns to tell people to vote or else to be prepared to face punitive action. Again, during the 2002 and 2008 State Assembly elections, political activists were detained and curfew clamped in all the areas except the one where polling was to take place. What is a lesser known fact is that the army was omnipresent in manipulating elections in very insidious ways. During those elections, in towns and Srinagar city, not even 3 percent votes were cast by people, according to eye witnesses and journalists who were covering the elections and with whom I interacted. I reinforce these findings with my personal testimony, as I personally visited polling booths and found most of the booths in Srinagar city as well as in some places closer to Srinagar almost empty. Despite this dismal performance, the Government of India categorically claimed that 60 percent votes had been cast in the Valley.

This is how elections are manipulated in a “democratic” set-up, consent is manufactured, and hegemony established. The “truths,” thus, manufactured are packaged and then passed on to not only the world community but also to the Indian public. This is how the political identity of Kashmiris is constructed through the manipulation of elections, not only in terms of how governments are formed and mandate managed for the “political elite” of the state, but also how election, which has a limited mandate of forming a state government, is projected as a substitute for plebiscite for determining the people’s will for the future dispensation of the state.

Through my very personal argument, in which I have spoken from the heart, I have attempted to illustrate my understanding of the manufacture of consent and constitution of knowledge by exclusion, which is further highlighted by the mainstream Indian and Pakistani understanding of the Kashmir problem in the media, academia, and academic writings by “nationalist” historians and journalists.

NOTES

1. S. S. Bukhari, “Indian Media: An Instrument of Sadism,” *Greater Kashmir*, September 14, 2010.
2. “View Point of Fact-Finding Team,” *Rising Kashmir*, November 22, 2010.
3. Editor’s Note: During the 1987 elections, the Muslim United Front (MUF) laid emphasis on regionalism and cultural pride, enabling it to woo a large number of Kashmiri youth who felt alienated from other regional organizations. The MUF was an unwieldy coalition of

non-mainstream, antiestablishment groups, and it remained a structureless organization besieged by multiple and intractable political ideologies.

4. Editor's Note: In 1993 over 30 political organizations joined hands to form a coalition group known as the All Parties Hurriyat Conference (APHC). The APHC comprised Syed Ali Shah Geelani of the Jamaat-e-Islami, Abdul Ghani Lone of the People's Conference, Maulvi Abbas Ansari of the Liberation Council, and Professor Abdul Ghani Bhat of the Muslim Conference. This conglomerate was headed by the then teenaged religious leader of the Awami Action Committee, Maulvi Omar Farooq. The commonality that bound these politicians and religious leaders of disparate ideologies was the necessity of giving the people of India-administered Jammu and Kashmir the right of self-determination. The various components of the APHC were at loggerheads about whether independence, or accession to Pakistan, or return to the pre-1953 status for J&K within the Indian Union was the most viable option.

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